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     Abstract 
The end of World War II was the beginning of an era of promises being made for the 
protection of human rights. Since then, the international community has established a 
variety of legal instruments that aim to achieve this protection. These legal 
instruments at the international level provide certain standards for states to fulfil, such 
as the right to a fair trial and prohibition of arbitrary detention. Despite the growing 
international human rights network including several official and non-official actors, 
non-compliance with international protection standards by states is still a serious 
challenge within the system. The ever-enlarging literature on international law 
compliance theories persistently seeks to find ways to overcome this problem.  
Immigration detention of children, one of the human rights issues on which 
the international network has provided guidance to states, has been practiced by 
Turkish and British immigration authorities for a considerable period of time. This 
practice has been justified on the grounds of efficient immigration control. 
Nevertheless, these two countries recently took legislative steps towards compliance 
with international human rights standards regarding immigration detention of minors. 
This research investigated these processes in Turkey and the UK to find out whether 
there were any actors that influenced the decision to change legislation by applying a 
selected compliance theory that focuses on socialisation between various actors such 
as courts and international monitoring bodies and the state. It was clear that these two 
very different countries reached the same conclusions via distinct routes, in reference 
to different reasons and motivations. While the theory’s predictive value showed only 
limited success in the UK’s case due to its reliance on socialisation and international 
law, it had high explanatory power for Turkey’s case. Nonetheless, it still 
demonstrated the importance of identifying actors capable of influencing decision-
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
CHAPTER 1.1. COMPLIANCE THEORIES 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1 adopted in 1948, was the 
beginning of an era of promises for the protection of human rights. Since this date, the 
international community has established a variety of legal instruments that aim to 
achieve this protection.2 Several rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights laid out a background for many international treaties.3 In 2017, we cannot 
point to a state that has not ratified at least one international human rights treaty.4 
Although we have this expanding international network between states to protect 
human rights, we have a serious problem: non-compliance.  
Compliance can be defined as ‘sustained behaviour and domestic practices 
that conform to the international human rights norms’.5 It is not guaranteed that 
ratification of a treaty will be followed by compliance. 6  Even though some 
international treaties have their own monitoring bodies in order to follow up states’ 
actions in relation to the treaty requirements, they do not have the authority to enforce 
the obligations defined under these treaties. Thus, states are the sole decision-makers 
regarding their compliance. This has led many scholars to develop research in order to 
identify the rationale of states towards compliance.  
This research brought several different compliance theories that can be 
grouped under rational actor, normative and recent models. In general, the difference 
among these models is very important to note. Whereas rational actor and normative 
                                                
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) 
(UDHR). 
2 Emilie M Hafner-Burton, ‘International Regimes for Human Rights’ (2012) 15 Annual Review of 
Political Science 265. 
3 Some examples of these international treaties: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 
January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 
 (CERD) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 
18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) UNGA Res 34/180 (CEDAW).  
4 ‘Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties’ (OHCHR) <http://indicators.ohchr.org/> 
accessed 4 September 2017.  
5 Thomas Risse and Stephen C Ropp, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in Thomas Risse and others 
(eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2013) 9. 
6 Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) 111 The Yale Law 
Journal 1935; Emilie M Hafner‐Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, ‘Human Rights in a Globalizing World: 
The Paradox of Empty Promises’ (2005) 110 American Journal of Sociology; Hafner-Burton (n 2). 
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models analyse the situations regarding compliance with international law in general, 
recent models have shifted their focus specifically on cases of compliance with 
human rights’ treaties. This change of focus required new techniques and perceptions 
for recent models. Hence, this chapter also aims to touch upon these different 
perceptions of recent models.  
I. RATIONAL ACTOR MODELS 
a. Realism 
 
There are several different perspectives to explain states’ compliance. Rational actor 
models such as realism, institutionalism and liberalism have their own way of 
examining compliance of states. These models are described as rational actor models 
since these theories share this assumption that states are rational self-interested actors 
that can calculate costs and benefits of their actions.7 
To start with, realist theory8 defines states as unitary actors who mainly search 
for power and security.9 For this reason, international politics is a ground for anarchy 
where states as unitary actors seek power. Realists believe that power should be 
controlled in order to minimise the danger of its misuse for the exploitation of 
others.10 On the other hand, realism does not believe in pacifism or power-neutral 
administration. Although the use of power results unavoidably in evil, this is not an 
excuse for actors not to exercise their power, realists believe. The reason for this is 
that the anarchic environment in the international system brings a real conflict or 
potential uncertainty that states must always be fully prepared for a potential war.11 
They describe power as the currency of the international system.12 For this reason, 
power as a phenomenon should be used but controlled at the same time.  
                                                
7 Hathaway (n 6) 1944. 
8  For a discussion of classical realism, see Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations 
(Cambridge University Press 2000); Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace (A. A. Knopf 1948); Michael C Williams, Realism Reconsidered (Oxford University 
Press 2007); Edward Hallett Carr and Michael Cox, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2010).  
9 Joseph M Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism’ (1988) 42 International Organization 485. 
10 Morgenthau (n 8) xxi-xxii. 
11 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ (1995) 6 European Journal 
of International Law 503, 507. 
12 ibid. 
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Realism at analytic framework level excludes transnational actors such as 
global corporations and non-governmental organisations in terms of their influence on 
states.13 For this reason, international institutions cannot play a meaningful role in this 
power driven and anarchic environment.14 According to this view, the reason why 
states comply with international law is only that compliance is coincidentally parallel 
with states’ self-interest.15 For this reason, realists claim that the wording of many 
international legal documents such as the Charter of the United Nations16 is mostly 
vague and uncertain due to the necessity of finding a common ground for national 
interests of various states.17 For instance, the priority of self-interest shows itself in 
the Nine Power Treaty relating to Principles and Policies to be followed in Matters 
concerning China18 which recognised the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
China. This treaty was signed by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, the 
Republic of China, France, Italy, Imperial Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal in 
order to stabilise the distribution of power relating to China.19 The contracting parties 
signed this treaty prioritising their self-interests, which were mainly keeping strong 
trade relations with China. Hence, the territorial integrity of China was the main focus 
of the treaty, yet the reason for ratification by states was different.  
b. Liberalism 
 
Another existing international law theory, liberalism, argues that states are composed 
of many different dynamics instead of being unitary actors.20 Hence, we have to 
comprehend different groups such as state actors or interest groups in a state in order 
to reason states’ actions in general. Social ideas, interests and institutions have an 
impact on state behaviour in the sense that they frame state preferences.21 This is why 
liberalism assumes that there is a certain level of interdependency in states’ 
                                                
13 ibid.  
14 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill 1979) 118. 
15 Morgenthau (n 8). 
16 The Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XV1. 
17 Morgenthau (n 8) 289. 
18 Principles and Policies Concerning China (signed 6 February 1922, entered into force 5 August 
1925) 44 Stat. 2113 (Nine Power Treaty). 
19 Morgenthau (n 8) 52. 
20 For a detailed discussion on liberalism, see Slaughter (n 11) 503; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking 
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’ (1997) 51 International Organization 
513, 513. 
21 Moravcsik (n 20). 
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decisions.22 Liberalism emphasises the interdependence between actors and different 
ways of putting pressure on national governments by individuals and groups. States’ 
preferences are dependent on the representation of individual and group actors’ 
preferences.23 States’ compliance, thus, depends on the interrelated relations between 
domestic actors, i.e. domestic politics is key to determining states’ compliance instead 
of states’ self-interests as is claimed by realism.24 For this reason, states become 
aware of other states’ domestic political processes and legislative participation in 
order to be able to influence states’ behaviour.25 This can be seen in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade26 (GATT) negotiations. During the Uruguay Round 
of negotiations, some negotiators from a number of states were in close contact with 
US senators based in Washington in order to bring an agreement, due to US senators’ 
influence on this process.27  
If adapted to human rights treaties’ compliance, the liberal view would claim 
that these treaties must influence states’ action through influencing domestic 
interests. 28  Ratification of a treaty brings an international legal obligation that 
domestic interest groups can employ in order to put pressure on the governments 
through conformity with that specific norm.29 Therefore, liberalism asserts that it is 




The third theory of existing international law literature is institutionalism. This theory 
sees states as rational unitary actors like realism.30 However, different from realism, 
institutionalism believes that there is a potential cooperation between states. 
Moreover, international institutions can initiate this type of cooperation.31 According 
                                                
22 ibid 520. 
23 Slaughter (n 11) 508.  
24 Hathaway (n 6) 1954. 
25 Slaughter (n 11) 531. 
26 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (signed 30 October 1947, entered into force 1 January 1948) 
55 UNTS 187 (GATT).  
27 Slaughter (n 11) 531. 
28 Hathaway (n 6) 1954. 
29 ibid. 
30 Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton University Press 1984) 25; Robert M Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books 
2006). 
31 Andrew T Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’ (2002) 90 California Law 
Review 1823, 1840. 
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to this theory, institutions facilitate the cooperation between states by restricting the 
power of states in the short term in order to achieve long-term goals.32 Hereby, states 
decide to comply with international law ‘as the result of rational self-interested 
behaviour on the part of states, the result of a reasoned weighing of the costs and 
benefits of alternative modes of action’.33 Thereby, unlike realism, institutionalism 
considers that states are open to cooperation with other states in order to achieve their 
self-interests in the long run.  
As regards human rights treaties, this model asserts that states comply with 
their international legal obligations as they tend to protect their reputation. Since a 
state’s reputation has an intrinsic value with potential benefits, states do not usually 
tend to damage this reputation. A state that has a reputation for general compliance 
with its international obligations will be perceived as a cooperative state by other 
states.34 This will allow binding promises to happen between cooperative states.  
II. NORMATIVE MODELS 
a. Legitimacy theory  
 
Normative models believe in ‘the persuasive power of legitimate legal obligations’.35 
In order to comprehend states’ action fully, we should be looking at the impact and 
importance of the ideas as suggested by normative models. Simple calculations of 
interests by rational actor models cannot define the situation fully according to 
normative models.  
Thomas Franck’s theory, called legitimacy theory, believes that states follow 
rules as long as rules are fair.36 To make sure that rules are fair, they should be created 
and implemented in the right process. This right process has four paradigms, ‘states 
are sovereign and equal; their sovereignty can only be restricted by consent; consent 
binds; and states, in joining the international community, are bound by the ground 
rules of community’.37 There is a strong connection between fairness and legitimacy 
                                                
32  Robert O Keohane, 'The Demand for International Regimes’ in Stephen D. Krasner 
(ed), International Regimes (Cornell University Press 1983) 141. 
33 Hathaway (n 6) 1951. 
34 Guzman (n 31) 1849. 
35 Hathaway (n 6) 1955. 
36 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press 1998). 
37 ibid 26. 
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of rules and tendency of states towards compliance, legitimacy theory claims.  
According to Franck, there are four signs for rules to have legitimacy: 
determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence.38 Determinacy offers an 
unambiguous and transparent message within the rule for states. This principle can be 
seen in the hearing between Nicaragua and the United States before the International 
Court of Justice in the 1980s.39 The US had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice. However, there was a ‘Connally reservation’ stating 
that the US does not have to answer to any suit regarding matters within its domestic 
jurisdiction.40 For this reason, when Nicaragua opened a lawsuit against the US after 
the mining of Nicaragua’s harbours, the US attorneys were not able to use the 
Connally reservation and had to accept ICJ’s jurisdiction in this matter. The 
determinacy of the term domestic was vital in the failure of the US attorneys in this 
litigation.  
Symbolic validation, on the other hand, suggests the existence of an authority 
in the sense that there is a community that should follow these rules. The United 
Nations’ flag and emblem on peacekeeping forces is a relevant example of symbolic 
validation as this has provided a certain level of protection for peacekeeping forces on 
hostile territories like the Golan Heights. Coherence, on the other hand, means that 
the rule is applicable to similar cases and all rules are interrelated to each other 
uniformly. The Most Favoured Nation 41  principle within the GATT brings a 
consistency to this treaty by banning states from giving benefits to only some states.  
Adherence, lastly, brings a bond between a single primary rule and a pyramid 
of secondary rules that manage the creation and implementation of such rules within 
the community. The Vienna Convention on Treaties42 is an illustration of this point. 
This treaty brings the obligation of honouring treaty commitments. However, if this 
was the only source of pacta sunt servanda’s43 legitimacy, then this would allow a 
state, which is not the member state of this treaty, to disregard all the treaty 
                                                
38 ibid 31-42. 
39 ibid 32.  
40 The Resolution and Declaration filed expressly exclude: ‘Disputes with regards to matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States as determined by the United States.’ 
41 GATT (n 26) art 1.  
42 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (signed 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331. 
43 Pacta sunt servanda is a basic principle of international law meaning ‘agreements must be kept’. 
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obligations by which it is bound. In practice, states still obey their treaty obligations 
whether or not they ratify the Vienna Convention. They honour their treaty 
commitments due to their membership of a community in which the sacredness of 
treaty obligations is a value.  Legitimacy theory assumes that this tie would bring a 
better rate of compliance as the procedural and institutional framework supports rules. 
Overall, the presence of these four factors results in a push on states towards 
compliance.   
b. Constructivism 
Constructivism’s fundamental approach is that state behaviour is shaped by beliefs, 
norms and identities.44 States’ identities are not a given, as realism and liberalism 
postulate, instead they are created through the actors’ interactions. The ideas and 
discourses in society can have an impact on interests and identities of states. 
Alexander Wendt, as one of the main constructivists, refutes the neo-realist theory’s 
presentation of anarchy as an inherent part of the international environment.45 Instead, 
Wendt believes that anarchy is how states’ view it. States’ interaction with different 
states depends on the collective meanings between those two actors instead of 
describing such interactions as anarchy.46 He cites as an example the difference in 
Canada and Cuba’s perceptions of U.S. military power in spite of their similar 
structural positions. This derives from the understandings and expectations that 
establish their ideas of themselves and others. He believes that if the Soviet Union and 
the United States decided to be friends instead of enemies, the Cold War would be 
over instead of anarchy prevailing.47  
 According to Wendt, interaction between two states would require several 
different dynamics rather than a linear action. The first element in this interaction 
would be inter-subjective expectations and understandings of the states towards each 
other. This would be complemented by the process of the interaction itself, including 
the incentive for interaction, their definition of the situation, action and interpretation 
of this action.  Hence, the international environment is shaped and reshaped 
constantly through these transactions.  
                                                
44 Stephen M. Walt, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’ (1998) 110 Foreign Policy 
29, 38. 
45 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ 
(1992) 46 International Organization 391, 394. 
46 ibid 398. 
47 ibid 397. 
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  Recently, Martha Finnemore built her approach on constructivist theory in 
relation to international politics and established a ground for emphasising the 
international structure of meaning and value instead of power.48 She argues that we 
need to look at the international structure of which a state is a part, in order to 
understand what states prefer. States are tangled in transnational and international 
networks that shape their perceptions and preferences. 
Her contribution to the literature was the focus on the role of international 
organisations in this social structure. She presents international organisations as 
bureaucracies in a sense that they are fundamental actors that have autonomy and 
power.49 International organisations can use material coercion and information to 
have an impact on states. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can 
push states to adopt some policies through their financial resources.50 They also 
manipulate information in order to influence more powerful states that cannot be 
influenced by material interests. She gives the example that a cease-fire certified by 
UN peacekeepers would be more secure as there is a risk of being caught if the 
ceasefire is broken.  
c. Managerial Model 
 
This model, brought by Chayes and Chayes, presumes that states tend to comply with 
their international treaty obligations instead of depending on effective threats to put 
pressure on states.51 According to this theory, there are three distinct considerations 
that bring this presumption: efficiency, interests and norms. States spend their 
resources and time on the matters that are important to them. For this reason, if a state 
spends its resources and time, it must have an interest in this issue in order to be 
efficient. However, interests cannot be only limited to state’s interests as states are 
composed of different actors and so different interests. This makes the negotiation 
process long and complicated. For instance, the UN Environment Program organised 
the first conference on stratospheric ozone in 1977 and the Vienna Convention on the 
                                                
48 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Cornell University Press 2017) 10.  
49 Michael N Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World (Cornell University Press 2004) 3. 
50 ibid 6.  
51 Abram Chayes and Antonia H Chayes, The New Sovereignty (Harvard University Press 1996) 3-6. 
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Protection of the Ozone Layer52 was not adopted until 1985.53 This lengthy process 
was due to the difficulty of finding a common ground for every related group in the 
negotiation process.  
Chayes and Chayes claim that as long as state is looking for efficiency and is 
interested in the same norms as an international treaty enshrines, the state has an 
intention to comply with the treaty obligations. It states that actors comply with the 
norms since there is an obligation to obey legal norms even there is no threat for 
punishment. However, they also believe that during the negotiation and treaty-making 
process, states devote their time and resources not only to limiting their own 
commitment but also to ensuring other states’ non-compliance more difficult.54 
Therefore, this is two-folded process.  
Against this assumption of the tendency to comply with international treaty 
obligations, there are still cases of non-compliance in practice. This model asserts that 
non-compliance happens where there is a lack of capacity on the state side; vague 
treaty language and a transitional period for social and economic changes required for 
compliance. For this reason, ‘managed compliance’ is suggested to prevent the 
occurrences of these cases.  
First of all, cases of lack of state capacity to comply can be easily managed by 
providing technical and financial assistance to these specific states. The most notable 
case of this solution is the Montreal Protocol.55 Four years after the adoption of the 
Montreal Protocol, it was found out that only half the member states complied with 
the treaty requirement of reporting their annual chlorofluorocarbon consumption.56 In 
order to investigate this low level of compliance, the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on 
Reporting was established. The results of the investigation illustrated that most of the 
non-complying states were not capable of reporting without any technical assistance 
from the treaty organisation. In the end, this non-compliance issue was solved by 
providing the necessary technical and financial assistance to the developing countries.  
                                                
52 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (signed 22 March 1985, entered into force 
22 September 1988) 1513 UNTS 323. 
53 Chayes and Chayes (n 51) 182.  
54 ibid 187. 
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The ambiguity of treaty language, as the second ‘cause’ of non-compliance, 
can be solved with an improvement of dispute settlement mechanisms. The case 
between Japan and the US on the GATT exemplifies this point.57 The GATT bans any 
member states from imposing quotas on imports.58 When Japanese exports of steel 
reached high levels and resulted in heated reaction from domestic producers in the 
United States, US trade lawyers proposed the voluntary restraint agreement in which 
Japanese exporters agreed to limit their steel sales to the US instead of facing a strict 
quota. Hence, US lawyers found an indirect way to manage this issue that could have 
led to non-compliance by the US.  
The last suggested reason for non-compliance is the temporal dimension of 
social and economic changes required by the treaty. This model suggests transparency 
as the potential management strategy to manipulate member states towards 
compliance with treaty agreements.59 For instance, the Vienna Convention on the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer60 brought one general obligation for member states to 
cooperate in research, exchange information and adopt domestic policies in line with 
the protection of the ozone layer ‘in accordance with the means at their disposal and 
their capabilities’.61 Two years later, scientific findings showed the damaging effect 
of CFCs on the ozone layer, and the Montreal Protocol negotiations supported a 50 
per cent reduction from 1986 by 2000. In June 1990, the member states agreed to 
reach the target by the target date. Hence, transparency in treaty obligations and 
giving enough time for temporal changes required by a treaty can prevent non-
compliance by states.  
Overall, the managerial model brought the concept of managed compliance 
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and so suggested that there are possible ways of avoiding non-compliance by member 
states. As a whole, these actions listed above will help to persuade non-complying 
countries to comply with international law.  
d. Transnational Legal Model  
 
The most recent normative theory was Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal 
process.62 This is described as ‘the complex process of institutional interaction 
whereby global norms are not just debated and interpreted, but ultimately internalized 
by domestic legal systems.’63 This internalisation process has three defined phases. 
The first phase will be the interaction provoked by one or more transnational actors to 
another. This interaction will bring an interpretation of the specific norm. Thereby, 
the moving party pursues other party’s internalisation of the new interpretation of that 
norm. This type of transaction brings a legal rule that can be applied to the future 
interactions between transnational actors. Future interactions will bring further 
internalisation of the norms.  
A clear example of this is the reinterpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty. The ABM Treaty64 was signed in 1972 between the US and Soviet Union that 
banned space-based systems for territorial defence. In 1983, the US proposed the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that provided for a space-based anti-ballistic missile 
system for territorial defence. Furthermore, the US suggested reinterpreting the ABM 
treaty to allow SDI without the Soviet Union and Senate’s consent. This caused an 
eight-year discussion and this proposal was revoked in the end. To Koh, transnational 
legal process can explain this process. 65  Transnational actors and several non-
governmental organisations formed an ‘epistemic community’ to mobilise different 
elite constituencies and triggered interactions with the US Government. They 
questioned the proposal for a reinterpretation in public and private settings and 
managed to use the narrow interpretation in legislative texts. Finally, the executive 
branch also had to internalise this narrow interpretation into their policy. 
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The application of this theory into the human rights regime and international 
arena is straightforward according to Koh. He argues that the increasing number of 
actors within this interaction and interpretation process can help to promote 
compliance of states with human rights treaties. Intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organisations’ participation in this process will bring further 
internalisation of international norms by states. Overall, like all other normative 
models mentioned above, Koh’s transnational legal process theory depends on 
voluntary obedience instead of coercion.  
III. RECENT COMPLIANCE MODELS 
 
So far, rational actor and normative models explained compliance cases with regards 
to international law. They based their argument on the principle of reciprocity 
between participating states at international law level. However, there is a lack of 
reciprocity between states in human rights treaties. When states sign and ratify a 
human rights treaty, this does not bring any responsibilities towards other states. 
Therefore, the approaches adopted by rational actor and normative models find it 
challenging to explain state behaviour with regard to human rights treaties. Recent 
models have emerged out of recognition of this key difference, and have focused their 
approach towards solely human rights treaties.  
a. Spiral Model 
 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s theory of compliance is called the ‘spiral model’.66 The 
spiral model established five distinct phases during socialisation processes: 
repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status and rule-consistent 
behaviour.  
Repression is the phase where the leaders of states suppress the society. 
During this phase, domestic advocacy groups are repressed and powerless. Denial as 
the second phase occurs if transnational groups can gather adequate information on 
human rights violations in order to facilitate the advocacy process at an international 
level and inform international society. In this process, states generally deny human 
rights violations and refuse to recognise the validity of international human rights 
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norms. However, this model argued that denial process is valuable in the sense that 
there is an emerging conversation between international institutions and states. 
Following this stage, tactical concessions is the process whereby states take steps 
towards compliance in order to scale down the pressure coming from international 
human rights community. Tactical concessions can be signing up to international 
treaties or showing tolerance to mass demonstrations. During this stage, domestic 
advocacy groups improve their networking at domestic and international level and 
adopt human rights as domestic discourse. Therefore, this model indicated that this 
process results in further empowerment of domestic advocacy groups and assisting 
their rapid mobilisation. In the fourth phase, states accept the validity of international 
human rights norms and tend to make amendments in domestic law under the 
continuous mobilisation of the advocacy network at international level. Human rights 
norms become a part of state and bureaucratic discourse. After this phase, rule-
consistent behaviour occurs, which was defined as behavioural change and sustained 
compliance with international human rights. 67  Thus, this model stated that 
compliance with international human rights norms arises as a result of local pro-
change groups’ success in influencing international support, which leads a victory 
over domestic opponents. In this scenario, international institutions and domestic pro-
compliance groups use each other’s work in order to pressure states towards 
compliance.68  
There are several states looked at through the lens of the spiral model by 
different scholars. For instance, China as an example is worth mentioning. The 
scholars claimed that China is now in phase three of the spiral model: tactical 
concessions.69 After the Tiananmen massacre70 in 1989, China started participating 
actively in the international human rights community in order to lessen the negative 
publicity at international level. It passed a series of governmental white papers on 
human rights and two human rights action plans. It also files reports to treaty bodies 
and faced a public review in 2009 regarding human rights issues in China under the 
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Human Rights Council’s mandate. It is significant that it started giving tactical 
concessions and taking positive steps. Although there is no firm evidence that China 
is moving towards to the fourth phase of spiral model, some scholars believe that 
China is taking steps towards the fourth phase.  
b. Material Inducement, Persuasion and Acculturation 
 
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, in their book, suggest that a model-based theory is 
necessary in order to capture the process by which international law influences states 
to promote human rights. 71 It suggests that there is a socialisation mechanism among 
states, international organisations, institutions and non-governmental organisations. 
The theory can be used to analyse the change in state behaviour in the case of a 
substantial interaction between a state and a relevant actor. Also, international law 
should be the fundamental element of this interaction in the sense that the relevant 
actor refers to international law to convince state to comply. They recognised three 
separate mechanisms as the drivers of state behaviour: material inducement, 
persuasion and acculturation. While putting special emphasis on acculturation as a 
distinct mechanism, they did not necessarily prioritise acculturation or present it as 
the most ideal mechanism. Nevertheless, their aim is to improve the understanding of 
these three mechanisms in general in order to improve the theory of international 
law’s impact. 
Material inducement is the process whereby the introduction of material costs 
and material benefits influence state behaviour.72 Therefore, states and institutions can 
force states to comply with the standards of human rights through material rewards 
and punishments. The material interest of states is the main push towards compliance 
in this mechanism. Material inducement concentrates mostly on military or economic 
sanctions as the principal machinery to change state behaviour. 73 Accordingly, 
criticism brought by international monitoring bodies and domestic actors does not 
have a meaningful weight on state behaviour since it does not engage with any type of 
material sanctions. Although they might cause some sort of reputational damage, they 
would lack monetary sanctions, which is important for the material inducement 
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approach. For instance, when the United States adopts the principle of not providing 
foreign assistance to states that ‘are engaging in a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognised human rights’74 under its Foreign Assistance 
Act, the US openly employed material inducement to change other states’ behaviour 
by changing the cost-benefit calculations of those states.75 This change normally 
occurs through an involuntary acceptance rather than a voluntary one.  
The second mechanism recognised by Goodman and Jinks is persuasion. 
Psychologists and sociologists describe persuasion as a social influence mechanism. 
They suggested that behaviour of a state could be changed through social learning and 
other forms of information exchange between actors. This is defined as the process 
‘whereby target actors are convinced of the truth, validity, or appropriateness of a 
norm, belief, or practice’.76 In this scenario, states actively evaluate the content of a 
particular norm and change their opinions about this norm depending on the 
compatibility of that norm with their current beliefs.  
This could happen through framing or cuing. With regards to framing, states 
can more likely be persuaded if the issue is reframed in order to associate it with their 
current norms. Three elements play a crucial role in this process: centrality, 
experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity. Centrality means how essential 
the beliefs or norms related to the message are to the target state. Experiential 
commensurability regards to the extent to which the message is related to the life and 
experiences of the target state. Narrative fidelity is about the extent to which the 
message relates to fundamental ideologies already embraced in the target states’ 
social context. These three elements can determine whether the target state will be 
persuaded or not. Secondly, cuing is the other micro process to persuade the target 
actors. States can be persuaded through cuing in order to think harder about the 
advantages of that specific norm or message. When actors are introduced to new 
information, they are more likely to think, reflect and argue that information. 
Psychological empirical studies have shown that actors often tend to change their 
beliefs when they are exposed to new information.  
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At the end of the persuasion process, states that are already persuaded 
internalise these new norms and practices. They, thus, adjust their interests and 
identities according to these new norms. For the persuasion mechanism, 
managerialism theory, suggested by Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, is the 
means for promotion of objectives.77 Managerialism theory asserted that states could 
change their behaviour ‘by systematically engaging governments in discussion about 
controversial practices and (2) by fostering structural opportunities for transnational 
networks to engage governments (or other relevant audiences)’.78 According to this 
view, monitoring mechanisms such as periodic state reports can have a valuable 
impact on state behaviour as it encourages persuasion and increases the engagement 
of states.  
The final social influence mechanism on state behaviour is acculturation. 
Based on social psychological studies, Goodman and Jinks brought a set of related 
social processes together to define acculturation. Acculturation assumes that actors 
are induced to embrace the behavioural practices around them and this happens 
through pressures to conform by other actors. With regards to state behaviour, they 
proposed that states adopt behavioural norms of the surrounding culture without the 
influence of material benefits and punishments or through persuasion.79  Unlike 
persuasion, acculturation relies on the relationship of the target actor to a reference 
group or a wider cultural environment.80 The reference group’s views play a very 
important role in the way the target actor would act. 
Instead, acculturation occurs through cognitive and social pressures. Firstly, 
actors are generally compelled to conform, according to cognitive studies. Therefore, 
cognitive pressure comes from the inner self in two ways: a) social-psychological 
costs of nonconformity and b) social-psychological benefits of conformity. For 
instance, when people experience cognitive dissonance, defined as the discomfort due 
to holding two or more inconsistent cognitions, their reaction will be the basic human 
need to rationalise their actions to themselves and others. Empirical studies on this 
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topic illustrated that actors feel discomfort ‘whenever they confront cognitions about 
some aspect of their behaviour inconsistent with their self-conception’.81 They tend to 
change their behaviour or rationalise their past behaviour in order to lessen this 
discomfort. Hence, acculturation occurs through internal pressures rather than 
external ones.  
Secondly, acculturation can also happen through social pressures by a group. 
They could be grouped under two elements: a) the employment of social-
psychological costs through shaming or shunning and b) the presentation of social-
psychological benefits through public approval. Social-psychological studies reveal 
that actors tend to change their behaviour in order to conform to the group’s norms 
when faced social pressure from a group. The reputational damage that might be 
caused by the non-compliance with the group is very important in the decision to 
comply. Interestingly, actors follow these behavioural attitudes and patterns of the 
group even if the group is certainly wrong as this external pressure is about public 
compliance with social norms instead of personal acceptance. In the cases of 
acculturation happening through external pressures, it is more likely to end with 
public compliance but not necessarily private acceptance of the norm that is imposed 
by the reference group. 
With regards to state behaviour, acculturation suggests that states change their 
behaviour in order to achieve cognitive/social comfort or terminate cognitive/social 
discomfort. Consequently, international regimes and domestic actors can push states 
to comply with international law through establishing models of legitimate state 
practice and engaging with citizenry and states through forums that apply these 
standards. Goodman and Jinks, in this study, based their argument at the empirical 
level on studies done by other scholars. For instance, the study by Bearce and 
Bondanella reveal that the voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly 
of pairs of states who participate in same intergovernmental (IGO) membership tend 
to show some convergence in time through social pressures.82 Although this cannot be 
fully related to the socialisation between states, this must take a significant part in this 
convergence.  
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Another example of this type of convergence was seen in the arena of 
women’s rights. According to one study, after universal suffrage became a well-
founded principle that is linked to the modern nation-state, the number of states 
adopting women’s suffrage rose dramatically.83 Moreover, this study also reveals that 
when women’s suffrage as a norm was institutionalised, states are more likely to 
follow their neighbouring states’ adoption pattern. Another study on women’s rights 
demonstrated that almost all American states formed women’s councils that put 
domestic violence against women as a priority in a short amount of time.84 These 
states also organised educational campaigns to fight against this issue and 
criminalised domestic violence. When the obligation to address domestic violence 
was institutionalised, states followed this pattern regardless of the different levels of 
political and economic power women have in different states. These examples can 
demonstrate that social and cognitive pressures can influence state behaviour on 
human rights issues.  
CONCLUSION 
Goodman and Jinks explanation of three distinct mechanisms provides valuable 
findings about the compliance of states. Given the findings of different compliance 
theories, Goodman and Jinks’ approach is deployed in this thesis to apply to the 
chosen case studies. As their work on acculturation depends mostly on sociological 
and social psychological approaches85, it is very distinct from rational actor and 
normative models. Goodman and Jinks discussed that acculturation can effectively 
encourage compliance more than material inducement and persuasion. However, they 
did not conduct empirical research on how acculturation can be seen in the real world. 
Hence, this thesis will look into all these three separate mechanisms instead of only 
acculturation. This theory of social mechanisms, as explained above, is very detailed 
and has broader capacity in terms of reasoning to understand state compliance. As a 
theory, it seeks to cover different mechanisms such as material, cognitive and social 
pressures on states. This gives the thesis the opportunity to improve the understanding 
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of how exactly these factors can promote compliance.  
Compared to rational actor models mentioned above, this theory does not 
solely depend on calculations of costs and benefits. There are more insights into state 
compliance rather than sole focus on rewards or punishments. Hence, this theory 
would give the opportunity to have a better and deeper understanding of compliance 
compared to rational actor models. On the other hand, normative models explain state 
compliance with a set of assumptions. This can be seen as a main limitation of 
normative models. The shared assumption of voluntary obedience of states by 
normative models can be quite hard to apply to the reality in modern world. 
Additionally, as mentioned before, Goodman and Jinks’ theory as a recent compliance 
model can explain state behaviour towards human rights treaties. In contrast with the 
spiral model, this theory gives a more flexible approach to understand state behaviour 
instead of one strict model that has certain phases. 
 Even though a very broad and detailed theory has been picked for this 
research, it is still very challenging to have a whole understanding on compliance. 
The compliance process is rarely a straightforward process for states. It can involve 
different actors such as domestic advocacy groups or international monitoring bodies 
and different dynamics such as political costs or international reputation. Therefore, it 
is impossible to have conclusive findings on why states comply and reveal a direct 
causal link between developments in states’ historical records of compliance. This is 
the main limitation of this research. Even though we have the empirical evidence and 
examples presented by Goodman and Jinks, every state’s record will be different from 
each other. The compliance process will be still a multi-dynamic process with several 
distinct actors involved.  
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CHAPTER 1.2. CASE STUDIES  
After establishing the first step of the general methodology framework with 
compliance theories in the previous chapter, it is important to address the main 
elements of case study research and data collection methods for this research. The 
selected case studies of this thesis are Turkey and the UK.  The critical objective of 
this case study is to figure out the dynamics that led the compliance with international 
human rights standards for detention of minors on immigration grounds in Turkey and 
the UK. A case study can have several different definitions and ways of use and 
selection as a method. This subchapter will describe case study as a method and the 
appropriate data collection methods in relation to the reasons of choosing this as a 
method for this specific research.  
a. What is a case study?  
Many different theorists have defined case study research in distinct ways.86 A case 
study can be used for qualitative studies or ethnographic, clinical or participant-
observation field research. Furthermore, it might refer to a work of process-tracing, 
which will be defined later on, or a work that analyses the features of a single case. 
Last but not least, case study can be a type of research that explores a single 
phenomenon or sample. For our purposes here, a case study can be defined as a study 
that investigates the research questions while bringing different kinds of evidence.87 It 
is an empirical and qualitative study that ‘explores a phenomenon in depth and within 
its real context’.88  
Case studies can be used in research where the researcher is looking for a 
broad and thorough description of a phenomenon.89 This phenomenon can be a broad 
term or a historical event such as nation state or revolution. If a study seeks to show a 
decision or a set of decisions made by the involved actors and how and why those 
decisions are made, a case study will be a helpful option as a method.90 Furthermore, 
case study research provides a space for the researcher to employ a wide range of 
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different sources of data to answer the research questions.91 This secures better 
evidence in terms of research findings during the reporting stage of the research.  
b. Design and Case Selection  
As stated previously, a case study, for our purposes here, can be defined as a method 
for investigation that focuses on a phenomenon in its real context. While doing this, 
this research employed a compliance theory of Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks for 
the reasons explained in the previous part. There are three consecutive steps for 
designing and implementing a theory-oriented case study.92 The first phase is where a 
researcher maps the objectives, design and structure of the research. The following 
phase is the part in which the researcher carries out each case study in line with the 
design. In the third phase, the researcher analyses the findings of the case studies and 
evaluates these findings in the light of the research objectives. These stages are 
complementary and the researcher is in the position to link them when necessary. 
Among these phases, it is necessary to elaborate on the first one as the rest is self-
explanatory.  
The design phase as the first phase mentioned above can be explained with 
five tasks. The first task is defining the problem and the research objective.93 The 
problem should be a part of a carefully-made assessment that indicates the gaps in the 
current literature and justifies the need for this research. Regarding research 
objectives, George and Bennett explain six different types of theory-building research 
objectives: atheoretical/configurative idiographic case studies; disciplined 
configurative case studies; heuristic case studies; theory-testing case studies; 
plausibility probes; and ‘building block’. For our purposes here, theory-testing case 
studies need further explanation since it suits this particular research. A theory-testing 
case study evaluates the validity and capacity of single or competing theories. This 
research, as firstly defined as a case study, has similarities with the theory-testing case 
study although this study chooses to apply the theory to see whether there is any 
applicability instead of testing to refute or promote the theory. This research employs 
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’ theory in two case studies in order to assess the 
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applicability of this specific theory on states’ compliance. This is significant in the 
sense that application of this theory may provide a way to map a pattern of the 
behaviour of two countries, Turkey and the UK, on the way to compliance with 
international human rights standards specific to immigration. Having a behavioural 
pattern for these two cases fills the gap in the current state of knowledge on this 
particular topic. Furthermore, to be able to demonstrate why Turkey and the UK 
complied with international human rights standards on detention of children for 
immigration purposes brings further information of these states’ motivations during 
decision-making processes. This knowledge can be useful in the context of promoting 
further compliance needed in Turkey or the UK.  
The second task under the first phase is developing a research strategy such as 
defining the variables.94 George and Bennett note that there are certain questions to be 
answered in consideration of formulating the variables of a research. Questions are 
mostly about the dependent and independent variables of the research. For this 
specific research, the outcome that Turkey and the UK complied with international 
human rights standards regarding detention of minors for immigration purposes is the 
dependent variable while the independent variable is the dynamics behind the 
compliance decision. These factors can be listed under two categories: domestic and 
international. Domestic dynamics behind the compliance process might be pressure 
from civil society or national organisations, public opinion, discussions in Parliament 
or domestic case law. On the other hand, international dynamics could include 
pressure from the international human rights community, critiques from international 
monitoring reports or cases before international courts. The independent variables 
listed were intended to be inclusive. They were chosen after a thorough literature 
research and interviews with the selected officials. These different independent 
variables are central to this research in a sense that they help make sense of the 
dependent variable. They revealed the triggers behind the change in state behaviour in 
Turkey and the UK. Furthermore, they brought a detailed analysis on which factors 
weigh more than others in terms of influencing Turkey and the UK.  
The third task within the first phase is case selection for the study.95 Selecting 
cases for this particular study needed a well-informed assessment and clear vision. 
The potential contribution to the literature is to analyse these countries’ compliance 
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experience in terms of the different dynamics involved. A further output of this 
research, as mentioned above, could be mapping a behavioural pattern for compliance 
in these two cases. Moreover, both countries recently showed compliance on 
detention of minors at policy and legislation level. Being two different countries and 
having two different profiles in terms of their human rights reputation and history 
produce different independent variables, which is important for theory application.  
In addition to George and Bennett’s theory of case selection, there are other 
several theories for case selection that could be suitable in this research. For instance, 
Gerring comes up with nine distinct case study types: typical; diverse; extreme; 
deviant; influential; crucial; path-way; most-similar; and most different.96 The most 
different case study needs elaboration for the purposes of our case selection. This type 
of case study means that the selected cases are similar on the key factor of interest 
(one independent variable) and the outcome (the dependent variable) while they are 
different on all other factors.97  
To elaborate on this point, in our case selection, Turkey and the UK are two 
very different countries in terms of human rights records and human rights 
commitment. For instance, Turkey and the UK can be positioned at two different 
sides of the human rights compliance spectrum. The UK was a founding member of 
the Council of Europe98 and played an important role in the drafting of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and was among the first to ratify the Convention.99 
Furthermore, the UK Parliament passed the Human Rights Act in 1998 in order to 
incorporate   the   European   Convention   into   its   domestic   law. Accordingly, the 
compliance record of the UK at European Court of Human Rights’ judgments showed 
high rates of compliance at 71 per cent.100 It was shown that the UK has an ideal 
record in implementing the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.101 
The judgments of the European Court normally lead to changes in domestic 
legislation and practice. Hence, it can be said that the UK showed a clear commitment 
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to respect human rights so far.102  On the other hand, Turkey’s reputation in terms of 
respect towards human rights is different than the UK’s.  In the last fifty years, two 
military interventions occurred in Turkey with several human rights violations and 
ethnic conflict between Kurdish groups and Turkish army has existed for the last 
thirty years.103 Freedom of speech and freedom of press are among the basic human 
rights and freedoms that are under restraint in Turkey. Turkey’s membership 
application to European Union was made in 1999, and Turkey’s membership chances 
are still doubtful. This long-term candidacy can be ascribed to many different reasons 
but Turkey’s commitment towards human rights is certainly one of them as can be 
seen in Turkey’s European Union progress reports.104 Turkey’s compliance record at 
the European Court of Human Rights, also, is around 49 per cent.105  
Even though there are structural differences between Turkey and the UK, they 
are similar on the key factor of interest (practice of detention of minors for 
immigration purposes) and the outcome (compliance with international human rights 
standards of detention of minors for immigration purposes). To elaborate on this, the 
UK and Turkey practiced detention of minors for immigration purposes for a lengthy 
amount of time as will be explained in the respective chapters on Turkey and the 
UK’s historical record on compliance.106 Their policies and legislation supported this 
practice in the meantime. For that reason, this can be seen as the key factor of interest. 
On the other hand, the outcome of compliance with international human rights 
standards on immigration detention of minors is a recent development in these 
selected countries. This recent development showed us that Turkey and the UK 
revised their legislation in order to bring compliance with international human rights 
standards.107 Overall, the selected theory can apply to these two countries for different 
reasons and at different levels. Being two different states yet producing same results 
                                                
102 This positive record of the UK can be challenged with the high publicity cases such as voting rights 
of prisoners. However, the bigger picture of compliance reveals that these cases can be seen as 
exceptions when looking at the overall record of implementing judgments into domestic legislation.  
103 To read further on Turkey’s history during this specific era, see Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern 
History (3rd edn, IBTauris 2004) pt III. 
104 To read further on this, see Turkey’s progress reports since 1998 to date.  
105 Hillebrecht (n 100). 
106 To read further on immigration detention in Turkey, see Chapter 3. Turkey’s Historical Record in 
Relation to Compliance with International Standards, for the UK’s immigration detention practice see 
Chapter 4. The UK’s Historical Record in Relation to Compliance with International Standards. 
107 To read further on this legislation change, see Chapter 3. Turkey’s Historical Record in Relation to 
Compliance with International Standards and Chapter 4. The UK’s Historical Record in Relation to 
Compliance with International Standards. 
 31 
in terms of compliance makes the research a challenging and interesting process in 
terms of its findings.  
The fourth task is describing the variance in variables. 108  This task is 
important in the sense that describing the variance decides on the capability of the 
case studies in terms of assessment of existing theories. The way of describing the 
variance in variables is essential to achieve the research objectives since identification 
of causal relationships might depend on the way of variance is decided. For this 
particular research, variance can be found and described in one of the independent 
variables. As mentioned before, the dynamics behind the compliance decision of 
Turkey and the UK is the main independent variable. After thorough research on this 
area, these dynamics can be identified in the following ways: domestic and 
international dynamics. As explained before, domestic dynamics behind the 
compliance process can be pressure from civil society or national organisations, 
public opinion, discussions in Parliaments or domestic cases. On the other hand, 
international dynamics can include pressure from the international human rights 
community, critiques from international monitoring reports or cases before 
international courts.  By framing the independent variable in different types, there is 
the potential to recognise the effectiveness and validity of these factors that led states 
to compliance.  
The last task in the first design phase is the formulation of data 
requirements.109 Building the data requirements should be linked to the other four 
design tasks as it gives the structure to the study in general. For our purposes here, the 
data requirements were determined by the theoretical framework as there will be 
literature research on the independent variable and interviews with people who were 
directly involved in the potential processes that influenced Turkey and the UK’s 
compliance with international human rights standards. These data collection methods 
will be explained below in more detail.  
c. Carrying out a Theory-Oriented Case Study  
A case study can have three different implications in terms of theories.110 
Theory-testing in a case study usually aims to reinforce or weaken a theory; limit or 
broaden the range of a theory; or decide whether this theory can explain a case or 
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general phenomenon. Here, a case study on Turkey and the UK using Ryan Goodman 
and Derek Jinks’ theory seeks to find out whether this theory can explain the reasons 
behind Turkey and the UK’s compliance with international human rights standards on 
detention of minors for immigration purposes. This should not be confused with 
refuting this theory as this theory might be capable of explaining different 
phenomenon thoroughly. On the other hand, this research is not aiming to claim this 
theory’s success over all similar cases or phenomenon since overgeneralisation is 
risky. Having a claim like this can cause problems as it is a claim on cases that are not 
studied yet. Therefore, this research focuses its aim on deciding whether this theory 
can explain this phenomenon in the chosen case studies.  
Theory-testing has its own challenges in the implementation of a case study. It 
is a testing process when theories suggest complex causal relations such as the 
influence of interaction between actors. The selected theory for this particular 
research theorises this type of causal relation, such as dynamics that can change state 
behaviour within an interaction. In order to overcome this challenge, this case study 
added process-tracing techniques into theory testing.  
d. What is Process Tracing?  
Process tracing provided by George and McKeown is a technique that can be used in 
case studies that explain a phenomenon or a historical event.111 For our purposes here, 
this technique helps us to explain why compliance with international human rights 
standards on detention of minors for immigration purposes has happened in Turkey 
and the UK. It is a suitable way to approach theory-testing case studies where 
multiple interaction effects are involved. 112  Multiple interaction effects can be 
clarified as a situation where several different actors interact with each other and this 
interaction has an influence on this historical event. In this research, there are many 
distinct actors at domestic and international level that had an impact on the 
compliance decision of Turkey and the UK. For that reason, process tracing is 
valuable to reveal these interaction effects. While doing this, process tracing also does 
produce several distinct observations within a case as this provides adaptability to the 
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research in general. Instead of presenting only one observation for a case, several 
different observations bring flexibility to the argument.  
There are different types of process tracing: detailed narrative; use of 
hypotheses and generalisations; analytical explanation; and more general 
explanation.113 Detailed narrative as the basic model of process tracing comes up with 
a form of chronicle that tells a detailed story. This type is generally not suitable to use 
with theory-testing case studies as the narrative is very specific. The second variety of 
process tracing uses hypotheses and generalisations in a way that some details of the 
narrative are related to specific causal hypotheses without using any theoretical 
variables for this aim. Third type, analytical explanation, changes a historical 
narrative into a causal explanation in an analytical manner. This type of explanation 
can be selective as the researcher deliberately focuses on more significant parts of the 
narrative. The last type of process tracing chooses a general explanation instead of a 
detailed narrative. This type often is being used in research that does not pay 
particular attention to the individual decision-making process.  
Overall, the third variety of process tracing, analytical explanation, is the most 
fitting method for this particular research as this research seeks to spot the dynamics 
behind the compliance decision by approaching the narrative in an analytical manner. 
Since the selected compliance theory provides well-established and specific 
predictions regarding the reasons for change in state behaviour, this research’s 
process-tracing method evaluates these predictions of the theory. In this way, the 
research decides whether there is a match between the observed processes and the 
predictions of the selected theory.114 However, like all other research methods, 
process tracing has its own limitations. For instance, if the theory is vague on 
variables or the data for process tracing is not accessible, process tracing can only 
provide tentative conclusions instead of definite conclusions.115 However, the selected 
compliance theory for this specific research delivers detailed arguments and 
hypotheses as explained in the previous chapter in depth. Therefore, this limitation is 
overcome with the selected theory’s characteristics. Also, the data for process tracing 
is accessible as the materials in relation to the compliance process are transparent and 
easily accessible to anyone.  
                                                
113 George and Bennett (n 92) 210-12.   
114 ibid 217.  
115 ibid 222. 
 34 
e. Data Collection Methods 
Data collection is a significant and essential part of a case study, as it is for all kinds 
of research. Evidence is primary in this research rather than theory as this research 
primarily aims to find out the reasons behind the decision of compliance instead of 
testing a theory.116 There are different types of evidence for a case study: documents, 
records, interviews, detached observation, participant observation and physical 
artefacts.117 Documents can be regulations, policy papers, regulations or any kind of 
evidence that provide a formal background to a case study. Records are mostly 
statistics of some phenomenon related to the case study concerned. Interviews are one 
of the main methods used in qualitative research in order to gather information from 
people who are involved in a related process or development. Detached observation, 
on the other hand, is totally different from interviews. It is an observation made from 
outside in a careful and particular way. This method is often used in quantitative 
research. Participant observation is another method of observation where the 
researcher is involved in the process and it is generally used in qualitative studies. 
Lastly, physical artefact is a device, tool or instrument that is used as evidence in a 
study. Detached observation and physical artefacts are not used in this specific case 
study since they are not suitable for qualitative studies. Participant observation is also 
not suitable as it requires the researcher’s involvement in the process whereas this 
study investigates a phenomenon which has already occurred in the past. For this 
research in particular, documents, records and interviews are employed in order to 
feed process-tracing method. In order to have an accurate case study, it is essential to 
have multiple sources of evidence.118  
Documents, as stated above, are policy papers, circulars, legislation, 
international monitoring reports, domestic and international cases and archival 
records such as parliamentary or committee discussions. This presents very detailed 
background information for what happened in the context of policy and law making 
for detention of minors in the UK and Turkey. This can be defined as a silent witness 
to show concerns and priorities which arose during this process in the UK and 
Turkey. In particular, archival records are seen as a sort of purposeful communication. 
The meaning and the evidential value of a speech or a discussion are assessed through 
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archival record.119 Secondly, records that are used in this research are statistics of 
asylum, new detention centres and minors detained for immigration purposes. This 
data is the quantitative side of the case study. This shows the scale of the issue in 
terms level of migration and detention in these countries. This contribution is an 
important source to prove the importance of this issue in terms of human rights.  
Last but not least, interviews with selected participants who were involved in 
the policy and law making on detention of minors for immigration law enforcement 
are one of the main methods to collect data regarding the legal developments in the 
UK and Turkey. Interviews are one of the main methods used in qualitative research 
in order to gather information from participants about their experiences, views and 
opinions.120 This is a vocal side of the case study as the actors such as members of 
Parliament, representatives of non-governmental organisations and civil servants talk 
about their approach to the issue and legal developments regarding detention of 
minors. Interviewing distinct actors from different backgrounds reveals different parts 
of the puzzle as each of them has different priorities and agendas in this process. For 
instance, a Member of Parliament and a civil servant have different recollections on 
the law-making process because a Member of Parliament’s agenda is filled with 
different topics and his or her daily work is not directly affected by the changes in the 
new legislation or policy whereas a civil servant’s daily work is directly influenced by 
the changes brought by the new policy. Furthermore, as this case study works on two 
different countries, the different nature of law-making in these two countries is taken 
into consideration. For this reason, different levels of officials are interviewed in 
Turkey and the UK.  
Interviews are chosen as data collection methods for the case studies where 
the sample is small, accessible and key for theory testing and research findings.121 In 
addition to being a most suitable tool for conducting a qualitative research, interviews 
are also chosen as a method in view of the fact that the compliance experienced in 
Turkey and the UK is quite recent. Therefore, people involved in this process are still 
at work and accessible. Their insight to this process gives a different perspective to 
the research. However, they only play a complementary role to the objective evidence 
as interviews can be subjective.  
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The structure of the interviews are semi-structured that allows the interviews 
to be more flexible and guided by the needs of the research. Semi-structured 
interviews allow a flexible way of conversation around the points which require 
clarification or elaboration whereas surveys are strictly limited to a list of 
predetermined questions.122  The key issues for the research are determined and 
placed in the interview questions (Appendix 1) implicitly. The advantage of semi-
structured interviews is that they allow the interviewee to reveal how they structure 
their own reality and perception in particular situations.123 This input can provide 
significant insight to the case study. However, there are also challenging aspects of 
conducting semi-structured interviews. Interviews can be seen as subjective and 
personal story-telling. They can still provide us a better understanding of the 
developments in Turkey and the UK. As mentioned before, due to multiple interaction 
effects between actors, interviews are valuable in the sense that they give us a deeper 
insight into the factors which influenced the compliance process in Turkey and the 
UK.  Another limitation is that interviews can be time-consuming.124  Face to face 
interviews with the participants can take a longer time than expected. For this reason, 
the number of the participants should be kept small. For this particular research, the 
number of interviews is limited to ten as maximum. The limited numbers of 
interviews reduce the complexity of using interviews in terms of time management. 
Within the literature on compliance theories, official history, legal 
developments, public statements of officials, confidential memos and interviews with 
the selected officials are employed in order to find out about the influential factors in 
the historical records on compliance.125 Confidential memos and interviews are 
usually used in some states such as China and the United States in order to reveal 
more insights about the process.126  For these reasons, interviews with selected 
participants involved in this process are valuable for this particular research. 
Furthermore, while understanding Turkey’s case through the lens of the compliance 
theory, interviews are central as there are not enough academic sources on Turkey’s 
compliance with human rights standards for detention of minors.  
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f. Ethics 
As stated before, interviews are one of the main methods for data collection for this 
research. Using this method brings moral and ethical issues due to required human 
interaction in an interview. These issues can be explained at seven different research 
stages. 127  In thematising stage, the researcher should perceive the aim of this 
interview as not only scientific value it would bring to the research but also 
improvement of the concerned human situation. Therefore, interview should be 
selected as a data collection method if there is an improvement of the human situation 
concerned. During the designing stage, receiving the participants’ informed consent to 
be a part of the study, ensuring confidentiality and analysing the risk assessment of 
the research should be taken into consideration regarding ethical issues of the 
research. Informed consent as an essential principle requires informing the 
participants regarding the aim of the research, potential risks and benefits, and the key 
characteristics of the design itself.128 Furthermore, this principle also entails the 
voluntary participation of the interviewees and informing them about their right to 
withdraw at any time. This principle with different elements in it requires a written 
consent form in order to provide protection for the subject and the researcher. This 
form can guarantee to provide necessary information to the participants such as their 
confidentiality, who has access to their statements, and the amount of information 
from the interview the researcher can use.  
Further on, conducting interview requires particular attention to the stress level 
of the interview or changes in self-awareness in terms of ethical issues. After 
conducting an interview, ethical issues should be still present in a researcher’s mind. 
In transcription phase, the confidentiality principle needs to be taken into account as 
well as ensuring the transcribed text is in line with the participant’s statement. The 
analysis stage also involves some ethical issues such as the level of involvement of 
the participant in interpreting his/her statements. During the verification stage, the 
researcher should ensure that the knowledge reported should be verified and 
protected. Reporting, as the last stage of the research, involves the principle of 
confidentiality of the participants since the research becomes accessible to public after 
reporting. It is indisputable that ethical issues are involved throughout every stage of 
the research.  Overall, ethics and moral issues are an integral part of a research from 
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beginning until the publication of the research. Hence, the consent forms (Appendix 
2) with participant information sheets (Appendix 3) for the interviewees are written in 
line with these abovementioned principles. During and after the interviews, these 
principles, again, were part of the thought process. The interviewees were informed of 
the transcription of their interviews and asked for any editing requests.  
g. Strengths and Limitations of Case Studies 
Like every research method, case study has its own strengths and limitations. It can be 
stated that it has advantages on four distinct parts: conceptual validity; deriving new 
hypotheses; exploring causal mechanisms; modelling and assessing complex causal 
relations.129  
Firstly, high levels of conceptual validity can be achieved with case studies. It 
helps a researcher to describe and measure indicators that are generally very 
challenging to measure such as democracy or power. In order to measure these 
variables, it is necessary to implement some contextual work within the study. Case 
studies allow this kind of contextual work unlike statistical research methods. This 
contextual work is important for this particular research as the main focus, reasoning 
behind the compliance process, can be challenging to measure. In addition to this, 
case study allows a researcher to derive new hypotheses and variables while the 
research is still on-going. Since case study often involves interviews with key 
participants, this type of human interaction can potentially bring new variables and so 
new hypotheses.  Furthermore, case studies are successful at exploring causal 
mechanisms. Unlike statistical methods, case studies allow the involvement of 
intervening and contextual variables throughout the study. This allows a researcher to 
have a better understanding of a phenomenon especially for historical developments 
like the particular focus of this research. Since historical developments require a more 
in-depth investigation on different variables, as this particular research aims to do, 
and case study is an appropriate method for these types of studies. Lastly, case studies 
can easily model and evaluate complex causal relations. Although they would need a 
considerable process-tracing evidence for this evaluation, case studies are still better 
at this than statistical methods where multiple interaction effects can be studied but 
very daunting to interpret. For this reason, case study combined with the process-
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tracing evidence was suitable for this research as multiple interaction effects are more 
likely to be the main focus within this research.  
There are two different types of case studies in terms of the numbers of cases 
involved. Multiple case studies have their own advantages compared to single case 
studies.130 While multiple case studies can provide more robust evidence on a 
particular historical development or a phenomenon, single case studies’ evidence are 
more limited in a sense that it is harder to generalise or apply to different cases. 
Furthermore, case studies often are seen as exploratory research methods instead of 
confirmatory.131 This exploratory nature of a case study changes when it involves 
more than one case in a study. Therefore, multiple case designs allow the researcher 
to come up with a more confirmatory analysis at the end due to the number of cases 
being more than one. Having two case studies in this particular research increases the 
likelihood of producing more confirmatory and robust evidence at the end.  
Beyond these advantages of a case study, it also has its own limitations to take 
into consideration. Case studies often do not rely on a sole method for investigation. 
They employ several different types of investigation methods such as interviews, 
archival records and so on. This makes case study a challenging and time-consuming 
research method. On the other hand, multiple sources of evidence make the study’s 
findings more reliable and valid. In addition to this, if designed as a multi-case 
research, as mentioned before, it requires a large amount of time and resources while 
providing better evidence and bringing a confirmatory nature. Therefore, being time 
consuming should be seen as the trade-off of a case study.    
CONCLUSION 
Case study as one of the established research methods is widely used in qualitative 
studies. It is a reliable tool in the case of analysing a phenomenon or an event. It 
provides robust and confirmatory findings where there are multiple interaction effects. 
Although it has its limitations like every other research design, it is essential to find 
ways to overcome these limitations and challenges if the design is suited to the 
research objectives.  
This research aims to identify the dynamics that could influence the decision 
to comply with the international human rights standards on detention of minors. This 
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requires a contextual work on historical developments in these case studies. Multiple-
effect interaction is involved as several different international and domestic dynamics 
need to be analysed to produce findings. Archival records combined with semi-
structured interviews provide the necessary in-depth information.  
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CHAPTER 2. DETENTION OF CHILDREN IN THE 
IMMIGRATION CONTEXT: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS STANDARDS  
States have legitimate interests in securing their borders and exercising immigration 
controls. International law recognises the notion of state sovereignty on this issue. 
Although there are domestic law and policies regarding the migration controls for 
each state, they are still obliged to observe international law standards to the extent 
they bound themselves. Being a party of those international conventions brings 
obligations that the States Parties need to follow. The international legal obligations 
by which Turkey and the UK are bound by ratification in terms of the treatment of 
immigrants with no right to enter or overstaying without any valid visa will be 
explained in detail in this chapter.  
I. IMMIGRATION DETENTION  
There are international human rights standards that specify the basis of immigration 
detention. To start with, Article 5 (1) of European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) brings protection for the right to liberty and security of person.132 The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its jurisprudence mentions this Article 
together with Articles 2, 3 and 4 as in the first rank of the fundamental rights for the 
physical security of a person.133 Its key aim is to provide guarantees to prevent 
arbitrary deprivations of liberty.134 Under this Article, Article 5 (1.f) permits detention 
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on the grounds of unauthorised entry and if there is an action taken against a person 
towards deportation or extradition. Hence, ECHR set the basis for immigration 
detention while preventing arbitrary detention.  
 As the implementing body of ECHR, the ECtHR135 has been seeking answers 
to complex cases regarding immigration detention. There were cases in which the 
duration of immigration detention was the main question before the ECtHR. In the 
Chahal136 case, for instance, the applicant was a Sikh separatist leader who was under 
detention for six years in the UK with a view to deportation on national security 
grounds.  He, as an Indian national, was a lawful resident in the UK. Allegations 
against him were in relation to his participation in political violence in the UK and 
India. The ECtHR considered the lawfulness of detention:  
Article 5 para. 1 (f) does not demand that the detention of a person against 
whom action is being taken with a view to deportation be reasonably 
considered necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or 
fleeing; in this respect Article 5 para. 1 (f) provides a different level of 
protection from Article 5 para. 1 (c). Indeed, all that is required under this 
provision (art. 5-1-f) is that ‘action is being taken with a view to 
deportation’.137 
The ECtHR clearly expressed that the justification for a decision to detain can be only 
a deportation order without any further necessary reasons. However, the judgment, 
further, carried on one very important condition that any detention under Article 5 
(1.f.) can be justified. Deportation proceedings must be in progress and dealt with due 
diligence by the authorities.138 When this was considered, the ECtHR stated: 
As the Court has observed in the context of Article 3 (art. 3), Mr Chahal's case 
involves considerations of an extremely serious and weighty nature. … 
Against this background, and bearing in mind what was at stake for the 
applicant and the interest that he had in his claims being thoroughly examined 
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by the courts, none of the periods complained of can be regarded as excessive, 
taken either individually or in combination. 139 
Hence, there was no violation of Article 5 (1.f.) in relation to domestic procedures’ 
due diligence. The ECtHR took a position towards immigration detention which 
confirmed that states have a wide discretion in their decision to detain as long as there 
is a deportation order and proceedings are on the way.  
 Another important case before the ECtHR was Saadi140 case. The applicant 
who is a doctor fled the Kurdish Autonomous Region of Iraq after facilitating the 
escape of three fellow members of the Iraqi Workers’ Communist Party. After his 
arrival at Heathrow airport, he claimed asylum immediately. Due to a lack of places at 
the Oakington Reception Centre, he was granted temporary admission three times. 
After the third time, he was detained and held at Oakington for seven days on fast 
track asylum process.141 Here, the ECtHR sought to answer an immigration detention 
case where the decision to detain was only taken due to administrative reasons. This 
judgment, firstly, interpreted the meaning of ‘to prevent his affecting an unauthorised 
entry into the country’. In its judgment, the Court stated: 
…until a State has ‘authorised’ entry to the country, any entry is 
‘unauthorised’ and the detention of a person who wishes to effect entry and 
who needs but does not yet have authorisation to do so can be, without any 
distortion of language, to ‘prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry’. 142 
The ECtHR claimed that an interpretation of ‘unauthorised entry’ as only involving 
those trying to evade entry restrictions would be too narrow so that the power of 
States to exercise their sovereign right to control their borders would be unduly 
restricted.143 The ECtHR supports its interpretation by reference to Conclusion no. 44 
of the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ 
Programme; UNHCR’s guidelines and the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation 
which permits detention of asylum seekers on certain similar grounds such as 
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conducting identity checks144. It is clear that the ECtHR sees this as a necessary 
complement to the right to liberty so that States are permitted to detain would-be 
immigrants whether the application to permission to enter was made by asylum or 
not.145 Therefore, the ECtHR rejected the necessity test within cases regarding 
unauthorised entry like it had in deportation cases.  
 The ECtHR, secondly, discussed the arbitrariness of this type of detention in 
detail. The judgment first listed the criteria to avoid arbitrary detention: acting in good 
faith; the purposeful connection to the aim; and the place, conditions and duration of 
detention. Taking these criteria into consideration, the ECtHR decided that this 
detention couldn’t be branded as arbitrary while the detention centre was adapted to 
asylum seekers, duration of detention was only 7 days and the decision to detain was 
taken in a good faith and to serve a purpose. The ECtHR concluded:  
…given the difficult administrative problems with which the United Kingdom 
was confronted during the period in question, with increasingly high numbers 
of asylum-seekers (see also Amuur, cited above, § 41), it was not incompatible 
with Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention to detain the applicant for seven days 
in suitable conditions to enable his claim to asylum to be processed speedily. 
146 
It is clear that states have wide discretion over their decision to detain for immigration 
law enforcement. These judgments, which did not challenge these practices, can give 
concerned states a stronger ground to continue with their current practice of detaining 
for immigration purposes.  
Another international standard which pertains to general terms of the right to 
liberty is contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights147. This 
Covenant is a basis for protection of human rights around the world and has been 
ratified by a majority of states.148 Article 9 of this Covenant states: 
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Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law. 
  Under this Covenant’s mandate, the Human Rights Committee 149  is 
established under Article 28 of the Covenant. This body has four different types of 
monitoring role.150 It receives and evaluates the monitoring reports submitted by 
States Parties. It, secondly, forms general comments in order to give further guidance 
to States Parties on the Covenant’s provisions. The Human Rights Committee’s third 
task is to receive and examine individual complaints made by nationals of States 
Parties that sign the Optional Protocol.151 It can produce non-binding ‘opinions’ with 
regards to individual complaints. Finally, the Human Rights Committee can consider 
inter-state complaints regarding the violations of the Covenant.  
  The Human Rights Committee’s approach towards immigration detention can 
be examined through its opinions while seeking answers to individual complaints. 
The first one was V.M.R.B. v Canada152 in 1988. An El-Salvador national entered 
Canada illegally and was detained for two months during his deportation hearings on 
the basis of danger to the public and high risk of absconding. The Human Rights 
Committee’s decision: 
With regard to article 9, the Committee points out that this article prohibits 
unlawful arrest and detention, whereas the author was lawfully arrested in 
connection with his unauthorized entry into Canada, and the decision to detain 
him was not made arbitrarily, especially in view of his insistence not to leave 
the territory of Canada. 153 
 
In 1997, another immigration detention case was brought to the Human Rights 
Committee. The complainant was a Cambodian national who arrived in Australia by 
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boat and claimed asylum after entry in 1989.154 His asylum application was rejected 
in 1990 and his appeal to this decision was also rejected in 1992. He was detained for 
approximately four years and challenged the lawfulness of his detention. The Human 
Rights Committee sought to answer whether the State party’s justification for this 
detention such as unauthorised entry and risk of absconding were adequate for 
indefinite and lengthy detention. In relation to this, the Human Rights Committee’s 
first note on this is very important:  
…the Committee recalls that the notion of ‘arbitrariness’ must not be equated 
with ‘against the law’ but be interpreted more broadly to include such 
elements as inappropriateness and injustice. Furthermore, remand in custody 
could be considered arbitrary if it is not necessary in all the circumstances of 
the case, for example to prevent flight or interference with evidence: the 
element of proportionality becomes relevant in this context. 155 
 
Hence, detainees should be released from detention at the point when the State could 
not provide proper justification. The Human Rights Committee elaborated: 
For example, the fact of illegal entry may indicate a need for investigation and 
there may be other factors particular to the individual, such as the likelihood 
of absconding and lack of cooperation, which may justify detention for a 
period. Without such factors detention may be considered arbitrary, even if 
entry was illegal.156 
 
Thus, it stated that unauthorised entry couldn’t be presented as the sole justification 
for immigration detention. Drawing upon this statement, the Human Rights 
Committee concluded that the State party did not provide any further justification for 
detention that took four years at different detention centres. Hence, there was a breach 
of Article 9.1. 
 Another case, again against Australia, was before the Human Rights 
Committee in 2002.157 C, an Iranian national, entered Australia with a visitor’s visa 
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but no return ticket. He was detained pending his removal. He made an asylum 
application on the basis of fear of persecution in Iran since he was an Assyrian 
Christian. He was in detention for two years. During this detention, his mental health 
was deteriorated. Drawing upon A. case mentioned above, the Human Rights 
Committee looked for further justification by the State party in order to continue 
detaining the complainant. Due to the complainant’s mental health condition, the 
Human Rights Committee stated: 
the State party has not demonstrated that, in the light of the author's particular 
circumstances, there were not less invasive means of achieving the same ends, 
that is to say, compliance with the State party's immigration policies, by, for 
example, the imposition of reporting obligations, sureties or other conditions 
which would take account of the author's deteriorating condition.158 
 
Therefore, C.’s detention was arbitrary due to long duration of detention without any 
further justification and judicial review. This case was important in the sense that it 
highlights detention can only be arbitrary as long as the State party is unable to 
advance its justifications.  
 The Human Rights Committee’s position towards immigration detention is 
significant in the way that it brought the proportionality element into the discussion. 
Although the Human Rights Committee only delivers non-binding opinions in these 
complaints, these opinions are seen to be the most effective for the Human Rights 
Committee’s role in developing achieving human rights jurisprudence.159 Combined 
with the ECtHR’s position, there has been a wide discretion for adult immigration 
detention for state authorities.  
In terms of soft law, the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants160 discusses the situation on migrants in general and the 
migrant children in his regional study report to the General Assembly.161 This report 
is a result of the regional visits taken from June 2012 to April 2013. During these 
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regional visits, he visited detention centres in different States Parties and had 
meetings with representatives from European Union (EU) institutions and States 
Parties. In his report, he recommends states to refrain from the criminalisation of 
language, practice and policies towards the migrants and to avoid using the term 
‘illegal migrant/migration’. 162  Regarding detention on immigration purposes, he 
recommends that states promote viable alternatives to detention, and not insist on 
further entrenching detention as a migration control mechanism.163 He states that 
detention should always be a measure of last resort; and most importantly, children 
should never be detained. Although his report is not legally binding for states, these 
recommendations have still strong character in terms of soft law.  
The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention164 within the United Nations 
mandate has published regular reports concerning detention standards. Its mandate 
has been extended to asylum seekers and immigrants in 1997 due to the concerns over 
immigration detention. In its report in 2009, the Working Group reminded states that 
detention should be the last resort, and is permissible only for the shortest period of 
time concerning detention of immigrants in an irregular situation.165 Alternatives to 
detention must be sought whenever possible. The Working Group states that grounds 
for detention must be clearly and exhaustively defined and the legality of detention 
must be open for challenge before a court and regular review within fixed time 
limits.166 The Working Group also warns states against criminalising immigrants in an 
irregular situation and looking at the case of the irregular migrants only through 
lenses of national security.   
II. IMMIGRATION DETENTION OF CHILDREN 
While immigration detention for adults is not directly challenged by international law, 
there are more specific standards for children under immigration detention. Due to 
their unique situation, children are granted higher standards and more protection by 
international law concerning any type of treatment in general.  
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To start with, the International Convention on the Rights of the Child167 
(CRC) should be the primary source in order to understand states’ obligations under 
international law regarding children. CRC is signed and ratified by most of the states 
in the world. The UK and Turkey, which are the case studies of this research, are 
among those states.168 According to CRC, the definition of ‘child’ is every human 
being below the age of eighteen years.169 Relying on its nature, CRC establishes and 
ensures that the best interests of the child should be applied all the time as a core 
principle.170 This principle should be taken into consideration by authorities during 
decisions and implementation of regulations and policies that are related to children. 
The meaning of this principle is that states need to apply this principle during the 
establishment of policies and legislation in relation to immigration control. The 
principle of ‘the best interests of the child’ does not define explicitly what the best is 
and what it is not. This decision on what the best is for the child is left to the States 
Parties. However, the presence of this principle still brings a need for a justification 
by the States Parties in order to explain why they consider that regulation as the best 
for the child.  
Besides this principle being applicable in general, CRC does not particularly 
ban detention of children under the principle of the best interests of the child if 
detention is in conformity with domestic law of the States Parties. Therefore, 
detention is seen as a legitimate claim in international law unless it is arbitrary or 
unlawful. Whereas there is no clear ban on detention of children, there are some clear-
cut principles regarding potential detention of children. CRC explicitly sets out in 
Article 37.b:  
No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The 
arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the 
law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time.  
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With this Article, CRC sets some general constraints on detention of children. 
A measure of last resort and the shortest appropriate period of time could be named as 
those constraints in this Article. The first limitation, concerning detention as being the 
last resort, put States Parties in the position that they need to justify the use of 
detention in terms of showing previous measures attempted before making a detention 
decision. In addition to this, duration of detention should be the shortest appropriate 
period of time, in order to prevent detention of children for long-term or indefinite 
time. However, appropriateness is a subjective word that gives States Parties a certain 
amount of flexibility since the definition of the appropriateness has not been made 
explicit in the CRC. This leaves the possible length of detention under shadow. This 
article would have been stronger on the issue of detention if there were an exact time 
limit for detention.  
In addition to these standards, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on detention of 
minors recently pointed out that there should be certain standards in terms of 
conditions and duration of detention. In one of these recent cases171, the applicants 
were a mother and her daughter.  At that time, the first applicant was in Canada with 
refugee status. During the second applicant’s travel to Europe from Congo, the 
authorities detained the second applicant in the Transit Centre and let the first 
applicant know about her daughter’s situation. Directions were made for her removal 
on the ground of lack of necessary documents. She had been detained for nearly two 
months in a closed centre that was designed for adults. The ECtHR decided that there 
was a violation of Article 3172 for the second applicant due to the conditions of the 
detention. However, the ECtHR also decided that there was a breach of Article 3 in 
respect of the first applicant since the stress and anxiety that the daughter’s detention 
caused for the mother was severe. Referring to the absolute nature of Article 3, the 
ECtHR pointed out that this takes precedence over deliberations relating to a minor’s 
immigration status. With this judgment, the ECtHR made clear that States Parties 
have to provide effective protection to everyone regardless of their immigration status 
due to the absolute nature of Article 3 while they are within States’ borders. 
Concerning Article 5.1, the ECtHR stated that since the minor was detained at a 
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facility not suitable for minors without being accompanied by her mother, her right to 
liberty had not been adequately protected. Hence, there was a breach of Article 5.1.  
The following case is about a mother and four children detained at a Transit 
Centre with a view to their being handed over to Polish authorities.173 The applicants 
claimed there was a violation of Article 3 during their administrative detention at the 
Transit Centre. In respect of the children, the ECtHR considered their ages in terms of 
understanding their surroundings during the detention. They were respectively aged 
seven months, three and a half years, five and seven years at the relevant time. The 
ECtHR stated that at least two of them were old enough to understand the conditions 
in which they were held. The closed transit centre was defined as a facility ill-
equipped to have children. The ECtHR also took the doctors’ assessment regarding 
the children’s mental state into account. The psychological examination of the 
applicants showed serious psychological and psychosomatic symptoms. Finally, the 
ECtHR considered the duration of detention, the doctors’ assessment and their ages in 
the decision and found that there had been a breach of Article 3 in respect of the 
children. Regarding Article 5.1, drawing upon the Mubilanzila case that explained 
above, the ECtHR stated that there was no reason to decide differently on this case 
regardless of the situation that mother accompanied her children at detention centre. 
Since the four children were held in a closed centre designed for adults, the ECtHR 
found that there had been a violation of Article 5.1. This case law demonstrated that 
conditions and length of detention play a significant role in terms of breach of the 
ECHR. Although the ECtHR did not set a time limit for detention of minors, it 
considered that time in detention should be fairly short for children.  
The Human Rights Committee’s approach towards detention of minors, 
however, did not differentiate from its approach towards immigration detention in 
general. The Human Rights Committee had the chance to examine a case regarding 
immigration detention including minors. In the case of D and E, and their two 
children v. Australia174, an Iranian family with two children were detained after their 
unauthorised entry to Australia by boat. Their asylum application was subsequently 
rejected and they were detained for over three years. The complainants challenged the 
                                                
173 Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v Belgium App no 41442/07 (ECtHR, 19 January 2010). 
174 D. and E., and their two children v Australia (2006) Communication No. 1050/2002, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/87/D/1050/2002. 
 52 
authorities’ decision to detain their children under Article 24175 of the Covenant. 
Nevertheless, the Human Rights Committee noted the effort of the authorities to 
provide detained children proper education and recreational programs outside the 
facility and found this claim inadmissible. In relation to Article 9, even though the 
Court found that this detention was arbitrary, there was no specific reference to 
children. The reasoning of the Human Rights Committee for the decision of breach 
carried the same features as the cases previously mentioned. The State Party could not 
justify this lengthy detention according to the Human Rights Committee. However, 
there was no special consideration as a consequence of this case including the 
detention of minors.  
Beyond hard law, General Comments by the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child have brought up more detailed issues and clarifications on children’s rights and 
especially migrant children’s rights. General Comments are the documents that clarify 
the rights stated by the human rights conventions. Since the context in the 
international field is constantly changing, the conventions should be read from 
different perspectives from time to time and the missing parts should be filled in. 
After the formulation of the Conventions, new human rights issues can arise in certain 
countries. Rather than having a new convention on this new issue, General Comments 
could address them if these issues are related to the rights in one of the Conventions.  
Although they are not like treaties that need to be signed and ratified, they still have 
their legal authority. This is why it is important to analyse General Comments in order 
to understand the extensive implications of the rights mentioned in the Convention.  
These General Comments mostly define the conditions, facilities and services 
that a detention centre should have in the case of holding children. For instance, 
General Comment 5 obliges States Parties to develop capacity building and training 
programs for the people who work with or for the children. 176 The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child mentioned the people who work with the children at institutions 
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and detention centres or in peacekeeping forces. States Parties are responsible for the 
organisation of these sorts of training in order to promote children’s rights.  
Further on, General Comment 6177 is a response to the increasing numbers of 
children who are in vulnerable situations, such as being unaccompanied and separated 
from their families. This General Comment is an important step forward for the rights 
of unaccompanied, separated, asylum-seeking or irregular migrant children. It clearly 
explicates the obligations of the States Parties towards not only children who are 
citizens but also children who are attempting to enter the country.178 The rights 
mentioned in the CRC and committed to by the States Parties upon ratification should 
be available to all children including refugee and migrant children irrespective of their 
nationality, immigration status and statelessness. 179  Furthermore, this General 
Comment articulates detention such that detention cannot be justified on the grounds 
of being unaccompanied or separated, or on children’s migratory or residence status, 
or lack thereof.180  
In relation to conditions and facilities, General Comments recommended that 
living quarters should be separated from adults and suitable for children.181 According 
to these General Comments, the fundamental approach should be care rather than 
detention. Services such as community resources, medical treatment, psychological 
counselling and legal aid should be made available to children.182 They should be able 
to make regular contact with their relatives, friends and guardians. They still have the 
right to education that takes place preferably outside of detention centres. The right of 
children to recreation and play should be still secured by the authorities as mentioned 
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in the Article 31 of the Convention. 183 The best interests principle should be in 
practice in all decisions in relation to children in detention. 184 
CONCLUSION 
There are certain set standards such as non-arbitrariness or lawfulness regarding 
immigration in general. In relation to children, there are more detailed standards such 
as the best interests principle or certain levels of care adapted for children’s needs at 
detention centres. In addition to this, the ECtHR’s position has been non-
interventionist even though some cases forced the Court to answer complicated issues 
involving lengthy detention or detention for administrative purposes. Regarding 
detention of minors, the ECtHR set standards concerning conditions of detention 
centres and duration of detention. Although the standards were not clear-cut, they still 
limited the wide discretion of states to a certain extent. The Human Rights 
Committee, on the other hand, analysed the cases through proportionality and further 
justifications. However, its approach has not changed when children were involved.  
With the increasing use of detention powers by states on the basis of 
sovereignty and effective border controls, international law has evolved accordingly. 
International law, with the help of case law, reports and General Comments has been 
seeking to find a balance for this practice between sovereignty and human rights. 
There has been a trend of a demand for a more restrictive approach to detention of 
minors.185  However, the picture drawn in this chapter regarding international human 
rights standards of detention of minors reveals that there are certain expected 
standards on decision to detain such as the principle of last resort, conditions as being 
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suitable for children and duration of detention as the shortest appropriate period of 
time. Nevertheless, these standards will still be limited due to the sovereign right of 
states to decide on the issues within their borders.  
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CHAPTER 3. TURKEY’S HISTORICAL RECORD IN RELATION 
TO COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
Domestic law evolves in time as a response to different contextual developments. 
These developments could be domestic such as change of public opinion or economic 
recession. On the other hand, there could be a development, which occurs at the 
international level, such as joining a transnational union or a conflict in a 
neighbouring region that could influence domestic law. To know and understand 
these developments affecting law-making is very important in order to analyse the 
reasoning behind change in domestic law. To serve this aim, this chapter explains the 
evolution of Turkey’s immigration law with reference to the international and national 
actors’ involvement in this process. While this chapter explains immigration law’s 
history in general terms, it mostly traces how child detention finds its place within this 
immigration law. This chapter follows a chronological order of what changed in the 
immigration legislation and policy in Turkey and international and national reactions 
to the law and practices in relation to immigration detention.  
Turkey’s history could be characterised by a long tradition of immigration and 
asylum.186 Over 1.6 million people migrated to Turkey, especially from Balkan 
countries between 1923 and 1997. Thousands of people from the Communist states in 
Eastern Europe sought asylum in Turkey and were settled to third countries by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) during the Cold War.187 
Following this, asylum seekers from Iran, Iraq and other developing countries arrived 
in Turkey during the 1980s.188 Conflicts, tension and wars in the region resulted in an 
increase in the numbers of asylum seekers. During 1988 to 1999, Turkey faced mass 
arrivals of Kurdish refugees from Iraq and also Albanians, Bosnian Muslims and 
Pomaks.189 In total, Turkey was the host country to almost one million asylum seekers 
and refugees during this period of time. Recently, Turkey has become a transit 
country for irregular migrants on their way to the European Union (EU) due to its 
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geographical location190 as well as becoming a destination country for people from 
former Soviet bloc countries and Middle Eastern countries.191 As a result of the on-
going war in Syria, Turkey is a host country to 2.7 million registered Syrian 
refugees.192 
Despite the volume of immigration towards Turkey, immigration law did not 
adequately manage the consequences of this influx during this period. Turkey’s 
immigration history can be broken down into three phases in terms of the evolution of 
its domestic law. These three stages could be listed as follows: a legal vacuum period 
before 1994; transition period towards international norms between 1994 and 2001 
and the last period characterised by European Unionisation.193  
I. LEGAL VACUUM PERIOD (PRE-1994) 
The first period could be named a ‘legal vacuum stage’ in terms of immigration law in 
Turkey. During this period, there were not many laws or regulations regarding a 
migration management system. Although there was not an extensive immigration 
management system, Turkey still had certain legislation and policies before 1994. In 
1934, the Turkish Parliament passed the Settlement Law, which was in use until the 
2006 Settlement Law.194 The Turkish Parliament brought this piece of law in 1934 
while trying to find an answer to how to sort the issue of migration of people with 
Turkish descent or Turkish culture to mainland Turkey.195 This law basically sets the 
parameters of asylum in Turkey.196 It also determines how people of Turkish origin 
could come back to mainland in order to settle. This was strictly just for people of 
Turkish origin since that period was characterised by nation-state building attempts by 
the Government under the recently established Republic following the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire. Since this law did not include any systematic regulations regarding 
migration management, this period has been characterised as a legal vacuum 
                                                
190 Ahmet İçduygu and Damla B Aksel, ‘Irregular Migration in Turkey’ (International Migration 
Organization Turkey September 2012) 17. 
191 Kirişci (n 186).  
192 ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response’ (UNHCR) <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php> 
accessed 4 September 2017. 
193 Ahmet İçduygu, ‘Demographic Mobility over Turkey: Migration Experiences and Government 
Responses’ (2004) 15 Mediterranean Quarterly 88, 90.  
194 İskan Kanunu [Settlement Law] 1934, No: 2510. 
195 İçduygu and Aksel (n 190) 40.  
196 Celia Mannaert, ‘Irregular Migration and Asylum in Turkey’ (2003) UNHCR New Issues in 




While 1934 Settlement Law sets limited basic rules about migration management 
in Turkey, there were two additional laws passed in 1950 concerning foreigners’ 
residency and travel. The law on foreigners’ residency and movement198 briefly states 
that if a foreigner’s stay is seen as being against national security, political or 
administrative interests, that person could be asked to leave the country in a given 
amount of time. If voluntary leave does not happen, authorities could deport 
him/her. 199  In this way, this law sets the conditions for deportation without 
mentioning detention or detention centres. However, this legislation has a critical part 
declaring that authorities are obliged to accommodate ‘political’ asylum seekers till 
their asylum application’s decision is reached.200 This brought the establishment of 
guesthouses for asylum seekers in Turkey. Another piece of legislation during this 
period, the Passport Law201, was drafted in 1950 and basically categorises types of 
passports for Turkish citizens and briefly sets out how people without valid passports 
or visas could be rejected at the border. This law, however, does not have any 
connotations regarding immigrant detention. In summary, these pieces of legislation 
did include a few principles of immigration management yet they did not bring 
systematic or detailed regulations in general.   
Within this legal vacuum period, in 1983, the Ministry of Interior Affairs 
published a directive on refugees’ guesthouses.202 Before analysing this directive, it is 
essential to look closely what foreign guesthouses are. Contrary to its name, these 
guesthouses are in fact detention centres, which detainees were held involuntarily and 
were not allowed to leave freely.203 Definition of detention centres was made by 
UNHCR as follows, ‘custodial settings ranging from holding facilities at points of 
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entry, to police stations, prisons and specialized detention centres’.204 Despite their 
official name, Turkey’s guesthouses undeniably fell under this definition.205 Foreign 
nationals were detained in guesthouses for several reasons such as alleged criminal 
activity, illegal entry or exit from Turkey or failure to fulfil requirements of 
temporary asylum system.206 The reason for their detention was usually implementing 
administrative procedures like deportation or transfer to a satellite city207. There was 
no court order needed to justify their detention. It depended on an administrative 
ruling provided by the Ministry of Interior.208 This resulted in the lack of clear and 
foreseeable law for detainees. Furthermore, Turkish regulations did not mention the 
appropriate duration of detention.209 Refugees could be kept under detention until 
they got their visa to leave the country or they were transferred to a satellite city.210 
Additionally, the conditions of the guesthouses were very problematic in terms of 
poor nutrition, mixed accommodation and inadequate bedding.211 It is clear to say that 
the guesthouses were very different from accommodation centres that are sites used 
only for asylum seekers and their accompanying family members.212  
As mentioned before, the Ministry of Interior Affairs published a directive on 
these guesthouses. Drafting this directive on the guesthouses coincided with the 
arrival of asylum seekers from Middle Eastern countries. This directive sets the 
division of labour between authorities regarding management of the guesthouses. 
While the police force is responsible for the security of the guesthouses and asylum 
seekers, the decision to build guesthouses is under the Ministry of Interior Affairs’ 
responsibility. The directive also states that the duration of accommodation of asylum 
seekers would be temporary and would end once their case is finalised.213 The 
directive also mentions facilities that the authorities should be providing to asylum 
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seekers. Food would be served three times a day.214 A laundry, reading rooms and a 
canteen are the facilities that are to be provided to detainees.215 Visits to the 
guesthouses would be dependent on the Ministry of Interior Affairs’ decision.216 
While the technicalities of detention practice such as facilities were explained in this 
directive, there was no regulation in relation to conditions of detention and legal basis 
for detention. This was the continuation of the lack of clear and foreseeable 
legislation for detainees.  
II. TRANSITION PERIOD TOWARDS INSTITUTIONALISATION (1994-
2001)  
a. Changes in Immigration Legislation 
This leads us to the next period of Turkey’s immigration management that covers 
1994 to 2001. Turkey faced large influxes of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing 
events taking place in Southeast Europe during the 1990s.217 After 1989, for example, 
large numbers of Bulgarians of Turkish ethnic origin fled the oppressive regime in 
Bulgaria.218 Due to war in Bosnia, around 25,000 Bosnian Muslims sought refuge in 
Turkey between 1992 and 1994.219 Beyond migration from European countries, 
Turkey also witnessed a large wave of migrants from non-European countries during 
this period. Due to the change of regime in Iran after 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war, 
Turkey opened its borders for people fleeing Iran to stay temporarily in Turkey. 
Under this policy, around 1.5 million people came to Turkey between 1980 and 
1991.220 In addition to this, Iraqis form the second largest group of non-European 
refugees who fled to Turkey during this period.221 First large influx occurred in 1988 
due to Iraqi military attack on the Kurds because of their support towards Iran during 
the Iran-Iraq war. Between 1988 and 1991, around 600,000 people came to Turkey in 
search of protection.222 Beyond these mass and one-time influxes, there was a 
constant move towards Turkey from Iraq due to years of political instability, conflict 
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and poverty in the region.223 Beyond that, Turkey became a transit country for people 
from countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Pakistan on the way to the 
West. 
The 1994 Asylum Regulation224 was brought as a response to these large influxes 
of refugees and asylum seekers stated above. However, this was not the only reason 
for this piece of legislation. It also aimed to solve the issue of Turkey becoming a 
buffer zone where asylum seekers and other migrants were stuck due to stricter 
European border controls.225 This regulation was the turning point towards change 
and institutionalisation in immigration management policies.226 It basically gave the 
responsibility of status determination for asylum seekers to the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs instead of the UNHCR.227 It set the obligation of being recognised by the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs before being able to be referred to the UNHCR for 
resettlement.228 Furthermore, under this framework asylum seekers had to register 
with the police within five days of entry to Turkey – a requirement that caused 
criticism due to the short amount of time given for such registration.229 Although this 
regulation was a basis for asylum procedures in Turkey, it referred to the Refugees’ 
Guesthouses Directive only very briefly.230 Unless stated otherwise, this Directive 
was to be the basis for treatment of refugees. In addition to that, it mentioned that 
asylum seekers whose application was taken by the Ministry of Interior Affairs would 
be accommodated in one of the guesthouses in Turkey. As mentioned above, this 
would mean detention of asylum seekers until their application reaches a decision. In 
general, this regulation was significant in terms of bringing structure to the 
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immigration system. However, it also resulted in an increase in the State’s 
authoritative power over migration management.231  
b. The Approach of the International Community to Turkey’s Progress 
As mentioned before, new policies and legislation can be introduced due to 
several dynamics. So far, it is obvious that Turkey’s immigration law was influenced 
by mass influxes caused by regional conflicts. In addition to this, it is essential to see 
what type of opinion the international community had towards Turkey’s immigration 
law in order to find out whether there was any impact of the new legislation on the 
international community’s opinion. The EU’s progress reports on Turkey are very 
significant in order to see this impact. They only date back to 1998, as it was the time 
that Turkey’s EU negotiation process started. The 1998 Progress Report232 defined the 
problem of irregular migration to Turkey on the way to West. It also mentioned 
concerns over Turkey’s border controls and suggested re-admission agreements with 
third countries.233 It also offered cooperation with the EU on migration-related issues 
and suggested Turkey bring new regulations and law on this area. The following 
year’s report234 also stated irregular migration statistics for Turkey and pointed out 
Turkey’s position as a transit country instead of a destination country. However, 
increasing numbers of irregular migrants apprehended in Turkey revealed the need of 
establishing accommodation centres for these people and allocating funds for this 
area.   
The 1999 Progress Report suggested a new way of centralised organisation for 
border controls as border controls were under the responsibility of different branches 
of the army and police in Turkey. It specifically stated concerns over the conditions in 
which asylum seekers were kept and recommended improvement of these conditions. 
Lastly, the 2000 Progress Report235 appreciated Turkey’s efforts of cooperation with 
the EU on border controls and training of officials. It suggested acceleration of efforts 
to decrease the numbers of irregular migrants to European countries. It again 
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recommended the need for establishing suitable accommodation centres for asylum 
seekers.  
Apart from the EU’s progress reports, the same kind of concerns could also be 
seen in the European Commission’s reports. In 1999, the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance236’s country report237 on Turkey highlighted the lack 
of comprehensive immigration policy. It also recommended that Turkey take 
necessary measures to introduce an immigration policy as a response to rising 
immigration into Turkey.238 The following year’s report still pointed out a lack of 
comprehensive immigration management system.239 Its second country report on 
Turkey also mentioned the use of excessive force by law enforcement officials against 
irregular migrants in Turkey and the harsh and degrading conditions of detention for 
irregular migrants.240 It also stated that rising criminalisation of migrants should be 
prevented and necessary complaint mechanisms should be put in place in order to 
follow unlawful behaviour of law enforcement officials.241 Therefore, it is clear that 
the EU and the European Commission were increasingly critical of both Turkey’s 
asylum procedures and its border and immigration policies in the late 1990s.242 
III. “EUROPEANISATION” PERIOD (2001-) 
Turkey’s further step towards proper immigration law started with beginning of the 
EU negotiation process after 1999. This period could be characterised by 
Europeanisation as the third period of Turkey’s immigration law.243 It is clear that up 
to 1999, Turkey had not shown much improvement on its immigration law.244 The 
statistics showed a dramatic increase in terms of asylum applications and arrivals to 
Turkey. While the number of foreigners who came to Turkey was 6,762,956 in 1995, 
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this number reached to 27,024,609 in 2010.245 The asylum statistics also showed a 
steady increase during this period. While the number of asylum applications was 
2,024 in 1995, it was 8,190 in 2010.  
Immigration law became one of the top concerns on government officials’ list 
due to external pressure, such as from the EU, instead of local policy concerns.246 
Thus, the beginning of the EU accession period could be named as the crucial turning 
point247 and main driving force behind development of the immigration policies and 
legislation in Turkey.248 This part of the chapter will follow a chronological order in 
terms of the developments in Turkey’s immigration law and the dynamics that have 
potential influence on these developments.  
Due to the EU’s concerns over immigration issues, asylum and migration were 
main elements of the agenda of reforms during the accession period.249 As a first step 
of the accession period, Turkey signed Acquis Communautaire through a national 
programme focusing on justice and home affairs.250 This Accession Partnership 
Document included some priorities and targets for Turkey’s immigration law. These 
were as follows251: 
• Develop training programmes on Community law and on the implementation of 
the Justice and Home Affairs252 (JHA) Acquis. 
• Further develop and strengthen JHA institutions with a view in particular to 
ensuring the accountability of the police. 
• Start alignment of visa legislation and practice with those of the EU. 
• Adopt and implement the EU Acquis and practices on migration (admission, 
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readmission, expulsion) so as to prevent illegal migrations. 
• Continue strengthening border management and prepare for full implementation 
of the Schengen Convention. 
According to these targets, Turkey wrote a national programme for the adoption 
of the Acquis in 2001.253 Within this programme under the subject of JHA, Turkey 
put comprehensive targets on the asylum and migration issue, such as alignment of 
Turkish visa legislation and practices with the EU Acquis. There were also specific 
targets such as further development of accommodation facilities and social support 
mechanisms for refugees or adoption of the EU Acquis and practices to prevent illegal 
migration.254 Due to the importance of migration issues in the eyes of the EU, Turkey 
established a Special Task Force in the field of migration and asylum, on which 
several state agencies responsible for border control, migration and asylum are 
represented.255 They started working on a national action plan on migration and 
asylum.  
a. The Approach of the International Community to Turkey’s Progress (1) 
International reactions to these kinds of improvements are significant in order to see 
how the development of law and policy is affected by these international reactions as 
a next step. Following signature of the EU Acquis and forming the national 
programme in 2001, the EU’s progress reports on Turkey should be mentioned in 
order to see the international community’s opinion on this area. The 2001 Progress 
Report stated that there were some improvements on areas such as strengthening 
border controls with building new checkpoints and starting negotiations for 
readmission agreements with countries like Iran, Pakistan and Bangladesh.256 The 
report also mentioned the EU’s concerns over growing numbers of irregular migrants 
to Turkey.257 These improvements and pressure led Turkey to consider adopting or 
reviewing legislation on asylum, which was appreciated by the EU in the report. The 
work towards ameliorating accommodations and conditions for refugees was started 
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in two refugee guesthouses at Yozgat and Kirklareli.258 Officials pointed out the 
necessity of new guesthouses in 11 different cities.  
The 2002 Progress Report appreciated Turkey’s formation of the Special Task 
Force within the Ministry of Interior Affairs, composed of representatives from 
several ministries and law enforcement officials, which is mentioned above.259 This 
report also referred to Turkey as not only a transit but also a destination country for 
illegal migration flows for the first time.260 It stated the statistics of irregular migrants 
apprehended in 2001. Finally, the 2003 Progress Report indicated that the Special 
Task Force finished their work on alignment with EU Acquis on border 
management.261 It also stated that the trend of irregular migration via Turkey had 
shown a decrease.262 Turkish authorities reported that increased efforts and measures 
targeting irregular migration led routes to divert away from Turkey in 2002 and 
2003.263 There was no reference to the guesthouses or return centres in this report.  
In 2003, the EU revised its 2001 Accession Partnership Document and Turkey 
adopted a new national programme accordingly. The Revised Accession Partnership 
Document stated a few short-term and medium-term targets for Turkey to follow on 
the immigration issue. Some of them were as follows264: 
 
Short term: 
• Reinforce the fight against illegal immigration, negotiate and conclude as soon 
as possible a readmission agreement with the European Community. 
• Improve the capacity of public administration to develop an effective border 
management, including the detection of forged and falsified documents, in line with 
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• Adopt and implement the Acquis and best practices on migration (admission, 
readmission, expulsion) with a view to preventing illegal immigration. 
• Continue alignment with the Acquis and best practices concerning border 
management so as to prepare for full implementation of the Schengen Acquis. 
• Start with the alignment of the Acquis in the field of asylum including lifting 
the geographical reservation to the 1951 Geneva Convention; strengthen the system 
for hearing and determining applications for asylum; develop accommodation 
facilities and social support for asylum seekers and refugees.  
 
The Revised Accession Partnership Document still took the same approach as the 
2001 Accession Partnership Document. Turkey’s national programme, formed in 
2003 according to this revised Accession Partnership Document, put a timeline for 
necessary changes in two topics as legislative and institutional changes.265 In the area 
of asylum, the national programme listed necessary legislative changes such as 
alignment with the Joint Action of 26 April 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis 
of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, establishing projects and measures to 
provide practical support in relation to the reception and voluntary repatriation of 
refugees, displaced persons and asylum seekers, including emergency assistance to 
persons who have fled as a result of recent events in Kosovo.266 In the same area, 
necessary institutional changes were the establishment of additional refugee 
guesthouses and shelter houses and reception centres for asylum seekers; developing 
social support mechanisms for refugees; strengthening social support mechanisms that 
are being provided for the vulnerable; recruitment and training of personnel such as 
experts for psycho-social support and interpreters. 267  In the area of irregular 
migration, Turkey promised alignment with EU legislation related to irregular 
migration flows in the national programme. Necessary legislative changes included 
issues like adopting Council decisions and recommendations on carrying out 
expulsion measures or adopting a uniform format for residence permits. 268 
Institutional changes were the establishment of expulsion centres and training of 
personnel to be employed at these centres.  
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This highly Europeanised influence on Turkey’s national programme could also 
be seen in the budget for these plans. For instance, while the establishment of 
expulsion centres had a budget of twenty million euros, three quarters of the budget is 
from the EU resources.269 Apart from this financial support, there were twinning 
projects on asylum and immigration and combating trafficking in human beings with 
Austria, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom in order to help to build up 
institutional capacity and form training programmes.270 Several training seminars 
were organised for Turkish officials on EU practice on these areas.271 Following this 
revised national programme according to the Revised Accession Partnership 
Document, the 2004 Progress Report appreciated the start of the work on a National 
Action Plan by the Special Task Force to implement the asylum and migration 
strategy adopted in 2003.272 It also mentioned that training sessions were completed 
with law enforcement officials.  
In addition to the EU’s progress reports, there are other institutions in 
international arena that submit reports on Turkey’s approach to human rights in the 
area of immigration. Council of Europe (COE) is one of those institutions, and Turkey 
has been a member since 1949. The Commissioner for Human Rights273, as a non-
judicial institution under COE’s mandate, does regular visits to member countries and 
submits country reports on human rights issues such as protection of vulnerable 
groups or cultural rights. The Commissioner for Human Rights submitted his country 
report following an official visit to Turkey in 2003.274 In his report, he reported on the 
lack of suitable reception centres for asylum seekers.275 He criticised Turkey’s 
approach towards asylum as being more an internal security problem instead of 
human rights issue276. He recommended that Turkey work towards reaching European 
standards by amending current legislation.277  
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As an important step to answer this criticism, following their activities, the 
Special Task Force produced a National Action Plan for the adoption of the EU 
Acquis in the field of asylum and migration in 2005.278 This National Action Plan 
covered the legal arrangements that should be brought up within the harmonisation 
process with EU and measured necessary actions in finalising administrative set-up 
and physical infrastructure in order to adopt the EU Acquis within Turkish 
asylum/migration legislation.279 In relation to the detention centres, the Plan indicated 
necessary steps for accommodation centres for asylum seekers, refugee guesthouses 
and return centres for aliens to be returned.280 The Plan stated that work should be 
done towards establishment of accommodation centres and guesthouses for applicants 
who have applied for asylum and who have not yet been granted the status and those, 
who have been granted the refugee or asylum seeker status, for whom residence 
outside of detention centres is not deemed appropriate.281 These centres with a 
capacity of around 750 people should be built in seven different regions in Turkey 
and serve as Regional Centres. The Plan referred to EU Council Directive on 
reception centres as a source of the state’s responsibility on providing shelter and 
suitable physical reception conditions to asylum seekers.282 It also covered return 
centres to host aliens who are to be returned to their origin countries until the 
completion of their procedures. Necessary legal arrangements should be made 
regarding the operation of these centres and recruitment of staff to be employed in the 
centres.283 The Plan referred to participation of NGOs and negotiations with the 
relevant institutions and agencies during the establishment of a reception system. This 
Action Plan covered broad issues regarding the establishment of detention centres and 
the scope of detention.  
The following year’s progress report commends the finished version of the 
National Action Plan on asylum and migration as progress.284 It recommended that 
this plan should be put into action as soon as possible by the officials.285 While these 
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new steps are appreciated, reports showing that some asylum seekers at the border are 
prosecuted for illegal entry and deported are still the EU’s main concerns. People who 
are apprehended away from the border are not always allowed to apply for asylum as 
their illegal entries are seen as acts in bad faith.286 This resulted in difficulties for the 
UNHCR in accessing such people while they are under detention. Lastly, the report 
also encouraged Turkey to improve the efforts to ameliorate reception conditions.287  
As mentioned above, the COE is an organisation that submits reports on its 
member countries. Apart from that, the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE (the 
Assembly) consists of 318 representatives from the parliaments of the COE’s 47 
member states. While the Commissioner for Human Rights under the COE is an 
independent expert submitting reports, the Assembly is formed of member states’ 
representatives that make it a political mechanism. In this way, Commissioner’s 
reports and the Assembly’ resolutions carry different role and character. The 
Assembly could demand answers from Presidents and Prime Ministers regarding 
critical human rights violations. The Assembly submits resolutions regarding critical 
issues in member countries.  
In 2005, the Assembly published a resolution on the issue of asylum seekers and 
migrants in Turkey.288 In this resolution, the Assembly called on the Government of 
Turkey to continue the process of amending or introducing new legislation regarding 
irregular migration. Furthermore, there were some recommendations on improving 
the accommodation and social support services for asylum seekers and refugees.  The 
Assembly also called on Turkey to review certain requirements on asylum 
applications such as the ten-day limit for filing an application and to improve its 
financial and technical resources to deal with illegal migration in a more effective 
way. 
 Following year, the Assembly published another resolution due to growing 
concern over irregular migration in Europe.289 In this resolution, the Assembly 
basically set minimum conditions for detention of irregular migrants such as that 
detention should be as a last resort and not for an excessive period of time. It also 
stated the standards for child detention for immigration law enforcement. Regarding 
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detention of families, separate accommodation should be made available. The rights 
of irregular migrants such as the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention or 
communication with the outside world whilst under detention were reiterated to the 
member states. During the same year, the Assembly composed another resolution on 
irregular migrants and found it necessary to remind the member states on their human 
rights and humanitarian obligations regarding detention of irregular migrants.290  
During 2006, the EU revised the Accession Partnership Document and 
established targets (some of which are listed below) for Turkey under Justice, 
Freedom and Security.291  
 
• Continue to develop and strengthen all law enforcement institutions and align 
their status and functioning with European standards, including through developing 
inter-agency cooperation.  
• Establish an independent and effective complaints system to ensure greater 
accountability of the police and gendarmerie. Develop the use of modern investigative 
techniques and crime prevention strategies.  
• Continue efforts to implement the National Action Plan on Migration and 
Asylum, to combat illegal migration and to conclude urgently a readmission 
agreement with the EU. 
• Adopt and begin implementation of the National Action Plan on Border 
Management, in particular through de-mining of the border. 
It is clear that the EU called for more alignment with the European standards on 
immigration, more cooperation with the EU on institutionalisation, and more training 
for law enforcement officials in this revised Accession Partnership Document. 
Beyond its revised Accession Partnership Document, the EU also evaluated Turkey’s 
progress in its regular progress reports as mentioned above. In its 2006 Progress 
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Report, the EU stated that only limited progress was made in the field of migration.292 
Although the National Action Plan was being implemented, it still did not provide 
details on deadlines. In the area of asylum, there was still much improvement needed 
in the legislation in order to provide appropriate protection for asylum seekers. It held 
that the capacity at the reception centres needed improvement and these facilities 
needed renovation. The EU also asked for clarification on the institutional 
responsibility for these centres. Like the 2006 Progress Report, the 2007 Progress 
Report could not relate much improvement in the field of migration and asylum.293 
The report pointed out that new legislation was necessary in these fields and it was 
important to improve the reception conditions and accommodation arrangements. 
According to these comments and recommendations from the EU, Turkey 
submitted a national programme in 2008.294 In this national programme, Turkey set 
targets in terms of legislation and institutional capacity in the area of asylum and 
migration within a timeline. While some of the legislative changes were forming a 
common unit for asylum migration under the Ministry of the Interior or harmonising 
the means of struggle against illegal migration, institutional changes were still 
concerned with the establishment of reception centres for asylum seekers and removal 
centres for aliens. These were scheduled for between 2009 and 2011. Within the same 
year, Turkey formed a Development and Implementation Office on Asylum and 
Migration Legislation and Administrative Capacity (Asylum and Migration Bureau) 
in order to keep promises made to the EU to establish a common unit for asylum and 
migration. This office was established under the Ministry of the Interior. Their 
responsibilities are carrying out studies, projects and analysis on the legislative and 
administrative structure in line with the National Action Plan on asylum and 
migration and national programmes.  
After explaining the context in Turkey in terms of targets and plans, it is essential 
to look at the international context for the reasons mentioned above. The Assembly 
wrote a resolution on irregular migration flows as Europe’s “boat people”, due to 
growing concerns on irregular migration and irregular migrants’ human rights.295 In 
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this resolution, the Assembly reminded the member states of several principles of 
which they need to be aware during immigrant detention. These are for example: 
detention must be authorised by the judiciary; duration of detention; vulnerable 
persons’ treatment; facilities and services that every reception or detention centre 
needs to have; separate accommodation for families and communication with the 
outside world.296  
The EU’s 2008 Progress Report on Turkey reported the statistics of irregular 
migration and capacity to accommodate illegal migrants. 297  This capacity was 
increased from 1512 to 1793.298 The report states that limited progress can be reported 
on the management of irregular migrants in Turkey. Regarding the detention and 
deportation procedures, the officials need to inform detainees in a language they can 
understand. Duration of detention should be limited by law and reviewed on regular 
basis. The conditions of detention centres need to be ameliorated. The segregation 
should be based on gender, age and criminal record. Family members should have the 
right to be accommodated together. The report recommended that Turkey provide 
services to detainees (such as access to free legal aid or asylum procedures; 
recreational activities or counselling) in close cooperation with national and 
international organisations. The report pointed out there was no specific training for 
staff working in this area and there was no compatible data system in migration.  
Apart from the EU and the COE, Turkey has ratified Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC).299 Within this domain, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(the Committee) submits concluding observations depending on reports submitted by 
member states. Since detention of children for immigration law enforcement is the 
main focus for this research, the Committee’s concluding observations are very 
significant in terms of understanding problem areas. Although the situation of minors 
in the case of detention was not particularly mentioned in the documents stated 
previously, the Committee’s observations that will be mentioned in this chapter 
include issues regarding detention of minors.  
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In 2009, the Committee wrote a concluding observation on Turkey regarding 
children in armed conflict.300 Within this observation, the Committee referred to 
refugee and asylum seeking children’s identification. It criticised Turkey for not 
having a regular and appropriate identification, reintegration and recovery scheme for 
children who might have been involved in the hostilities. As mentioned before, the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the COE visits member countries and writes 
country reports afterwards. In 2009, the Commissioner’s visit to Turkey was followed 
by a detailed country report.301 In his report, he pointed out the inadequate conditions 
of detention centres in Turkey.302 He mentioned they were usually overcrowded, dirty 
and insect-infected without hot water. Outside communication was limited due to 
fares for public telephones and a shortage of such phones. Food was generally in low 
quality and low in nutritious level. Children were kept with their parents in the wards. 
There were not any separate accommodation facilities for families. The 
Commissioner held that detention of families should be a last resort and for a limited 
period of time. The Commissioner appreciated the Government’s effort to shorten 
duration of detention.  
The same year’s Progress Report also mentioned Turkey’s progress in the 
migration and asylum area. 303  The EU appreciated the establishment of the 
Development and Implementation Office on Asylum and Migration Legislation and 
Administrative Capacity even though the report mentioned that the resources of the 
office are very limited compared to its responsibilities. The report also referred to the 
capacity of the accommodation for irregular migrants as being low although new units 
were established. There was limited progress on establishing a network of six centres 
for reception, screening and accommodation of refugees and asylum seekers, two 
centres for illegal migrants and a new set of procedures and management rules for 
these centres. Following criticism in the CRC’s previous report, Turkey established a 
screening system for apprehended irregular migrants in order to identify people in 
need of protection, which was appreciated by the EU.  
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b. Civil Society Reports  
To start with, there are only a handful of civil society reports on Turkey’s detention 
practices. Helsinki Citizens Assembly (HCA) published two reports on the conditions 
of the detention centres and detention of minors respectively. In the first report, HCA 
conducted interviews with 40 refugees who had experienced detention on 
immigration grounds at six different detention centres in Turkey.304 The interviews 
with these former detainees showed that overcrowding had been a major problem at 
the guesthouses and it sometimes led detainees to sleep on the floor due to lack of 
bedding. Meals served were low in nutritional and caloric value. Fresh vegetables or 
fruit were not being served. No drinking water was provided at detention centres 
where tap water was undrinkable. Communication with the outside was limited as 
costs to use telephones were really high and there was a limit on the number of 
visitors. Recreational facilities and activities were mostly unavailable to detainees. 
This report also showed that minors were detained for immigration law enforcement 
in the guesthouses against the principle of best interests of the child. It revealed that 
minors were housed with adults or with others accused of or convicted of crimes. At 
the end of the report, HCA made a detailed list of recommendations on legal rights, 
improvement of detention centres and alternatives to detention of minors.  
 The second report, published in 2010, was particularly on separated minor 
refugees.305 HCA conducted interviews with minor refugees, civil servants, UNHCR 
staff and members of NGOs for this report. It also reviewed their client files as they 
work closely with asylum seekers in Turkey to inform them of their legal rights and 
help with the procedure. Seventeen in-depth interviews were conducted with 
separated minor refugees. The findings demonstrated that minor refugees had very 
negative experiences at detention centres. Many of the interviewees reported 
overcrowded rooms, insufficient bedding and inadequate food at the detention 
centres.306 One of the minors mentioned that he was only given bread and cheese on 
some days and he was not provided any food on other days. Another minor reported 
that he was with 16 children with four beds in the room. Based on these findings, 
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HCA urged the Government of Turkey to comply with their international obligations 
in relation to minors and respect the principles brought by these obligations.307 HCA 
also recommended that the Government use detention only as a last resort and 
improve the conditions of the guesthouses.  
 
c. The European Court of Human Rights’ perspective on Turkey’s immigration 
law  
As a member of the COE, Turkey ratified the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)308 in 1954. This ratification gave the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) a mandate to rule on allegations regarding Turkey. The ECtHR decides on 
the cases regarding the civil and political rights stated in the European Convention on 
Human Rights. There are two possible ways of applying to the ECtHR: individual 
applications and inter-state applications brought by one state against another state.309 
The ECtHR’s decisions are binding on the states concerned. When the ECtHR issues 
a judgment on the case which confirms a violation, it submits the judgment to the 
Committee of Ministers of the COE in order to monitor the execution of the 
judgment.310 The monitoring of the judgment by the Committee especially ensures 
that the concerned state will pay the monetary compensation awarded to the applicant. 
In the cases of damage sustained, the ECtHR can decide on monetary compensation 
that will be paid to the applicant directly by the concerned state. Overall, the ECtHR 
is an essential part of this system of human rights. 
 In 2009, Turkey faced a case in front of the ECtHR regarding its detention and 
deportation procedures where there was not any relevant domestic case law regarding 
immigration detention.311 The applicants, Mohsen Abdolkhani and Hamid Karimnia, 
were Iranian nationals who were held in Gaziosmanpaşa Foreigners’ Admission and 
Accommodation Centre in Kırklareli (Turkey). As previous members of the People’s 
Mohajedin Organisation, they left Iran for Iraq to be trained at the camp. Due to 
disagreements with the organisation, they entered a refugee camp in Iraq. After their 
refugee camp was closed, they entered Turkey irregularly and were arrested and 
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deported back to Iraq on 17 June 2008. Right after deportation, they re-entered 
Turkey and were arrested and detained in police custody. During this period, they 
were not provided any legal assistance. They informed authorities about their 
background and refugee status under the UNHCR’s mandate. Following this, they 
were convicted of illegal entry to Turkey. Although they claimed their lives were in 
danger in the country of origin, the courts noted that they would be deported. The 
applicants were notified of neither the decision nor the reason of this decision.  
The first attempt to deport them failed as Iranian authorities refused their entry. 
The applicants claimed that their detention was a deprivation of liberty. The 
Government claimed that the applicants were not detained within the meaning of 
Turkish law, yet were accommodated pending deportation proceedings. The ECtHR 
concluded that in the lack of clear legal provisions establishing the procedure for 
ordering and extending detention for deportation proceedings, their detention was 
arbitrary due to the lack of adequate safeguards.312 The ECtHR stated that Turkey’s 
immigration management system lacked clear legal provisions regarding detention 
with a view to deportation. Following this judgment, there were fifteen cases within 
two years where the ECtHR found that Turkey’s detention centres conditions were 
threatening migrants’ human rights and most of these judgments demanded monetary 
compensation to be paid to applicants.313  
This case paved the way for other applicants that were in the same situation to 
bring cases to the ECtHR which ended with awards for monetary compensation. For 
instance, in Aliev’s case, the ECtHR clearly expressed that: 
The Court has already examined a similar grievance in the case of Abdolkhani 
and Karimnia v. Turkey (no. 30471/08, §§ 125-135, 22 September 2009), in 
which it found that in the absence of clear legal provisions in Turkish law 
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establishing the procedure for ordering detention with a view to deportation, 
the applicants’ detention was not ‘lawful’ for the purposes of Article 5 of the 
Convention. The Court has examined the present case and finds no particular 
circumstances which would require it to depart from its findings in the above-
mentioned judgment. 314 
 
In addition to this, the ECtHR also decided that applicants did not need to exhaust 
domestic remedies since Turkish domestic law did not provide any effective remedy 
for the people that were affected in these circumstances. Another example from 
Tehrani’s case, the ECtHR stated this argument: 
 
The Court reiterates that, under Turkish law, seeking the annulment of a 
deportation order does not have automatic suspensive effect and, therefore, 
applicants were not required to apply to the administrative courts in order to 
exhaust domestic remedies as understood by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention 
(see Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, § 59). The Court accordingly 
dismisses the Government's objections. 315 
 
The ECtHR also commented on the conditions of detention in Turkey in one of 
these cases. In the Charahili316 case, the applicant was a Tunisian national who came 
to Turkey and obtained a false passport because his documents were stolen. After his 
arrest by police officers in Hatay, he was detained at Fatih police station till he was 
transferred to Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre. During 
his time in detention at the police station, the applicant claimed that he was detained 
for nineteen months and twenty-six days in a dirty room that had serious ventilation 
problems.317 He claimed that the capacity of the room was exceeded so people had to 
share single beds. The Government claimed that it was not a detention facility; instead 
it was a guesthouse in the basement of the detention facility where the rooms were not 
locked. 318 Since the Government had not submitted any evidence to show the 
difference between the basement and the rest of the building, the ECtHR held that the 
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applicant was detained for almost twenty months in an ordinary police detention 
facility.319 Although the ECtHR could not verify the applicants’ allegations on the 
conditions of the detention facility, the inordinate length of time in detention 
amounted to a degrading treatment under Article 3320.321  
d. Circulars: Turkey’s domestic law progress   
Following these judgments and criticisms in international organisations’ reports, 
Turkey took some substantial steps in immigration management in 2010. First of all, 
the Ministry of Interior Affairs published a circular on illegal migration.322 In this 
Circular, the Ministry gave information about the measures that the authorities should 
take regarding irregular migration. It states that cooperation between authorities is 
essential. This Circular also explains further steps after apprehending irregular 
migrants. It notes that irregular migrants will be accommodated at return centres till 
their deportation proceedings end. Return centres will be established in cities in which 
law enforcement officials apprehend irregular migrants more frequently. These 
centres will be investigated with or without notice twice a year by the Police Force.  
As an attachment to this Circular, another document was sent to the authorities. 
This document set out the main principles and conditions with which return centres 
need to comply. It states that these centres should have three different sections for 
men, women and families. Facilities such as toilets, hot water and washing machines 
will be provided at the centres. Food will be served three times a day. Drinking water 
will be provided where tap water is not drinkable. Medical services will be provided 
at entry and exit. A doctor should see irregular migrants if there is an urgent situation. 
Recreational activities will be provided to migrants. This is the first time that the 
authorities formed a detailed directive regarding the management of return centres.  
In addition to this, the Ministry of Interior submitted another Circular on asylum 
seekers and refugees.323 This Circular points out that there is an on-going process on 
alignment with the EU Acquis regarding migration and asylum. Until new legislation 
is passed, the Ministry concludes that some major changes in the immigration 
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management system are needed in practice. Turkey was criticised severely on its 
restrictions on asylum applications of irregular migrants so far. In this Circular, the 
Ministry states that migrants who are apprehended because of illegal entry or overstay 
should be able to access asylum application procedures. Their applications should be 
directed to suitable authorities in the shortest period of time. This Circular is a step 
towards alignment with the EU Acquis.  
In 2010, there was one last circular on migration and asylum. This was submitted 
by Social Services regarding unaccompanied minors in Turkey.324 Unaccompanied 
minors are to be accommodated at facilities under the auspices of Social Services. 
The type of facilities in which they would be accommodated depends on their age and 
gender. This Circular states that unaccompanied minors should be sent to language 
courses after their settlement at state facilities. Before they reach 18, all arrangements 
should be completed to transfer the minors to guesthouses once they come of age. 
These three Circulars published in 2010 give a clearer picture on the measures that the 
authorities should be taking in the area of immigration management. They also carried 
a very similar tone with the EU’s recommendations to Turkey.  
e. The Approach of the International Community to Turkey’s Progress (2) 
Apart from sending out the Circulars discussed above to relevant departments, Turkey 
was also still working on legislative alignment with the EU Acquis. It is essential to 
investigate the reaction from the international actors during this period in which 
Turkey developed new legislation and made some improvements in this field. In the 
same year of these developments in Turkey, the Commissioner for Human Rights 
wrote a letter to the Minister of Interior of Turkey.325 In this letter, he welcomed the 
plans of the Government to introduce new legislation in order to prevent further 
human rights violations. He also appreciated the first steps taken by the ministerial 
circulars as explained above. He held that he received favourable comments from 
civil society members and the UNHCR regarding significant reforms Turkey has gone 
through. However, he mentioned a few problems experienced in practice such as 
some detainees’ access to asylum procedures. He recommended that Turkey ensured 
its reforms were reflected in practice and that such developments became a stable 
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feature of the immigration management system.  
The EU’s progress report of the same year appreciated the ministerial circulars on 
migration and asylum. 326  As mentioned above, Turkey was undertaking a 
comprehensive programme of new legislation on foreigners. The progress report 
pointed out that full implementation of the new circulars and fast adoption of the new 
legislation is a key priority in order to provide fair procedures for the detention and 
deportation of irregular migrants.327 The report also addressed the judgment of the 
ECtHR on Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey and Charahili v Turkey, mentioned 
above, in order to show Turkey was still in the early stages of its transition to a 
modern, efficient and fair management system. 328  The EU appreciated the 
establishment of new removal centres in different cities of Turkey. The EU reminded 
Turkey to raise awareness among administrators, governors, municipalities and the 
public on the rights of irregular migrants and procedures in migration management.  
In 2011, the European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) submitted 
a country report on Turkey.329 This report pointed out that Turkey still didn’t have a 
comprehensive asylum and immigration law.330 It also referred to the Abdolkhani and 
Karimnia v. Turkey case. The report stated that since this judgment became final and 
binding, two ministerial circulars as explained above were issued by the Ministry of 
Interior in order to remedy these kinds of problems. ECRI also welcomed the 
upcoming legislation under preparation on asylum and migration and noted that the 
Committee of Ministers, as part of their supervision responsibility, would examine all 
of these reforms.331  
Within the same year, the Assembly submitted two resolutions on irregular 
migration due to growing concern over the large-scale arrival of irregular migration 
flows. First one mentioned that member states should refrain from automatic 
detention, which should only be used when there is no other alternative.332 States 
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should ensure that detention conditions meet minimum human rights standards.333 
Vulnerable people should not be detained and should be provided with the necessary 
care and assistance. The Assembly’s second resolution was on the same topic.334 The 
Assembly called on member states to ensure that detention facilities are authorised by 
the judicial authorities. Detention should only happen where necessary and on 
grounds prescribed by law.335  
The 2011 Progress Report referred to Turkey as an important country of transit 
and a destination for irregular migration.336 The EU noted that the statistics of illegal 
entries coming directly or transiting from Turkey had increased significantly.337 The 
EU welcomed the efforts of expanding the capacity to host irregular migrants in 
decent conditions with a view to deportation. The EU appreciated preparation of new 
legislation regulating the status of regular and irregular migrants, asylum seekers and 
refugees in Turkey. It also noted that the circulars issued in 2010 had improved the 
practices of law enforcement forces. After the issuance of the Circulars, posters and 
brochures explaining the rights of irregular migrants were sent to all removal centres. 
However, the EU criticised the lack of systematic psychosocial services in the 
removal centres. It noted that access to legal aid is also limited at the removal centres.  
In 2012, the Committee on Rights of the Child mentioned asylum seeking and 
refugee children in its concluding observations of Turkey.338 The Committee raised its 
concerns on the difficulties for asylum seeking and refugee children to access health 
and education and their detention with adults.339 The Committee called on Turkey to 
ensure that every effort is made to secure these children’ rights and provide 
counselling. The same year’s progress report by the EU pointed out that progress had 
been made towards enacting new legislation.340 The report noted that the work 
towards the new legislation341 is a significant step towards having a single and 
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comprehensive legislative framework in the area of immigration management.342 
Although the new law was on its way to adoption at the Parliament, there were no 
substantial administrative measures in order to improve the situation of irregular 
migrants. The capacity to host irregular migrants decreased to 2176. The report stated 
that minimum living standards at removal centres and their inspection remain 
unregulated. Lack of human and financial resources damaged the improvement of 
conditions at removal centres. There was no progress on providing psychosocial 
services to irregular migrants. The EU appreciated the training of the staff working in 
this area with national resources and support from the EU. Access to legal aid still 
remained limited. In the asylum area, the report welcomed the submission of the new 
law to the Parliament. The report noted that building of seven reception centres for 
asylum seekers and refugees funded by the EU was still on-going.  
f. Syrian Refugee Influx and Public Opinion on Immigration  
In addition to international dynamics, it is also vital to look at internal dynamics. 
Public opinion can be a significant factor for governments in deciding how they will 
act on a specific issue. Research was carried out on the Turkish public’s opinion on 
refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants.343 This research’s findings revealed 
that there was an obvious lack of information regarding numbers of irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers and confusion over terms such as irregular migrants and 
refugees.344 The interviewees in this research assumed that there was an insignificant 
number of asylum seekers or irregular migrants in Turkey. They also were not sure 
about the meaning of terms such as asylum seekers, refugees or irregular migrants. 
The interviewees mostly approached the topic in a positive way by saying that Turkey 
is a multicultural and welcoming country and so is Turkish society. There was also a 
compassionate concern factor in the interviews towards aliens in difficult 
situations.345 Beyond that, some interviewees mentioned that Turkey should stay 
Turkish without any interference with foreigners. 346  Few of them pointed out 
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Turkey’s weak economy in the sense that they assume aliens will come and steal 
‘their’ jobs.347 However, the research revealed that as there was no public discussion 
over migration and asylum issues at the time, public opinion did not have an impact 
on policy making unlike Western nations where negative perceptions influence 
policy.348  
Here, it is significant to bring the incoming Syrian refugee population to the 
discussion. As mentioned before, Turkey is a host country to 2.7 million Syrian 
refugees as of today.349 Nonetheless, this influx from Syria had a limited impact on 
the introduction of this new legislation. This can be related to the numbers of people 
arrived to Turkey and severity of the issue during the making of this legislation. 
While there were only 174,491 persons of concern on 1 January 2013, there were 
2,620,553 persons of concern on 15 February 2016.350 This demonstrated that during 
the law making process, Syrian refugee influx was a minor issue in terms of its 
numbers although the statistics proved otherwise in a short amount of time. This was 
also in line with the lack of public opinion explained above. However, the perception 
towards refugees has also recently changed in public eye. The research conducted in 
2015 presented that 84% of the respondents were worried by refugees coming from 
Syria and 68% of them wanted the government to introduce more restrictive 
immigration policies.351  This dramatic shift in numbers and so public opinion in a 
short span of time showed that the legislation might have had a different structure and 
focus if discussed at Parliament a few years later than it was. However, this lack of 
impact and public opinion during law making allowed the law-drafting group to be 
more liberal with the upcoming legislation. 
IV. THE LAW ON FOREIGNERS AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
(2013) 
It is clear that Turkey’s immigration management system was widely criticised by the 
EU and other international organisations of which Turkey is a member in terms of the 
lack of a comprehensive immigration and asylum policy in line with international and 
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EU standards. In the meantime, the Turkish authorities dealt with the issue with 
circulars and policies instead of adopting comprehensive immigration legislation. 
However, the work on the new law on Foreigners and International Protection 
started in 2009.  As mentioned before, the Government formed a Development and 
Implementation Office on Asylum and Migration Legislation and Administrative 
Capacity under the Ministry of Interior in order to keep promises to the EU to draft 
comprehensive legislation. This Office had been working on drafting a new law on 
immigration and asylum since 2009. Once the draft was finalised, the Cabinet 
submitted the work to the Head of Parliament and from there is was due to be sent to 
the relevant Commissions.352 Hence, it was sent to the Interior Affairs Commission in 
2012 for scrutiny. This was followed by revision and amendments by other 
Commissions such as the Justice and International Affairs Commissions. 353 
Subsequently, this was sent to Parliament, discussed in three sessions and adopted on 
4 April 2013.354  
This law is remarkable in terms of the reform it brought to Turkey’s immigration 
management system. It brings clear provisions about administrative detention of 
irregular migrants, as mentioned in the ECtHR’s previous judgments.355 The new law 
states that when law enforcement officials apprehend foreigners under Article 54, 
they should contact the governorship of the concerned city immediately. The 
governorship will decide on their status within the next forty-eight hours. If the 
governorship takes a removal decision, they should issue an administrative detention 
order for those who bear the risk of absconding or disappearing; have breached the 
rules of entry into and exit from Turkey; have used false documents; have overstayed 
in Turkey after the expiry of their visa or pose a threat to public order, public security 
or health.  
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The new law also states that the duration of administrative detention cannot 
exceed six months. However, if the removal is not successful due to the foreigner’s 
failure of cooperation or providing correct documents about their country of origin, 
duration might be extended to an additional six months. There should be monthly 
reviews on the need for detention. All of these decisions should be notified to the 
foreigner. Foreigners under administrative detention shall be held at removal 
centres.356 The directive regarding the management of the removal centres will be the 
main document to follow for the authorities. Lastly, emergency and primary health 
care services will be provided free of charge.357 Foreigners can have visitors and meet 
representatives from the UNHCR.  
The law mentions the best interests of the child principle and requires that 
families with children and unaccompanied minors will have separate accommodation. 
With regard to unaccompanied children, the new law takes the best interests of the 
child as primary consideration.358 The Ministry of Family and Social Policies will 
place unaccompanied minors in suitable units in the care of their adult relatives or a 
foster family. Children over 16 might be placed at reception or accommodation 
centres. Siblings will be accommodated together taking into account their interest, age 
and level of maturity.  
This new law established a new civilian institution called the General Directorate 
of Migration Management which the EU had recommended for Turkey since the 
beginning of the accession period. As mentioned above, there is a new directive on 
the management on the removal centres.359 This Directive states that the services that 
the removal centres are to have are as follows: shelter, food, security, emergency and 
primary health care, psychological and social assistance and separate areas for people 
in need. Providing these facilities could be read as an attempt to bring remedy to the 
EU’s and other international actors’ concerns as explained above. These centres will 
be inspected by the governorship on a regular basis. They will be also inspected by 
General Directorate of Migration Management every year and Ministerial Inspection 
Bureau every three years. This Directive puts clear provisions on the services and 
inspections. As discussed above, the EU had previously criticised the lack of such 
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services and inspections.  
In 2013, EU’s progress report appreciated adoption of this new law and called on 
Turkey to implement the legislation as a priority.360 The report also welcomed 
establishment of the civilian institution in the migration management system. 
However, there were still shortcomings on Turkey’s side regarding irregular migrants’ 
rights. The establishment of removal centres had not been completed.361 The EU 
criticised Turkey on the lack of structured psychosocial services for irregular migrants 
staying in the centres as they did a year before. In 2013, the Assembly also issued a 
resolution and urged Greece, Turkey and other Mediterranean countries to take 
necessary to measures to tackle irregular migration.362 The Assembly invited Turkey 
to take steps to improve the conditions of detention of irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers. 
CONCLUSION 
 The law has come a long way since the start of the evolution of legislation and 
policies on immigration in Turkey. During the first two periods, the Government did 
not prioritise immigration issues. They managed the massive influxes with circulars 
and regulations. These two periods also were characterised by a lack of any 
international reaction such as monitoring or progress reports, recommendation or 
resolutions.  
Finally, the final period that started with the EU’s membership application, 
witnessed the start of changes in the management of immigration legislation. There 
were several improvements in relation to managing asylum and immigration such as 
building removal centres and such as forming an office to start working on the new 
law. This period was also unique in terms of the international community’s 
involvement. While there was a constant and yearly monitoring by the EU’s progress 
reports, there were other actors that had a say on Turkey’s immigration management 
and in particular its detention policies such as the ECtHR, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child and Council of Europe.  
This period was followed by the adoption of new immigration and 
international protection legislation that provided several safeguards for the relevant 
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people. Turkey, now, has comprehensive legislation that follows the EU and 
international human rights standards. In the Parliamentary Commission meeting and 
parliamentary debates, there was a common opinion on the need for a new legislation 
in this area due to the EU alignment process and to bring remedy to issues pointed out 
by judgments of the ECtHR.363  In the Parliamentary Commission and parliamentary 
debates there was not a deep discussion or disagreement among political parties as is 
normally the case for other issues, such as reforms in national education or health.  
There was a dearth of public opinion on migration issues and no significant difference 
in the agendas of political parties and so the Parliament Members were in agreement 
in this new legislation. It was passed by Parliament after only three brief 
parliamentary sessions without any amendments.  
While this chapter aimed to list the history of the evolution of Turkey’s 
immigration law and policies and the international reaction to Turkey’s detention 
policies chronologically, they will be scrutinised in Chapter 5 with reference to 
parliamentary debates, Commission debates and interviews with selected officials 
involved in the recent law drafting process.  
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CHAPTER 4. THE UK'S HISTORICAL RECORD IN RELATION 
TO COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
Following the previous chapter on Turkey’s immigration law history, this chapter will 
be on the development of the UK’s domestic law in relation to immigration issues. 
This will have a specific focus on immigration detention. This chapter will also 
analyse international and national approaches to changes in the UK’s immigration law 
and practices in relation to immigration detention. As mentioned in the chapter on 
Turkey, domestic law evolves in time as a response to different contextual 
developments such as campaigning at domestic level or being a part of a transnational 
union. These developments can be important in terms of a state’s decision on 
compliance with human rights standards. This chapter will specifically trace how the 
UK’s approach towards immigrant detention has changed over the years and reactions 
towards these issues in a chronological order.  
As explained in the theoretical analysis of compliance theories, compliance is 
generally the result of international and institutional drivers, facilitated by domestic 
politics and structures364 with the motives of advancing their reputation or avoiding 
sanctions.365 The selected compliance theory for this thesis, on the other hand, came 
up with three distinct social mechanisms that change state behaviour in order to give a 
better understanding of states’ compliance: material inducement, persuasion and 
acculturation. This chapter will provide valuable data in order to find out whether the 
UK’s compliance can be read with one of those mechanisms. Analysis on these 
factors and application of Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’ theory to this case study 
will be presented in the next chapter.  
This chapter, with its four subchapters, seeks to explain the UK’s approach 
towards immigration detention with reference to contextual changes at domestic and 
international level within a timeline starting from the 1970s. The first subchapter will 
be on the period between 1971 and 1993 while touching issues like habeas corpus, 
the definition of detention and statistics during this period. Following this, the second 
subchapter’s focus will be on adult detention in the UK between 1993 and 2009. This 
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period was characterised by rising detention of irregular migrants and asylum seekers. 
The third part will analyse detention of minors in the UK with reference to domestic 
cases and statistics between 1993 and 2009. The last subchapter will evaluate the 
period after 2010 when the Government committed to end detention of minors for 
immigration law enforcement. In order to understand the history of the UK’s 
compliance with human rights standards, this chapter will be crucial in terms of 
revealing the dynamics that might have an impact on progress. 
 
I. ADULT DETENTION (1971-1993) 
a. Background of the 1971 Immigration Act and Its Implications 
The UK has always been a country that receives a significant number of 
migrants from different countries due to its colonial history. To summarise the 
immigration flows to Britain, it can be stated that 600,000 people were added to the 
UK’s population through immigration between 1961 and 1971.366 Another large 
influx happened between 1991 and 2001, during which time immigration added 1.1 
million people to the total population.367  Overall, the non-UK born residents in 
England and Wales has quadrupled between 1951 and 2011.368  
 
As a country with a long history of immigration, the UK had an established 
immigration law for a long time. The 1971 Immigration Act369 can be characterised as 
the start of modern detention in the UK immigration history even though the 1905 
Aliens Act370 provided immigration authorities with the power to detain. The 1905 
Aliens Act banned immigrants from landing without a medical examination and a 
permit from an immigration officer.371 People who were refused entry under the 1905 
Aliens Act were detained on board the vessels on which they had come to the UK 
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since there was no accommodation facility on shore.372 Following the 1905 Aliens 
Act, the 1971 Act was the start of modern immigration detention.  
The 1971 Act was the culmination of legislative changes which occurred in 
the 1960s.373 The 1960s was marked by policy changes towards Commonwealth 
immigration.374 Commonwealth citizens as citizens of colonies and former colonies of 
the UK had free entry to the UK before the 1960s. The Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act 1962 and 1968 were brought by the then Governments in order to manage high 
flow from Commonwealth countries to the UK as this phenomenon became an issue 
in the media and the public eye. Research carried out during the 1960s and 1970s on 
the public concern about immigration indicated that three-quarters of the British 
public believed that the UK had received too many immigrants without any strict 
limitations.375 While the 1962 Act brought statutory powers to refuse entry and deport 
Commonwealth citizens if they did so within 24 hours of entry, the 1968 Act 
introduced administrative removal for illegal Commonwealth entrants if caught within 
28 days and made the entry conditional for Commonwealth citizens upon their parent 
or grandparent being born in Britain.376  
Following these changes in immigration law, the 1971 Act clarified the 
powers of expulsion and codified the modern detention for immigration purposes.377 
The background of the 1971 Act could also be linked to motives in domestic politics. 
The Conservative party intended to satisfy the opponents of immigration after they 
won the elections in 1970.378 The general election manifesto by the Conservative 
Party in 1970 targeted the public’s concerns regarding immigration statistics and 
revealed that their plan was to bring a new unified system of control over immigration 
from overseas and give the Home Secretary authority of a complete control over the 
entry of individuals into the country.379  As a result, Parliament started planning a 
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comprehensive immigration bill to replace its old approach towards immigration.380 
This context brought the Immigration Act 1971 as a formal and statutory basis for 
immigration detention381 that also gave a strong message on limiting immigration to 
the UK.382 It was a clear sign of the Government’s intention to have wide powers on 
control over the entry of non-Europeans.383 
In terms of the Act’s content, immigration officers in the Home Office have 
the authority to detain or grant temporary admission to migrants subject to 
immigration control.384 As a general overview, this Act ‘legalized detention, pending 
completion of legal examination, a decision to remove, the execution of removal 
directions, or successful deportation’.385 These circumstances can be grouped under 
two main forms: people who are detained on entry and after entry.386 On entry 
detention occurs when there is a pending decision to admit, to change the conditions 
of admission, to allow ‘exceptional leave to remain’, to remove or to deport.387 
Detention happens after entry when there is a violation of permitted entry or 
overstay.388  
It is essential to state the statistics in the 1970s and 1980s in order to 
understand how widely these powers were used. Immigration statistics showed a 
steady increase in numbers of immigration detainees in the UK within this period. 
While the numbers of detained people under immigration purposes were just over 100 
until 1975, this statistics hit 1000 in 1980 and increased steadily after 1985 reaching 
3,138 in 1989.389 With regard to detention of minors’ statistics, available statistics at 
Harmondsworth detention centre, one of the main detention centres in the UK, 
showed that there were 271 children detained in 1978.390 This number was 315 in 
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1979 and 131 in 1981.391 During this time period, the UK did not have many 
established detention facilities compared to the numbers under detention. Detentions 
usually occurred at Harmondsworth, Gatwick and Queen’s Building within those 
years.392 Due to overcrowding at Harmondsworth, many other detainees were kept in 
local prisons.393 Although they were not brought before the courts when they were 
detained under the 1971 Immigration Act powers, they were still treated as prisoners 
and experienced the same treatment as prisoners in the prisons.394  
b. The Approach of Domestic Courts towards Immigration Detention 
Domestic courts interpreted the 1971 Act in several cases. Courts’ jurisprudence can 
be a push factor on states towards compliance with human rights standards in the 
presence of an alignment between jurisprudence and human rights standards. 
Domestic courts can use international law to force lawmakers to change their 
legislation and policies in a case of inconsistency between practice and international 
standards. On the other hand, unless there is such alignment, states can use Courts’ 
jurisprudence in order to support non-compliance with human rights standards. For 
this reason, domestic courts’ approach to detention is worth mentioning as an 
important dynamic at domestic level.  
The 1971 Act does not require any judicial approval mechanisms. This has 
resulted in increasing arbitrariness in the cases.395 Under these circumstances, an 
alleged illegal entrant can challenge a decision to detain him through habeas 
corpus396.397 In the Azam and Others case, the applicants were illegal entrants before 
the 1971 Act came into force and were detained for six months pending the 
conclusion of proceedings.398 They were apprehended after the 1971 Act passed. They 
applied for habeas corpus and claimed that they had ‘settled’ status when the 1971 
Act passed. This would give them an indefinite leave to remain as settled people as 
long as they were not in breach of immigration laws under the 1971 Act. However, 
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the Court took a more restrictive interpretation and decided that they were in breach 
of immigration laws by their illegal entry. Their illegal entry in the first place made 
their detention lawful.  
Following this case, another case came before the domestic court in 1976. In R 
v. Governor of Risley ex parte Hassan399, the applicant, from Pakistan, was detained a 
year after his entry to the UK on the suspicion of entering the UK illegally. He 
claimed that he obtained a six month tourist visa during his entry. However, he lost 
the passport that contained this six month tourist visa stamp. He was detained for a 
month pending an application for habeas corpus. The Court stated that as long as the 
Government claimed that detention was based on its existing power to detain, the 
burden to prove the illegality of detention would be on detainees.400 This reflected the 
changing approach towards Commonwealth citizens in the 1968 Act. It became 
obvious that there is a very limited burden on authorities to justify immigration 
detention. The Court held that it would be satisfactory if the executive merely asserts 
its powers under the 1971 Immigration Act.401 
In 1983, in the Khawaja case, after the appellants had obtained leave to enter 
the UK, the Home Office noticed that they both gained this permission by practising 
fraud or deception at the ports of entry.402 For this reason, the immigration officers 
decided that the appellants should be detained with a view to deportation as illegal 
entrants. However, both of the appellants took the case to Court. In the judgment, the 
Court stated that habeas corpus should be available to all as there should be no 
distinction between citizens and aliens.403 This interpretation can be seen as very 
significant as it provided an equal right to all against administrative detention.404 
Within the same year, the Administrative Court introduced several principles 
on the duration of detention and stated the limitations on power to detain in the 
Hardial Singh405 case. The Administrative Court stated that the Secretary of State’s 
power to detain was subject to several limitations even though the Act did not provide 
any specific limitations on the duration of detention. Firstly, detention could only be 
                                                
399 R v Governor of Risley Remand Centre, ex parte Hassan [1976] 2 All ER 123, [1976] 1 WLR 971.  
400 Wilsher (n 395) 84.  
401 ibid 85. 
402 Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [1982] Imm AR 139, [1983] 2 WLR 321. 
403 Wilsher (n 395) 86-88.  
404 ibid 87. 
405 Singh, R (on the application of) v Governor of Durham Prison [1983] EWHC 1 (QB), 1984 1 WLR 
704. 
 95 
authorised if there was an on-going process on the making of a deportation order or 
pending detainee’s removal.406 No other reason could be used to justify detention. 
Since power to detain was only given to ensure deportation to be finalised, length of 
detention had to be limited to a time that was reasonably necessary for this aim.407 In 
addition to this, the Secretary of State should not use its power to detain in a situation 
where it was clear that the deportation order could not be finalised in a reasonable 
amount of time.408 Lastly, the Court emphasised that the Secretary of State should act 
with due diligence throughout the removal process.409 Thereby, the Administrative 
Court set out criteria for lawful detention for immigration law enforcement through 
this case. However, the case law does not clarify to what extent the Hardial Singh 
principles should be applied. It is not clear whether these principles can be applied to 
cases where the individual is awaiting a decision on its asylum application.410 411 
c. Parliament’s Secondary Agenda: Administrative Detention 
It is essential to be familiar with the arguments brought forward in Parliament in order 
to understand the dynamics that can have a potential impact on the approach towards 
immigrant detention. 412  Parliamentary debates are central to understanding the 
reasons for compliance or non-compliance with human rights standards in terms of 
immigration detention. Since compliance is determined by Parliament, particularly 
initiated by Government, parliamentary debates are the place to search for the soul of 
the reasoning for compliance or non-compliance. Given that states have the capacity 
to enforce change, the willingness to comply will be still dependent on the calculated 
political costs.413  
With regard to child detention for immigration purposes, it can be stated that 
this issue was not extensively on Parliament’s agenda in the 1970s and 1980s. Low 
numbers in detention statistics might be the reason for lack of attention by Parliament 
                                                
406 ibid para 7. 
407 ibid. 
408 ibid. 
409 ibid para 8.  
410 Harriet Samuels, ‘Administrative detention in immigration cases: the Hardial Singh principles 
revisited’ (1997) Public Law 623, 627.   
411 While there was not any international law reference within these judgments, it is still important to 
acknowledge them in order to see the Court’s perspective towards immigration detention during this 
period. 
412 Chapter 3. Turkey’s Historical Record in Relation to Compliance with International Standards did 
not, however, include any parliamentary debate on immigration detention as the archival research has 
shown that Turkish Parliament did not discuss immigration detention at any point except during the 
adoption of new legislation in 2014.   
413 Haas and Bilder (n 364) 46. 
 96 
members. In 1979, the Government was asked to give statistics regarding detention of 
minors at Harmondsworth centre and whether any special care arrangements had been 
made in order to protect children welfare.414 After providing the numbers of minors 
detained, the answer about special arrangements was as follows: 
If a child admitted to the detention centre is, or looks to be, under 17 years of 
age he is allowed to be with his/her parents if they, too, are detained. 
Unaccompanied children are placed in the care of a selected female detainee. 
Female Securicor orderlies must be present at all times that children are 
detained. Small children of either sex sleep in the women's quarters.415 
This topic also came to Parliament’s agenda in 1986 as there was a question directed 
to the Secretary of State regarding what type of childcare was provided in detention 
centres.416 It was revealed that children were not detained unless accompanied by one 
or both parents.417  
Adult detention was discussed frequently in the House of Lords and Commons 
in the 1980s. The discussion was mostly on length of detention; numbers of people 
detained under Immigration Act 1971; and the cost of the overall procedure of 
detention.418  It was requested from the Secretary of State to provide numbers 
detained overnight at Harmondsworth, Gatwick and Queen’s Building and also prison 
establishments. 419  The answer revealed that 93 people were detained at prison 
establishments across the UK on 31 March 1987.420 Since costs to taxpayers were 
high to detain people at detention centres, temporary admission was suggested as a 
possible alternative to detention.421 However, this suggestion was not accepted as 
suggested that this might hamper the operation of immigration control.422 It was 
argued that in order to protect the integrity of immigration control, detention had to be 
used on necessary occasions given that the UK did not use power to detain 
excessively.423  
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In addition to that, conditions in the detention centres, such as  the meals 
provided and access to necessary information in different languages were also 
questioned.424 It was stated that a wide range of meals seek to cover all dietary 
requirements as far as possible and work on providing necessary information to 
detainees in different languages was under the way.425  
II. ADULT DETENTION (1993-2009) 
This chapter seeks to establish a framework for adult detention in the UK. It will 
explain how administrative detention of adults become a standard practice between 
1993 and 2009 with reference to statistics, parliamentary debate on detention and 
international monitoring bodies’ approach to this measure. Since this period covers a 
long timeline, this chapter divides this period into two as 1993-2000 and 2000-2009 
in order to have a clear picture.  
a. 1993-2000 
a.1. More Asylum Applications, More Administrative Detention 
 
The end of the Cold War and greater accessibility to global mobility were the 
significant features to define the period after 1989.426 The UK was one of the 
countries affected by those developments in the world. During the 1990s, the UK 
faced high and constant levels of immigration to the country.427 The sharp increase in 
asylum applications started at the very end of the 1980s. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, 
the number of asylum seekers considerably increased.428 Between 1988 and 1991, the 
number of asylum applications rose to 44,840 from 3,998 in 1988.429 This rapid 
increase reflected itself on the detention statistics and new legislation. The detention 
statistics showed an increase in parallel as some of these asylum seekers were held on 
arrival. 430  In addition to this, some of the asylum seekers were not deported 
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immediately after their applications were refused.431 Thus, they were housed in 
prison-like detention centres.432 Whereas the number of detained people under 1971 
Act powers were just 1,086 in 1985, this number reached 5,778 in 1993 and 10,240 in 
1995.433  
Until the 1990s, the UK did not have many permanent detention centres.434 
Increase in the numbers of detained people resulted in expansion of detention 
facilities throughout the country. The Home Office announced that another 300 
immigration detention places were under way especially for detention of asylum 
seekers in November 1991.435 In November 1993, the Campsfield, Oxford detention 
centre was opened as the first purpose-built camp for immigration detainees with a 
capacity of 186 places.436 This was followed by expansion of facilities at the end of 
the 1990s. Following the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, three detention centres 
were built: Oakington – around 400 places, Harmondsworth – 530 places and Yarl’s 
Wood – 900 places.437  
a.2. The UK’s Domestic Law Response to Rise in Asylum Applications 
 
The rise in the number of asylum applications was not welcomed by the British public 
as asylum seekers were seen as a threat to the welfare state and national identity.438 
The Governments also approached this phenomenon with caution. For this reason, the 
1990s saw a new Act regarding asylum issues every three years.  
Asylum was an important driver in terms of the UK’s immigration policy 
since the statistics in asylum applications showed a rapid increase after 1990.439 This 
increase pointed out a need for a new legislation and the Government announced the 
new Act in 1992.440 The 1993 Act was aimed to deal with the high number of asylum 
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applications, the delay in processing claims and the challenges of making decisions.441 
The 1993 Act provided rights of appeal for asylum applicants.442 It also brought in the 
procedure of fingerprinting for asylum seekers and their children.443  
Within this period, administrative detention was regulated by the executive 
guidelines prepared for the Home Office staff.444 These guidelines explained that 
detention should be used as a last resort in order to effect removal or prevent 
absconding or offending.445 They refer to certain situations such as illegal entry, or 
fraud on documents as a substantial risk of absconding.446 In addition to this, the 
Immigration (Places of Detention) Direction was in place as it indicated where to 
detain people. This Direction stated that a person could be detained at secondary 
examination areas at ports, Prison Service establishments, Immigration Service 
detention centres and police cells.447 
Following the 1993 Act, the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 announced a 
list of countries where there was no ‘serious’ risk of persecution and thereby 
applicants from these countries were only allowed to apply to the accelerated appeals 
procedure.448 The appeal right given under the 1993 Act was thus undermined. 
Finally, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 introduced a ‘one-stop’ appeal process 
replacing the appeal process and did not provide any appeal rights for migrants that 
entered illegally.449 With regard to detention, the 1999 Act did not touch the main 
points of the 1971 Act. It only created statutory rules regarding management of a 
detention centre such as an appointment of a manager and declaring general rules for 
management of detention centres.450 Detention centre rules, which will be mentioned 
below, came into force in 2001. The 1999 Act also provided automatic bail 
hearings.451 However, this procedure was never implemented.452 
                                                
441 Cohen (n 376) 95.  
442 Asylum and Immigration Appeal Act (n 437), sch 2.  
443 ibid. 
444 Immigration Service Instructions to Staff on Detention, 31 December 1991 and 20 September 1994; 
Wilsher (n 395) 89.  
445 Immigration Service Instructions to Staff on Detention (n 444).  
446 ibid.  
447 Immigration (Places of Detention) Direction 1996; Home Secretary, Fairer, Faster and Firmer - A 
Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum (White Paper, Cm 4018, 1998). 
448 Asylum Claims.  
449 pt IV Appeals, One-Stop Procedure.  
450 ibid pt VIII Detention Centres and Detained Persons.   
451 ibid pt III Bail.  
 100 
These Acts were passed by the Conservative and Labour Party Governments 
consecutively in the 1990s. Although these two parties are from two different sides of 
the political spectrum, their Governments in the 1990s approached immigrant 
detention and asylum seekers in a similar manner. Immigration policy still gave a 
strong message about the Government’s fight against irregular migration and bogus 
refugees.453  The 1990s did not see any changes on detention measures regarding 
adults, minors or families. In addition to this, detention practices expanded, including 
asylum seekers as was seen in the statistics. Hence, this period, covering between 
1990 and 2000, did not experience any milestones with regards to the UK’s 
compliance with human rights standards.  
a.3. The Resistance of Parliament to Change 
 
In 1990, there were questions directed to the Secretary of State regarding the number 
of people detained for immigration purposes; places of detention and the number of 
asylum seekers in detention within these statistics.454 The written answer to these 
types of questions usually gave statistics for that exact date as there was no central 
record maintained.455  There were also inquiries with regard to the duration of 
immigration detention and any measures taken to reduce length of detention.456 The 
Minister of State explained the longest duration of detention was nine and a half 
months at that certain date.457 With relation to steps in order to reduce the duration of 
detention, the Minister of State declared, ‘Use of the power to detain under the 
Immigration Act is already kept to the minimum, and continuing detention in 
individual cases is regularly reviewed at progressively senior levels’. 458 
In 1991, detention of asylum seekers was discussed in terms of the Secretary 
of State’s plans for the future such as increasing the use of this measure or reducing 
the numbers kept in prisons.459 As an answer to this question, it was stated that 
persons were detained for immigration purposes only if they had not complied with 
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the terms of temporary admission or release.460 Thereby, in order to keep efficiency of 
immigration control, there were no plans to change this policy. It was also clarified 
that the places of detention could be prisons or detention centres depending on 
availability and the level of security required.461 In 1992, the Government was asked 
to provide information about the weekly cost of holding a detainee at a detention 
centre and a prison and the number of deaths which had occurred at Harmondsworth 
detention centre.462  
In 1993, there was an inquiry similar to the ones that had come before, 
regarding whether there were any plans to end detaining asylum seekers in prisons 
and the scale of increasing places at immigration detention centres.463 The answer was 
similar to the previous one as some immigration detainees might be held at prisons 
due to the lack of spaces.464 They also announced the plans to increase the number of 
places in immigration detention centres.465  
In 1994, the Secretary of State for the Home Department was asked what has 
been done to examine the duration of detention of asylum seekers in relation to the 
European Human Rights Convention (ECHR), Article 5.4.466 The answer from the 
Secretary of State stated that detention was only used when there was no alternative 
and people would not comply with the conditions of temporary admission.467 It also 
explained the rights of bail and appeal for detainees given under the 1993 Act.  
In 1997, the discussion was still about the use of power under immigration 
powers to detain asylum seekers.468 Mr Wardle of the Conservative Party claimed that 
the information about detention of asylum seekers were all misleading.469 He asserted 
that only a small proportion of applicants were detained. They were only detained if 
they were waiting for their removal or appeal in the case of risk of absconding.470 
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Parliamentary debates show that there was no attempt to change detention 
policy. Instead of this, the power to detain under the Immigration Act was always 
defended as an important part of asylum and immigration policy. Even though human 
rights standards from international conventions such as ECHR were brought before 
Parliament beside other issues such as places of detention, the policy of detention was 
defended and given priority over compliance with human rights standards for the 
efficiency of immigration control.  
a.4. The Approach of the International Community to the UK’s Immigration 
Detention Policy 
 
The international community’s opinion might result in introducing new legislation in 
domestic law in some countries with different motives such as sanctions, rewards or 
protection of reputation as mentioned within the discussion on compliance theories 
above. The selected compliance theory for this thesis stated that international 
institutions could change state behaviour by altering the cost-benefit calculations of 
that specified state.471 This potentially happens through increasing the benefits of 
compliance or the costs of noncompliance. 472  For this reason, international 
institutions’ critiques along with domestic actors such as domestic courts and non-
governmental organisation can be meaningful in understanding the factors which 
affect historical developments regarding compliance.  
The UK is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 473  Through this 
ratification, the UK has to submit reports on a regular basis and receive concluding 
observations or reports in return. In the 1990s, there were several reports written by 
the UK and also addressed the UK. At the end of 1994, the UK submitted a report to 
the Human Rights Committee474 regarding its application of the ICCPR articles into 
practice.475 The UK explained the conditions of detention centres in detail with 
references to outdoor/indoor facilities, provided meals, medical care and access to 
                                                
471  Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through 
International Law (Oxford University Press 2013) 23. 
472 ibid. 
473 ICCPR date of signature 16 September 1968, date of ratification 20 May 1976; CRC date of 
signature 19 April 1990, date of ratification 16 December 1991. 
474 The Human Rights Committee is composed of independent experts, their task is to observe the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its States Parties.  
475 The United Kingdom, ‘Fourth Periodic Report’ (19 December 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/95/Add.3.  
 103 
legal representatives.476 In addition to this, the UK explained in which circumstances 
detention was used and how the authorities regularly reviewed it.477 In 1995, the 
Human Rights Committee submitted its report on the UK.478 In this report, the Human 
Rights Committee stated its concerns over the treatment of irregular migrants, asylum 
seekers and people with a view to deportation.479 The Committee held that the long 
duration of the detention might not be necessary in every case.480  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments are crucial to look 
at in detail in order to have a general idea on international jurisprudence on this issue. 
As a member of the Council of Europe (COE)481, the UK ratified ECHR in 1951. 
Following this, the UK also accepted the optional clause that made the right of 
individual petition possible in 1966. This ratification and acceptance of this optional 
clause gave the ECtHR a mandate to rule on inter-state and individual allegations 
concerning the UK. In the case of violations by the UK, these judgments can award 
monetary compensation to the victim. In addition to the judgments against the UK, 
the Human Rights Act 1998 Section 2 482  states that ‘any judgment, decision, 
declaration or advisory opinion of the ECtHR should be taken into account by the 
domestic courts in the UK in relation to the ECHR rights. By adopting Human Rights 
Act in 1998, the UK Government widened the influence of the ECtHR judgments in a 
way that any ECtHR judgment should be taken into account by domestic courts. This 
should increase the potential level of influence of ECtHR on the UK.  
 The Chahal case483 in the 1990s was a landmark case relating to detention.484 
The applicant was a Sikh separatist leader who was under detention for six years in 
the UK. The ECtHR held that the as long as deportation proceedings are in progress 
and prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will be permissible.485 For this 
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reason, the ECtHR found that six years detention did not violate Article 5 of the 
ECHR due to the given exceptional circumstances of the case.486 Overall, while the 
ICCPR’s monitoring body was concerned over the widespread use of detention in the 
UK, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence had a more flexible approach towards detention for 
immigration purposes. This judgment points to the non-interventionist approach of the 
ECtHR in relation to immigration cases even when the right to liberty is at risk.487 
This gave the UK a wide discretion over the use of power to detain under the 
Immigration Act 1971.  
b. 2000-2009 
b.1. Rising Statistics of Administrative Detention and Expansion of Detention 
Centres 
 
In the 2000s, the UK was still under the Labour Party Government. This period of this 
Government in the 2000s can be defined as a ‘managed migration’ period.488 The 
general intention was to link the economy to migration policy due to the labour 
shortages in the UK, but also combat irregular migration at the same time.489 With the 
introduction of the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, the number of places for 
detention had immensely increased.490 Right after the 1999 Act, three detention 
centres were opened at Oakington, Harmondsworth and Yarl’s Wood as mentioned 
before. Oakington and Harmondsworth detention centres had a large capacity for 
families. In addition to this, Lindholme RAF base was redesigned as a removal centre, 
Dungavel prison was turned into a detention centre and a closed induction centre was 
established at Dover.491 Thereby, the Government followed its plans to expand its 
immigration detention estate in order to meet its commitment of 30,000 removals in a 
year.492 While there were 10,240 people detained under immigration act powers in 
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1995, there were estimated 23,940 people detained in the UK for immigration 
purposes in 2003.493  
b.2. The UK’s Domestic Law on Detention: Introduction of Fast Track and 
Policy Guidance  
 
In 1998, the Labour Government presented a White Paper to Parliament on their 
fairer, faster and firmer approach to immigration and asylum.494 This White Paper 
introduced detention under a fast track system for asylum seekers, which would be 
put into practice from 2000, in order to clear the backlog of applications and manage 
faster removals.495 The Minister of State announced that the fast track system would 
be in practice for only single men from the start of the asylum application till a 
decision was made.496 The features of this type of detention were a relaxed regime, 
legal representation on site, and seven days maximum detention.497 The Government 
expanded the capacity of fast track detention policy and started detaining single 
females at Yarl’s Wood detention centre in 2005.498 375 female asylum applicants 
were received into Yarl’s Wood detention centre and 1,205 applicants were detained 
at the Harmondsworth detention centre in 2006.499 
In addition to this fast track procedure, the Government passed the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act in 2002. The 2002 Act changed the name 
of the detention centres to ‘removal centres’. 500  Thereby, the name change 
emphasised the importance of detention in the removal of failed asylum seekers and 
others. The 2002 Act provided powers to detain to the Secretary of State in cases 
where previously the immigration service was bestowed with detention powers.501 
Along with the new Act, a statutory instrument called the Detention Centre Rules 
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2001 was passed by Parliament in 2001.502 This instrument set out the standards of the 
services provided by the authorities such as food, clothing, hygiene and outdoor 
facilities.  
The enforcement instructions and guidance for the immigration authorities in 
the 2000s are also significant in order to see the policy in practice. Chapter 55 on 
detention and temporary release states that detention is most usually appropriate to 
effect removal; initially to establish a person's identity or basis of claim; or where 
there is reason to believe that the person will fail to comply with any conditions 
attached to grant of temporary admission or release.503 It also said that detention must 
be used very carefully and for the shortest period of time.504 It advised immigration 
officers to consider temporary admission or temporary release if there is no strong 
ground that a person will not comply with conditions of temporary admission or 
release.505 In addition to that, all alternatives to detention should be taken into 
account.506 This guidance sets the power to detain with reference to the Immigration 
Act 1971 and mentions the factors that influence the decision to detain in detail.507  
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The 2000s were also significant in terms of the changing rhetoric of 
immigration policies due to the growing concerns over national security. Following 
9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings, the balance between securitisation and 
human rights became distorted. Governments put security as a priority in their 
policies in the United States and Europe. This, mostly, had an impact on the 
immigration policies in Western countries. The wide scale of immigration was 
perceived as a security threat by governments. 508  Following these attacks, 
immigration policies became stricter in order to improve security measures.509 The 
link between migrants and terrorism allowed governments to come up with 
exceptional measures that do not have a place in normal democratic politics.510 The 
trend in the immigration policies has become a “worst-case scenario” that justified a 
catch-all approach.511 This led to a situation where human rights can be overlooked 
for the sake of the country’s security. This has been seen in the conditions of 
detention centres and deportation processes.512  Governments in U.S. and Europe 
justified the sacrifice of human rights by arguing that this approach is regrettable but 
necessary for the security of their citizens. This approach can be implicitly seen in the 
UK Government’s decision on bringing a fast track system to detain asylum seekers.  
This period, in terms of the developments at domestic law and policy level, 
included several mixed steps towards compliance with human rights standards. On the 
one hand, one important development, fast track policy, widened the use of detention 
of asylum seekers. This was obviously a backward step for the UK’s compliance. 
Non-compliance steps were clearly a result of rising asylum applications and 
emerging necessity to control this rise. However, establishing detention centre rules 
was definitely a forward step towards compliance.  
b.3. Parliamentary Debate: Similar Approach to Similar Issues 
 
In the 2000s, Parliament discussed adult detention referring to different aspects such 
as cost, average time spent under detention, the statistics and new legislation. In 2000, 
the discussion tried to establish the capacity of planned detention centres at three 
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different locations and the criteria to detain asylum seekers and other immigrants.513 
The answer reflected the previous approach to immigration detention as inadmissible 
passengers, illegal entrants or people with a view to deportation would be kept under 
detention in these centres.514 It is clear that previous principles on detention remained 
unchanged. In 2001, the average length of detention was inquired, yet the answer was 
only accessible at disproportionate cost.515  
As mentioned before, the Detention Centre Rules were brought into force in 
2001. The scope of the Detention Centre Rules was mentioned in the parliamentary 
discussion. The inquiry was on whether this instrument would also be applicable to 
asylum seekers subject to detention. 516  The Secretary of State explained that 
Detention Centre Rules would apply to all detainees detained at immigration 
detention centres.517 In addition to this, the Government was asked whether the 
drafting of the Detention Centre Rules had involved enough consultation.518 It was 
stated that consultation with HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, NGOs, the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees, the Refugee Council, the Medical 
Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture and several others regarding the 
Detention Centre Rules took two years.519 In 2002, plans to expand the number of 
places for detention were revealed in parliamentary discussions.520 In addition to 
1,609 detention places in removal centres at that date, the Government stated that they 
were still planning to reach 4,000 detention places.521 
In 2004, the Secretary of State was asked about the number of immigration 
detainees held overnight in police cells in 2004.522 The response was that this 
information was not held centrally, yet immigration detention in police cells was kept 
to the minimum.523 On the other hand, the duration of detention was discussed in the 
House of Lords. It was questioned whether any steps had been taken to limit long 
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periods of detention.524 The answer to this inquiry yet again showed a similar 
approach as in previous years. It was argued: 
Detention is used sparingly and for the shortest period necessary. However, 
the power to detain must be retained to preserve the integrity of immigration 
control. Detention at Dover and Haslar, as with other immigration removal 
centres, is most usually appropriate in the following circumstances: initially, 
to establish identity and the basis of claim; where there are reasonable grounds 
for believing that an individual will not comply with the conditions of 
temporary admission or release; or to effect removal. In all cases detention is 
subject to regular and frequent review at successively higher levels within the 
Immigration Service to ensure that continued detention remains appropriate.525 
In addition to the places and the duration of detention, alternatives to detention 
such as electronic tagging were also discussed in Parliament. It was argued that the 
electronic tagging device might be used as an alternative to detention for immigration 
detainees depending on a decision of Chief Immigration Officer, adjudicator or judge 
of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.526 Electronic monitoring can be 
appropriate for families instead of detention after the risk of absconding was 
assessed.527 However, it was argued that this alternative for immigration purposes 
would be only available to people who are 18 and older.  
b.4. The International and National Community’s Approach to the UK’s 
Detention Policy and Permissive Tone of the Case Law 
 
As mentioned in the chapter on Turkey’s historical record of immigration law, the 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) is a human rights body 
of the COE528 that focuses on problems of racism and discrimination. As a member of 
the COE, the UK receives reports from the ECRI. Throughout the 2000s, the ECRI 
submitted several reports on the UK that mentioned detention for immigration 
purposes. The ECRI expressed its concerns over the increasing number of detention 
cases and the UK’s approach to irregular migrants and asylum seekers from a 
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criminalisation perspective.529 Furthermore, the ECRI also suggested that the UK 
should ensure that detention of children stays limited to cases where it is definitely 
necessary and that such detention should only be used on a temporary basis.530  
 The HM Chief Inspector of Prisons531 completed inspections at the UK’s 
immigration removal centres and submitted inspection reports in relation to 
conditions of these centres. For instance, the visit to Harmondsworth Immigration 
Removal Centre in July 2006 demonstrated that the conditions of the detainees’ 
rooms and showers were poor and needed improvement.532 Two years after this 
inspection, the Chief Inspector inspected the same immigration removal centre and 
checked whether the authorities had followed the recommendations given in the last 
inspection. This visit in 2008 revealed that some of the recommendations concerning 
the conditions of the detainees’ rooms, such as improving ventilation, had not been 
achieved.533 These inspections were made at different immigration removal centres 
such as Colnbrook, Yarl’s Wood, Dover and Tinsley House almost on a yearly or 
biennial basis.534 They all pointed out the poor conditions of the detention centres and 
urged the authorities to act to improve these conditions.  
In 2006, the Joint Committee on Human Rights535, as another national 
monitoring body, opened an inquiry on the treatment of asylum seekers.536 In this 
report, the Committee openly criticised the fast track procedure to detain asylum 
seekers and stated their concerns over the duration of this type of detention in 
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practice.537 It recommended that the Government ensure there is a time limit of 28 
days of detention for cases in which detention of an asylum seeker is unavoidable.538  
In 2008, the Commissioner for Human Rights, under the COE mandate, 
visited one of the immigration removal centres in the UK and wrote his report.539 He 
pointed out the lack of a time limit for administrative detention under Immigration 
Act powers.540 He also urged the authorities in the UK: 
…to consider the possibility of drastically limiting the practice of 
administrative detention of migrants, one problematic aspect of which is the 
high degree of discretion and broad powers of immigration officers… In the 
meantime, the Commissioner strongly recommends that a maximum time limit 
for administrative detention be introduced into the United Kingdom 
legislation.541 
 
The Human Rights Committee, under the mandate of ICCPR, also submitted 
reports and demanded further information on detention for immigration law 
enforcement during the 2000s. The Human Rights Committee stated their concerns on 
wide scale of detention of asylum seekers including children and holding asylum 
seekers in prisons542. Thereby, the Human Rights Committee recommended the UK: 
… review its detention policy with regard to asylum- seekers, especially 
children. It should take immediate and effective measures to ensure that all 
asylum-seekers who are detained pending deportation are held in centres 
specifically designed for that purpose, should consider alternatives to 
detention, and should end the detention of asylum-seekers in prisons. It should 
also ensure that asylum-seekers have full access to early and free legal 
representation so that their rights under the Covenant receive full protection.543 
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In addition to international monitoring bodies’ reports and recommendations, 
the domestic courts and ECtHR interpreted the fast track procedure in the UK within 
the Saadi544 case.545 Before being brought the attention of the ECtHR, the applicant 
took this case to the domestic court in the UK. The domestic court found the fast track 
detention policy546 lawful and reasonable. The House of Lords’ judgment sought to 
strike the balance between the management of asylum applications and the right to 
liberty within this practice and dismissed the appeal:  
It is regrettable that anyone should be deprived of his liberty other than 
pursuant to the order of a court but there are situations where such a course is 
justified. In a situation like the present with huge numbers and difficult 
decisions involved, with the risk of long delays to applicants seeking to come, 
a balancing exercise has to be performed. Getting a speedy decision is in the 
interests not only of the applicants but of those increasingly in the queue. 547 
After exhausting domestic remedies, the applicants brought their case to the ECtHR. 
The ECtHR’s judgment also decided that fast track detention of asylum seekers did 
not breach the ECHR considering the flexible conditions at detention centres in the 
Saadi case.548 The ECtHR elaborated on its decision, indicating that this fast track 
detention could not be branded as arbitrary while the detention centre was adapted to 
asylum seekers, duration of detention was only 7 days and the decision to detain was 
taken in a good faith and to serve a purpose.  
Even though international monitoring bodies such as ECRI and the Human 
Rights Committee criticised the UK over the extent of use of detention for 
immigration purposes, the ECtHR, on the other hand, found that fast track detention 
of asylum seekers did not breach Article 5 (1.f) of the ECHR. Thereby, the ECtHR 
did not find the policy unlawful. As stated before, such judgments which contradict 
international monitoring bodies’ view and declare the lawfulness of a policy can give 
a state a stronger ground to continue with its current practice. This judgment, in a 
way, eased the UK’s discomfort created by international monitoring bodies’ critique. 
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III. DETENTION OF MINORS (1993-2009) 
a. Statistics on Detention of Minors and Asylum Applications 
As explained so far in this chapter, the UK has a long history of detention for 
immigration law enforcement. Children were also part of this system as they were 
detained or deported with their parents or alone.549 Detention of minors became a 
routine part of the UK’s immigration law system from the start of the 21st century. In 
the 2000s, new detention centres (Yarl’s Wood, Dungavel and Tinsley removal 
centres) were built with allocated spaces for families and children as mentioned 
before. Instead of detaining families only before removal, families were detained 
indefinitely and for administrative purposes.550 Although this practice within the 
immigration system has been discussed widely in Parliament and criticised by 
domestic and international monitoring bodies, the Government justified it on the 
grounds of ensuring an effective immigration policy. This part of the chapter will 
touch on these issues. 
With regard to statistics, there had been no separate statistics showing how 
many children were detained for immigration purposes before 2009. As a result of 
persistent lobbying of NGOs551, and criticisms by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of 
Prisons552, separate statistics on detention of minors was made available to the public 
in 2009. Before this date, data on detention of asylum seekers were only given in 
quarterly snapshots and are no longer publicly available on the Home Office website.  
However, limited but available statistics revealed that detention of minors 
became a more frequent practice over time. While there were only 819 children 
detained in Harmondsworth between 1978 and 1982,553 there were 585 minors kept at 
Oakington only between September 2003 and September 2004.554 In 2007, the 
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Children’s Champion’s Office within the UKBA stated that 874 children were 
detained between May 2007 and May 2008, and 991 children for the calendar year in 
2008.555 
Asylum statistics, as an external dynamic, might play an important role 
influencing the Government’s decision to bring compliance or new legislation. 
Statistics show that there was a considerable decrease in the number of asylum 
applications after 2004. While the number of applications reached 80,000 at the 
beginning of the 2000s, this number dropped to 33,960 in 2004.556 This number 
showed a steady decrease until 2010, dropping to 17,916 in 2010.  
b. Where Does the UK Stand on Children’s Rights and Detention of Minors? 
In 1991, the UK ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) that 
provides important rights for all children, yet with a reservation that has significant 
implications in terms of immigration law. In practice, a reservation lets the state be a 
party to the treaty and exclude the legal effect of that specific provision in the treaty at 
the same time.557 The reservation to Article 22558 of the CRC stated that the UK 
retains its right to apply such immigration legislation as it may deem necessary to 
people who do not have the right to enter or remain in the UK. 559 With this 
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reservation, the UK aimed to keep immigration-related issues under its domestic 
control rather than being subject to international scrutiny. The reservation served as a 
protection for the Government to claim that issues related to immigration, even if 
concerning children’s rights, were under the UK’s control instead of the international 
human rights regime. The Government lifted this reservation to CRC in 2008.560 Until 
2008, several national and international organisations criticised the presence of this 
reservation and recommended that the UK lift it in order to show their commitment to 
children’s rights.561  
The presence of this reservation served as a protection for the UK in order to 
justify their treatment of minors for immigration purposes so far. Thereby, lifting 
reservation was a very noteworthy step towards compliance with human rights 
standards in the sense that the UK accepted its obligation to provide same level of 
protection for all children within the country. Although the lifting of the reservation 
was welcomed by all these domestic organisations, the announcement by the Minister 
for Borders and Immigration in 2008 that there was no plan to change legislation, 
guidance or practice caused disappointment since the lack of intention to change 
practice might make existing issues, such as not adopting the child’s best interests 
principle, persist.562  
Instead, in order to follow up this development, the UK Parliament imposed a 
general duty regarding the welfare of the children on the Home Office.563 The 
adaptation was stated in the 2009 Act as follows:  
Duty regarding the welfare of children  
The Secretary of State must make arrangements for ensuring that—  
(a)  the functions mentioned in subsection (2) are discharged having regard to 
the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children who are in the 
United Kingdom, and 
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(b)  any services provided by another person pursuant to arrangements which 
are made by the Secretary of State and relate to the discharge of a function 
mentioned in subsection (2) are provided having regard to that need.564 
 
Thereby, the Secretary of State has to promote and safeguard the welfare of the 
children in the UK within their arrangements. This was a very significant step for 
promoting children’s rights equally in immigration field as this would potentially 
bring a duty on the Home Office to safeguard the welfare of the children who do not 
necessarily have to be the citizens of the UK. In addition to this, this can be seen as 
another step towards compliance with human rights standards as these standards such 
as CRC require the consideration of the welfare of children as a fundamental 
principle. Furthermore, this duty was repeated in a statutory guidance for the UK 
Border Agency in 2009.565 This guidance set new duties for the UKBA regarding 
children’s rights, such as taking the child’s best interest principle as the primary 
consideration during detention or removal procedures.566  
In specific relation to detention of children, Parliament passed the Detention 
Centre Rules that has a particular section regarding treatment of children in 
detention.567 This instrument gave guidance on the situation of families and detention 
of minors. It stated that family members should enjoy family life within the security 
and safety of the detention centre. 568  Families and minors should be provided 
accommodation that is suitable to their needs and everything reasonably necessary for 
detainees’ protection, safety, well-being and care of infants should be provided.569 
This detailed instrument demonstrated that there was no intention to ban minor or 
family detention, instead providing rights and services within the limits of the security 
and safety of detention centres. Furthermore, UKBA’s guidance on detention and 
temporary release also structured policy on detention of minors during this period. 
First of all, UKBA has to conduct the criteria test in order to assess the age correctly 
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if there is an individual claiming to be under 18.570 However, if there is an individual 
who claims to be under 18, review on detention decision should be taken 
immediately.571 The guidance clearly declares that if the individual is found to be 
under 18, he, as an unaccompanied minor, must be released from detention into the 
care of a local authority.572 Only in exceptional situations may he be detained, 
normally overnight and with appropriate care, whilst alternative arrangements for 
their care and safety are made.573 The examples of the exceptional circumstances are 
listed in the instruction as follows: where there are no relatives or other appropriate 
adults immediately available to look after them; to separate them from adults thought 
to be a risk to them; or to prevent them from absconding pending a care placement 
being arranged.574 In these exceptional circumstances, unaccompanied minors can be 
detained at detention facilities overnight. 
 
c. Sensitive Topic on the Parliamentary Agenda: Detention of Minors 1993-2000 
Parliamentary debates are significant to look into in order to understand the dynamics 
underlying the approach to detention of minors. During the 1990s, issues related to 
detention of minors for immigration law enforcement led Parliament to discuss this 
topic more frequently than previously in the 1980s. In 1991, the discussion in 
Parliament was mostly on the numbers of minors detained and some of the members 
of Parliament asked for an assurance to cease this practice in the near future.575 In 
addition to this, the practice of fingerprinting procedures being applied to children 
was highly criticised.576 During the 1990s, detention of minors was a practice only 
used on a much smaller scale. Hence, there was not much attention from Parliament 
and civil society organisations. However, with the beginning of 2000s, this practice 
became more widely used. Hence, since 1996, the discussion before Parliament 
regarding detention of minors became more intense and detailed. Compliance with 
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international obligations regarding detention of minors for immigration purposes was 
mentioned. On the other hand, it claimed: 
Children are detained under Immigration Act powers only in the most 
exceptional circumstances. Authority at a minimum of inspector level is 
required for the detention of children under 18 and is reviewed by an assistant 
director within 24 hours. Unaccompanied young persons may be detained at 
around the age of 16 or 17 years. But in a large number of cases the true age 
may be the subject of dispute. Children younger than that will normally be 
held in detention centres only as part of a family unit. In those circumstances, 
the children may not be detained but accommodated with the detained parent 
or parents with their agreement. In those circumstances, the detention would 
be for a very short period only prior to removal of the family unit. We do not 
believe that our arrangements represent any breach of the United Kingdom's 
international obligations. 577 
In 1996, another parliamentary discussion was on a proposed amendment that 
suggested unaccompanied minors’ detention should not be permitted if there was no 
risk of absconding.578 It was supported by the argument that keeping children at adult 
detention centres was not appropriate. However, in rejecting this amendment, it was 
argued that the ECtHR’s case law demonstrated that 1971 Act was consistent with the 
ECHR. It was stated that: 
First, our record in relation to adhering to international obligations is very 
good in this country. The noble Earl is all too ready to note those few cases 
where the Government have lost a challenge on these issues, but the vast 
majority of cases, and in particular asylum cases, are won by the Government. 
Therefore, there is some imbalance in the criticisms made by the noble Earl. 
Secondly, the procedure described by law is satisfied by the 1971 Act which 
confers the power to detain as confirmed by Strasbourg. … 
…The noble Earl said that we are not consistent with our obligations under the 
ECHR. That is simply not the case. This is not just our law. Decisions of the 
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European Court of Human Rights have confirmed that the 1971 Act is indeed 
consistent with the convention. 579 
For this reason, there was no need to amend the current practice.580 Furthermore, the 
numbers detained were low and the detention was always used as a measure of last 
resort.  
Parliamentary debates after 1997 are a good indicator of the Labour Party’s 
attitude towards detention of minors. As mentioned above, the Labour Party followed 
a similar approach regarding irregular migration even though they adopted a more 
liberal immigration regime due to the market needs. After 1997, the UK’s reservation 
to CRC came to Parliament’s agenda and the Government responded that it had no 
intention of withdrawing this reservation.581 Following this, Parliament discussed Sir 
David Ramsbotham’s, the Chief Inspector of Prisons, report 582  written on the 
Campsfield House with reference to the conditions and numbers detained. 583 
However, it was asserted that detention was a regrettable but necessary consequence 
of immigration policy.584  
During the discussions regarding the 1999 Act, an amendment was suggested 
as follows: ‘A person who appeals under section 59 and who is under the age of 18 
shall not be detained for any period while the outcome of his appeal remains 
undetermined’.585 This amendment was opposed and stated that: 
The noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, says that every effort should be made 
to avoid detention of under-age children wherever possible. I agree, but we 
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recognise that there are certain limited circumstances where it is not possible 
for a short period of time to avoid detention. In those circumstances, 
Amendment No. 114, which would prevent detention ever, is not appropriate. 
I give one example of the circumstances in which such detention might be 
appropriate. A child's application is refused. He lodges an appeal; he 
absconds; he sleeps rough; he comes to the authorities late one night; and 
social services cannot respond. Amendment No. 114 means that he could not 
be sent to a detention centre even for the night.586 
Therefore, it was argued that detention was for child’s best interests until 
arrangements were made. With regard to family detention, it was asserted: 
It is our view that wherever possible the family should be kept together as a 
single unit unless the best interests of the child indicate otherwise. In family 
cases detention should again be for the shortest possible period, usually 
overnight prior to removal. 587 
Furthermore, it was also stated that there couldn’t be any lengthy detention as 
there was just one family unit at Tinsley House detention centre.588 With regard to the 
conditions of detention centres, specialist counselling; medical care and separate 
accommodation for families with children were suggested.589 There was no major 
opposition to these suggestions. Lastly, one amendment suggested a ten-day limit on 
the detention of asylum seekers at Oakington reception centre.590 The reasoning for 
this type of amendment was as follows:  
We simply tried to get the House to recognise that if we are to introduce the 
measure, there should be a limit on the time for which it applies. All we are 
asking is that while his application is looked into, an asylum seeker with no 
previous record of offending and no previous visits to the United 
Kingdom should not be required, by regulations that we have not seen, to be 
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under house arrest for more than 10 days. That should be long enough for 
someone to decide his status and how to deal with him. 591 
However, it was rejected by a majority vote. It was argued that detention would occur 
in order to have speedy results on asylum applications. Establishing a time limit on 
dealing with asylum applications and releasing the applicants before a decision was 
made might damage the meaning of this new policy.592 Furthermore, there were 
speeches against detention of children in the debate, but in response the ruling party 
explained the planned conditions at Oakington reception centre for asylum seekers 
and their families such as separate accommodation; short stay and flexible security.593 
However, further questioning on conditions of Oakington revealed its resemblance to 
any detention centre. It was stated that Oakington is a detention centre in terms of its 
design and current powers would be used to run it.594  
Overall, it can be stated that the approach towards minor and adult detention 
did not change regardless of the change in governing parties. Even though there was 
opposition towards this practice and so discussions over it, the majority of members 
of both main parties had still seen this practice as a ‘regrettable but necessary’ 
measure in the 1990s. 
d. The Approach of the International and National Monitoring Bodies: Criticism 
of the UK’s Detention Policy and Reservation to CRC 
In 1995, the Committee on the Rights of the Child submitted a concluding 
observation on the UK’s progress in terms of protection of child rights.595 This report 
was concerned about the UK’s reservation596, which is stated before, to CRC as this 
broad nature reservation might hamper the compatibility with the object and purpose 
of the Convention as it prevents migrant and asylum-seeking children from enjoying 
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the protection provided by the CRC.597 They also pointed out that the Immigration 
Acts couldn’t be compatible with the general principles of the CRC, especially 
Articles 2, 3, 9 and 10 of the CRC.598 The Articles concerned carry the core principles 
of the CRC such as the best interests of the child principle and anti-discrimination. 
Furthermore, detention-related parts of these Articles noted that detention should be 
used as a measure of last resort and for a shortest appropriate amount of time. 
Thereby, the Committee on the Rights of the Child was concerned that these core 
principles might be in conflict with the UK’s immigration law and regulations. 
At the national level in relation to the UK’s reservation to CRC, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights published reports in order to explain their concerns and 
recommend that the Government lift the reservation.599 The report stated: 
Of the 192 signatories to the CRC, only three have entered declarations 
relating to the treatment of non-nationals and only the UK has entered a 
general reservation to the application of the Convention to children who are 
subject to immigration control. We do not accept that the CRC undermines 
effective immigration controls. Our principal concern is that the practical 
impact of the reservation goes far beyond the determination of immigration 
status, and leaves children seeking asylum with a lower level of protection in 
relation to a range of rights which are unrelated to their immigration status. 
The evidence we have received testifies to the unequal protection of the rights 
of asylum seeking children under domestic law and practice. We reiterate our 
previous recommendation that the Government’s reservation to the CRC 
should be withdrawn. It is not needed to protect the public interest and 
undermines the international reputation of the country. 600 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the UK was criticised over the absence of consideration of 
the child’s best interests in its immigration policy and the presence of the reservations 
to CRC as an impediment to providing equal protection for asylum-seeking and 
migrant children.  
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In 2002, the Committee on the Rights of the Child raised its concerns over the 
increasing numbers of child detainees for immigration law enforcement in the UK.601 
It was noted that their detention for a lengthy period of time might breach their basic 
rights such as health and education.602 The Committee on the Rights of the Child also 
pointed out that new acts and policies on asylum did not address minors’ needs and 
rights.603 The Committee, again, urged the Government to withdraw the reservations 
on immigration and citizenship, which were incompatible with the purpose and object 
of the CRC as it prevents immigrant or asylum-seeking minors from enjoying the 
protection the CRC provided. 604  In the 2008’s concluding observations, the 
Committee welcomed the withdrawal of the reservations to Article 22 and 37(c) of the 
CRC.605 However, the Committee was still concerned about the numbers of minor 
detainees in the UK and recommended that the UK use detention as a measure of last 
resort and for the shortest appropriate amount of time as suggested by the CRC.606  
The Commissioner for Human Rights, also under the mandate of COE, visits 
member countries and submits reports upon her/his observations. In 2004, after a visit 
to the UK, the Commissioner expressed his concerns over the extent of use of 
detention in the UK.607 He noted: 
The numbers of children detained with their families suggests that insufficient 
attention has been paid to the examination of alternative forms of supervision.  
There has, it appears, been very little study of the likelihood of families with 
children to abscond that might support the Immigration Service’s increasing 
resort to detention.  Prima facie, indeed, families with children, particularly 
those who are settled with their children attending school, are less likely to 
abscond than any other category. 608 
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He was also concerned over the conditions of the detention centres that could increase 
the level of stress for detainees.609 He pointed out the problem of snap-shot statistics 
on detained children: 
There is a clear duty to ensure the utmost transparency on an issue of such 
importance – snap-shot statistics on any one day cannot be said to give a 
detailed picture of the true extent of the detention of children.  If the detention 
of children really is as exceptional as the Government claims, and subject, 
moreover, to special scrutiny, then it cannot be either time-consuming or 
costly to make detailed statistics publicly available. 610 
The Commissioner for Human Rights submitted another report, previously 
mentioned, in 2008 following a visit to the UK’s immigration removal centre. He was 
concerned over the use of detention for accompanied children for a period over three 
months.611 He urged the authorities to follow the standards of the CRC and ECHR and 
take a decision to detain children only in exceptional circumstances. Finally, he 
recommended that the UK withdraw its immigration reservation to the Convention on 
Rights of the Child as soon as possible.612 
National monitoring bodies also pointed out the wrong-doings regarding 
detention of minors. Firstly, the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons reported on the 
conditions at immigration removal centres, regarding minors. Dungavel Immigration 
Removal Centre, for instance, has been inspected several times. The first report 
voiced the concerns regarding the time limit of detention and the facilities provided to 
children detainees. The Inspectorate stated:  
Nevertheless, in spite of these admirable efforts, HMIE considered that even 
the improved educational facilities they found in July 2003 were acceptable 
only for a short period - no more than two weeks – and could not meet the 
educational needs of children detained for lengthier periods, certainly not 
more than six weeks. This is solely in relation to educational needs: there is 
also the wider question, which we also address in this report, of the 
development and welfare of children held for an indefinite period in a secure 
facility, without the possibility of normal social life, and exposed to the 
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general feelings of insecurity evident in the centre. 613 
In 2004 as result of an unannounced inspection of the centre, as the problems 
persisted, recommendations of the Inspectorate were as follows: 
The detention of children should be exceptional and for the shortest possible 
period. Within a matter of days, there should be an independent assessment of 
the welfare, educational and developmental needs of each child held in 
detention to inform decisions about the necessity of continued detention. This 
should be repeated at regular intervals to advise on the compatibility of 
detention with the welfare of the child and to inform reviews of detention. 614 
This demonstrated that even though the detention policy had the protections 
mentioned by the CRC, the practice was still lacking those protections. In 2006, 
another inspection led to a report that voiced concerns over the child’s best interests 
principle as mentioned by international human rights standards. Anne Owers, then 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, expressed her concerns: 
…and we repeat our recommendation that such assessments should take place 
within seven days of detention. Even this, however, is too late to identify any 
adverse impact of detention on a child, and we could find no evidence that the 
child’s interests played any part in initial decisions to detain, or that their 
detention was only authorised in exceptional cases. 615 
In 2008, the recommendations regarding child detention were repeated by 
Anne Owers in her report.616 The same pattern was followed for other detention 
centres as well such as Harmondsworth, Oakington, Tinsley House, and Yarl’s Wood 
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since 2002.617 The circumstances at the detention and removal centres were inspected 
and evaluated according to the international human rights standards. Not only the time 
principle but also additional facilities such as play and recreational areas that are 
required by international human rights standards were investigated at these centres.  
As previously mentioned, the Joint Committee on Human Rights opened an 
inquiry on the treatment of asylum seekers in 2006. This inquiry’s report had a section 
on detention of children.618 This part included references from international and 
national monitoring bodies’ such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child and 
HM Inspectorate of Prisons and expressed their own recommendations:  
We are concerned that the current process of detention does not consider the 
welfare of the child, meaning that children and their needs are invisible 
throughout the process – at the point a decision to detain is made; at the point 
of arrest and detention; whilst in detention; and during the removal process. 
We are particularly concerned that the detention of children can – and 
sometimes does – continue for lengthy periods with no automatic review of 
the decision. Where the case is reviewed (for example by an immigration 
judge or by the Minister after 28 days), assessments of the welfare of the child 
who is detained are not taken into account. The detention of children for the 
purpose of immigration control is incompatible with children’s right to liberty 
and is in breach of UK’s international human right’s obligations. 619 
 
In spite of these recommendations, a following inquiry in 2008 shared the same 
concerns and repeated its recommendations.620 
Lastly, the Children’s Commissioner also expressed his opinions on the topic 
of detention of minors in the UK. After a visit to Yarl’s Wood in 2005, one of the 
detention centres that held children, the Children’s Commissioner published the 
recommendations and expressed the shortcomings of the system.621 As a follow-up to 
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this report, the Commissioner has done two more visits to the same detention centre 
and conducted interviews. This revealed that UKBA followed some of the 
recommendations given previously.622 However, some were not followed and the 
Children’s Commissioner pointed out the situation regarding the decision to detain 
and better healthcare for children.  
e. The Approach of Civil Society to the UK’s Detention Policy  
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society were also part of the 
picture in the sense that they also produced reports and initiated advocacy campaigns 
against this steadily increasing practice across the UK followed by the increase in the 
number of detention centres. There had been different campaigns by different civil 
society organisations and NGOs such as BID, Save the Children, the Children’s 
Society and Citizens UK. The common theme in these campaigns and reports was 
providing counterargument and evidence against the Government’s justifications of 
the decision to detain families with children. To start with, the Government claimed 
that detention with families was only for removals and so only for a short period of 
time. Hence, the Government suggested that the practice followed the compliance 
norm of detention for a shortest period of time. Research by BID in 2003 has 
suggested that this was not the case. A small sample research with detained families 
revealed that families were detained for lengthy periods of times, for example 161 
days or 111 days.623 Another finding of this research demonstrated that detention 
occurred where removal was not immediate.624  
In 2005, Save the Children published a report based on case studies of 32 
children who were detained with or without their families.625 This report’s name, No 
Place for a Child, became the name of the campaign run by the Refugee Council, Bail 
for Immigration Detainees and Save the Children as the Refugee Children’s 
Consortium members in 2006. Some case studies in this research also showed that 
children with families were detained for more than 100 days.626 This study also 
demonstrated that some families were taken into detention while their asylum 
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application still had outstanding aspects.627 In 2008, the same problem of lengthy 
period of detention showed itself in BID’s briefing.628 This briefing stated ‘between 
October 2008 and January 2009 families supported by BID were detained on average 
for six and a half weeks’. 629 
As a second justification, the Government stated that detention of children with 
families was only used as a last resort and at a minimum scale. This is another part of 
the compliance norm that the Government, again, claimed to be following. Civil 
society reports have demonstrated that large numbers of children were detained each 
year. For instance, in 2005 it was stated that about 2000 children were detained for 
immigration purposes.630 This number dropped to 1000 in 2009631, yet it showed that 
there was still significant number of detention cases. Another BID and the Children’s 
Society’s joint report under a campaign called OutCry!: End Immigration Detention 
of Children 632  , which was funded by Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, 
demonstrated that detention was not used as a last resort. It stated: 
Our research found that in a considerable number of cases, families were 
detained when there was little risk of them absconding, their removal was not 
imminent, and they had not been given a meaningful opportunity to return 
voluntarily to their countries of origin. Indeed, in a large proportion of cases, 
there were barriers to families returning to their countries of origin during the 
time they were detained, which meant it was not possible, lawful or in the 
children’s best interests for the Home Office to forcibly remove them. 633 
Meanwhile, the Independent Asylum Commission (IAC) under Citizens UK634 also 
launched a nationwide citizens’ review of the UK asylum system in 2008. This 
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Commission produced three reports on more general aspects of the asylum system 
and the reports led to the Sanctuary Pledge Campaign. However, the reports also 
referred to detention of children. Their second report stated the findings regarding 
detention of children.635 The reports included the UKBA’s responses to these findings 
and the IAC’s assessment based on the UKBA’s responses. Regarding detention 
practice, the UKBA responded that only two very limited circumstances where 
children were detained: as a family for a few days for removal or as unaccompanied 
minors while care arrangements were made. However, the IAC assessed this response 
and expressed their concerns: 
We remain concerned that decisions are not always taken with the best 
interests of the child in mind, and note the prominence given to this criterion 
in the EU directives, the force of which is accepted by UKBA. We believe that 
detention, other than for the briefest of periods to avoid absolute destitution, 
can never be in the best interests of the child.636 
The IAC also referred to a public opinion poll conducted by Citizens UK on an online 
system stating that 53% of participants said that children should never be detained.637 
As it is clear that instead of a legal reference to international law, the campaigns used 
more of an ethical argument to justify their assertion that children should never be 
detained.     
In addition to the issue of when to detain, civil society also published reports 
regarding facilities and services provided at detention centres. For instance, the 
reports touched upon healthcare and leisure and play facilities provided for children. 
For instance, BID’s report in 2003 stated that child detainees received inadequate 
healthcare advice and treatment in detention centres.638 The case studies in this 
research showed that child detainees’ health problems were not taken seriously.639 
These findings were also echoed in case studies of the Save the Children’s report that 
was published in 2005.640  
In addition to this, the end of 2009 also saw the open letter written by a famous 
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poet that was appointed as Poet Laureate641 in 2009, Carol Ann Duffy, and seventy 
other writers addressing the prime minister. The letter called upon the Prime Minister 
and the Government to stop the practice of child detention as it was too harmful to be 
accepted in a civilised society.642 Again, here the reference was to moral values 
instead of international law or standards. Furthermore, several groups such as Medical 
Justice643 started similar campaigns in order to raise public awareness of this issue in 
2010.644 The Church of Scotland was also concerned over the conditions of the 
immigration removal centres in terms of children’s well-being.645 All of these efforts 
and campaigns helped to create a discussion over ethics of this practice in the UK.646   
Hence, it is apparent that there was wide criticism coming from civil society 
through shared projects, research reports including case studies and joint campaigns 
between 2002 and 2008. While the concerns and criticisms followed the same pattern, 
the recommendations to the Government and the border officials had the same tone as 
well. It was stated that detention is never in the best interest of a child, and so 
recommended that children should not be detained under Immigration Act powers.647 
Hence, these civil society reports showed that the norm of detaining children as a last 
resort for the shortest appropriate time and not detaining them at ill-suited detention 
centres was not fully followed by the immigration authorities in the UK. Whereas the 
international law reference was always there, the underlying argument by civil society 
had a moral nature than a legal one.   
f. The Approach of Domestic Courts to the UK’s Detention Policy and 
Administrative Detention in Practice 
In 2007, a case relating to a family’s detention came before the domestic courts in the 
UK. The applicant was a Jamaican national with her daughter and they arrived in the 
UK in 2002. They had been granted temporary admission with a requirement to return 
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to the airport in order to leave the UK in a week.648 Since she failed to do so, she was 
treated as an absconder. Until 2005, she lived in the UK illegally and gave birth to her 
second baby. In 2005, she was arrested because of an allegation of shoplifting at a 
supermarket and came to the attention of the Immigration Authorities. She and her 
daughters were taken to Yarl’s Wood Immigration Centre and the applicant was 
interviewed. During the interview, she claimed asylum. The applicant and her two 
children were released but they were told to come back to Gatwick Airport in two 
days in order to be taken to Oakington Detention Centre for fast track procedure. On 
the day requested, the applicant with her two children came to Gatwick Airport and 
was taken to Oakington. The applicant and her children were kept in detention after 
the conclusion of the fast track procedure.649 Their detention was reviewed and further 
authorised by the Immigration authorities according to their guidelines where it set 
out that once detention has been authorised, it has to be under close review.650 Their 
detention was authorised one more time because the decision to deport them to their 
country had been taken and there was a risk of absconding in the case of a temporary 
admission or release.651 In the end, they were not deported and they were released 
after two months in detention. In this case, the Government’s policy of detention of 
families with children was challenged.  For this reason, the judgment referred to the 
relevant articles of CRC and ECHR as follows in order to decide on the 
Government’s policy: 
In my judgment, it is open to significantly greater debate whether the 
Defendant's policy in 2005 on detention generally as it applied to families with 
children is unlawful. On balance, however, I have reached the conclusion that 
it is not. As I have indicated above the policy consists of a number of key 
elements. Although these key elements are not phrased in an identical manner 
to the phraseology of the relevant articles of UNCRC, in my judgment the 
Defendant's policy is compatible with the general thrust of the Articles of 
UNCRC… there is no material difference between Article 37 (b) which 
prohibits the deprivation of liberty of a child in an arbitrary fashion and 
specifies that detention shall be used a measure of last resort and for the 
shortest appropriate period of time and a policy which demands that detention 
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must be used only where all reasonable alternatives are discounted and for the 
shortest period necessary. Further, the fact that the interests of the child must 
be a primary consideration when taking action in respect of a child cannot 
preclude detention in all circumstances. 652  
Hence, the Court found that the defendant’s policies were in line with the principles 
mentioned in these international conventions.653 This is why the policy was lawful. 
However, the judgment also stated that: 
In my judgment a period of detention of two months, more or less, for these 
Claimants was unreasonable and would have been recognised as being 
unreasonable by a decision maker who turned his or her mind to such a period 
of detention. The detention period, after all, was coming immediately after a 
period of 13 days in detention when the fast-track procedures were operated. 
The detainees were a young woman and two very young children. It is not for 
this Court to lay down to what may have been a reasonable period of detention 
but, in my judgment, such a period was bound to be far less than 
approximately two months. 654 
 
In addition to this, the defendant’s statement of risk of absconding was not supported 
by evidence and the defendant did not consider all reasonable alternatives to detention 
during this unreasonably long detention period.655 For this reason, their detention after 
the completion of the fast track procedure to their date of release was found 
unlawful.656 The key argument in this judgment was confirming the lawfulness of the 
policy. As long as the policy was applied as it ought to be, there would not be any 
question regarding lawfulness of immigration detention of children with families in 
practice. Hence, this approach of the domestic court is vital for understanding the 
UK’s historical record on compliance. As mentioned before, a judgment supporting 
governmental policy can potentially provide a valid ground for non-compliance in the 
hands of a state that has no intention to comply as it does not cause any discomfort on 
the government in question, or lead to a discussion.  
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g. Sensitive Topic on the Parliamentary Agenda: Detention of Minors 2000-2009 
The discussion over detention of minors became a frequent topic in Parliament in the 
2000s. There were concerns and questions mentioned in parliamentary debate 
regarding the risk assessment of detaining children, rising numbers of detention 
spaces and lack of time limits on detention of minors.657 The ministerial answers to 
these concerns carried a similar perspective as the ones in the 1990s in order to justify 
current measures and explained the present practices in detail. They stated that 
unaccompanied children were not detained; instead they were taken to local social 
services department. 658  Detention of unaccompanied children only happened in 
exceptional circumstances till alternative care arrangements were made. Furthermore, 
the decision to detain families was said to be taken within consideration of Article 8 
of the ECHR and evidence of absconding and a previous history of not complying 
with the requirements of immigration control. This decision was risk-assessed by the 
Immigration Service.  
In addition to this, the same attitude was also taken towards proposals for 
reform in detention policy. The proposals were generally on bringing time limits on 
detention of minors and removing the power to detain minors. However, these 
proposals were rejected and claimed to be not reflecting reality. It was argued that:  
Our current policy on the detention of minors is clear. It is, of course, very 
regrettable to have to detain those who are under 18, but there are two limited 
sets of circumstances in which we may decide to do so. The first is where it is 
considered necessary in line with our policy to detain a family with children. 
In such a case, it is surely better for the children to be detained with the 
parents rather than to separate the family, which is likely to cause the children 
needless distress and anxiety. To suggest that in that case families should not 
be detained is, frankly, unrealistic. They may need to be detained while their 
identities or the basis of their claim are established, because they are unlikely 
to comply with the terms of temporary admission or release, to effect their 
removal, or as part of the fast-track asylum process at Oakington reception 
centre. 
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Secondly, there are exceptional instances where it is necessary to detain an 
unaccompanied minor while alternative care arrangements are made. The 
detention would normally be just overnight and in most cases with appropriate 
care facilities. A minor arrives alone late at night at a port of entry, for 
example, without family or adult relatives to go to. I am sure we can imagine 
circumstances arising from time to time fortunately, not too frequently, but 
they do arise—in which immigration officers and staff have to make hard 
decisions. 659 
It was claimed that in order to have an effective immigration policy, these practices 
should remain.  
 Nevertheless, there was a growing opposition towards detention of children in 
Parliament at the same time. Parliamentary support towards ending detention of 
children for immigration purposes can be seen in early day motions660 in Parliament 
since 2006. The main reason for submitting an early day motion is to bring an issue or 
a campaign to the spotlight. Since 2006, early day motions have been used every year 
in order to highlight the issue of detention of minors for immigration purposes.661 
Overall, every time this practice was questioned in Parliament, it was defined 
by the Labour Government as a regrettable but necessary practice in certain cases in 
order to ensure an effective immigration control and handle abuses in asylum 
system.662 Effective immigration policy was stated as a primary consideration in 
decision-making. Thereby, although it is a regrettable practice, the UK claimed that it 
is allowed to use this practice from time to time if necessary. At the same time, some 
of the Members of Parliament demonstrated their opposition towards this practice 
with early day motions.  
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IV. POST-2010 
a. Declining Statistics after 2010  
From 2010 to date, immigration detention has still been an important topic in the 
UK’s agenda. During 2010, 25,000 people were detained under the Immigration Act 
powers.663 The capacity of detention facilities has increased from 250 in 1993 to 3500 
in 2011. 664  In 2010, approximately 26,000 people entered detention under 
Immigration Act powers.665 In 2011, this number reached to around 27,000 and 
29,000 in 2012.666 The year ending September 2013, there was around 30,000 people 
entered detention.667 The following year, there was also approximately 30,000 people 
entered detention.668 With regard to minors, in 2010 there were 436 children entered 
detention and in 2011 over 100 children were under immigration detention.669 In 
2012, over 200 children entered detention under Immigration Act powers.670 This rise 
in numbers compared to previous year was linked to increasing use of Cedars pre-
departure accommodation, will be explained in detail, where children were kept in 
better conditions than previously in detention facilities.671 While there were around 
235 minors entered detention in 2013,672 this number dropped to approximately 120 in 
2014.  
b. The Approach of Domestic Courts to the UK’s Immigration Detention Policy 
Since 2010, there have been several important domestic cases concerning detention 
for immigration purposes. In Suppiah & Ors case in 2011, the claimants were a 
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mother and her two sons from Malaysia and a mother from Nigeria and her child.673 
The first claimant arrived in the UK while she was pregnant with the third claimant. 
She was granted leave to remain for six months as a visitor. The second claimant, the 
son of the first claimant, arrived in the UK and joined his mother. Nine months after 
her entry, she claimed asylum and was given papers treating her as an overstayer. Her 
asylum application was refused and her appeal was also dismissed. The three 
claimants were served their removal directions and were detained on the same date at 
Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre. There, the first claimant submitted further 
evidence to immigration authorities about her concerns over their removal. She also 
started proceedings for judicial review. The UKBA decided against removing the 
three claimants on 10 February 2010. However, they were detained until 24 February 
2010 in spite of cancellation of their removal directions.674   
The fourth claimant entered the UK from Nigeria with false documentation 
and she gave birth to the fifth claimant the day following her arrival.675 She claimed 
asylum two years after her illegal entry to the UK. Her asylum application was 
refused and her following appeal was also dismissed in a similar way to the first 
claimant. They were served their removal directions on 10 February 2010 and were 
taken to Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre with a view to deportation on 13 
February 2010. However, the fourth and fifth claimant were not removed on 13 
February as there was a ruling restraining removal on 12 February and the fourth 
claimant was not able to travel on that date. They remained at the detention centre till 
22 February 2010. 
The claimants challenged the lawfulness of the policy of detaining children 
with families. The judge found that the policy referred to several key elements: 
As I have found the Defendant's policy contains a number of key elements. 
Upon its proper interpretation exceptional circumstances must exist before 
detention of families with children is justified. It is the key elements taken 
together with the overarching obligation to resort to detention only in 
exceptional circumstances which ensure that the policy complies with section 
55 of the 2009 Act, obligations under UNCRC and the ECHR. The policy 
ensures that every decision-maker should know that the Defendant's policy 
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demands that detaining children should take place in exceptional 
circumstances only and is a measure of last resort; inevitably, therefore, the 
decision-maker will know that it is incumbent upon him to undergo a rigorous 
analysis of all relevant factors before authorising that measure of last resort. 676 
 
Furthermore, he held that as long as the policy was applied as it ought to be, there 
would not be any question regarding lawfulness of it.  
The claimants also referred to several ECtHR judgments against Belgium, 
especially Muskhadzhiyeva677 and Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga678, in 
order to support their claim that their detention breached Article 3 and Article 5 of the 
ECHR. Relying on their argument on these two significant cases by the claimants in 
the Suppiah case, the Court took the facts of these cases into account in its judgment. 
With regard to Article 3, the judge held that the conditions in the Yarl’s Wood 
detention centre were not comparable to the conditions in the 127 bis detention centre 
in Belgium mentioned in Muskhadzhiyeva v Belgium.679 It was also argued that the 
claimants did not develop any significant illnesses during their detention. For this 
reason, the minimum level of severity has not been reached in this case and the Court 
held that detention did not violate Article 3.680 The Court also found that there was a 
violation of Article 5 for all applicants as their detention from the time they were 
taken to custody till their release was unlawful as there was no risk of absconding and 
the detention was not a measure of last resort. The judgment concluded that the 
Defendant’s policy of detention of families with children, even though unwanted and 
potentially harmful to children, was lawful as it complied with its obligations under 
CRC and provided sufficient safeguards. 681 Although the policy was lawful, the judge 
still stated: 
There is, nonetheless, a significant body of evidence which demonstrates that 
employees of UKBA have failed to apply that policy with the rigour it 
deserves. The cases of the two families involved in this litigation provide good 
examples of the failure by UKBA to apply important aspects of the policy 
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both when the decisions were taken to detain each family and when decisions 
were taken to maintain detention after removal directions had been 
cancelled.682 
The Court found that the UKBA failed to perform its duty regarding welfare of 
children. The detention of claimants was not a measure of last resort because 
alternatives had not been considered.683 The key thing in this judgment was that the 
Court did not see the clarity in the obligations under CRC and ECHR. The absence of 
a well-defined ban gave a ground for the Court to decide the policy was lawful. It was 
clear that there was no push from courts towards the Government in order to change 
the policy.  
c. The UK’s Immigration Law: Ending Detention of Minors or Not Yet? More 
Challenges Ahead?  
Following the civil society campaigns mentioned before, Nick Clegg as the then 
leader of the Liberal Democrats referred to detention of minors for immigration law 
enforcement as a ‘state-sponsored cruelty’ and a ‘moral outrage’ in December 
2009.684 This perspective found its place in the 2010 election manifesto of the Liberal 
Democrats as a promise to ban child immigration detention. 685  The Liberal 
Democrats, in their manifesto, stated that they were committed to providing a safe 
haven for those fleeing persecution and to incorporate CRC into UK law. Along the 
same lines, they were devoted to ending detention of minors for immigration 
purposes. 
 The previously mentioned Sanctuary Pledge campaign, run by Citizens UK 
and several partner organisations, brought Nick Clegg, Gordon Brown and David 
Cameron together at the Citizens UK General Election Assembly on May 3rd 2010, 
only three days before the general election, where all party leaders expressed their 
commitment to end child detention for immigration purposes if they won the 
election.686 Before this Assembly, teams of Citizens UK around the country met their 
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respective parliamentary candidates and discussed supporting policies to end 
detention of children.687   
The 2010’s election resulted in the Conservative Party’s victory, ending up 
with a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. The Coalition Government’s 
perspective on immigration was shaped on the Conservative’s terms, such as an 
introduction of an immigration cap, due to their majority in the Government.688  The 
Conservative Party’s election manifesto briefly mentioned their potential policies on 
immigration, mostly suggesting reducing the numbers of immigrants.689 With regard 
to immigration detention, the only reference was made in suggesting improvement on 
immigration controls. The contribution of the Liberal Democrats in the coalition’s 
agenda was the promise of the Government to commit to end detention of minors for 
immigration purposes.690 Given the wide support for ending the practice by human 
rights activists, the Coalition parties might justify their commitment to their voters by 
arguing that the ban on detention of minors was very important as it would end this 
practice, but it would not damage immigration authorities’ capacity to deal with 
immigration offenders.691  
As a follow-up to the commitment of the Liberal Democrats in their election 
manifesto and in response to the previously mentioned public disapproval, Nick 
Clegg announced their commitment as a coalition government to this issue in July 21, 
2010 in Parliament. He promised the closure of family unit at Yarl’s Wood 
Immigration Removal Centre (IRC), which was the main place for detaining 
children.692 He also stated:  
…an enormous culture shift within our immigration system. The Coalition 
government has always been clear that the detention of children for 
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immigration purposes is unacceptable. We are placing the welfare of children 
and families at the centre of a fairer and more compassionate system. 693 
However, opening a pre-departure accommodation centre at Cedars just after closing 
the family units at Yarl’s Wood IRC has raised concerns over the real intention and 
demonstrated the complexity of this issue.694 This facility established at West Sussex, 
called Cedars, was a pre-departure accommodation centre that houses 44 detainees in 
families for up to one week with a view to deportation.695  
After 2010, this approach to detention of minors was reflected in policy as 
well. UKBA detention policy guidance has made several changes regarding family 
with children under 18 detention policy. The policy guidance used to note that 
detention of families with children was not subject to a particular time limit.696 
However, the policy recently stated that for planned returns, families should be kept at 
pre-departure accommodation centres for a maximum of 72 hours, yet in exceptional 
cases this time could be extended to a total of seven days with Ministerial authority.697 
Furthermore, the policy guidance demonstrated that there are rare circumstances in 
which families could be kept at Tinsley House rather than in pre-departure 
accommodation.698 As a general policy, the guidance establishes that families with 
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children under the age of 18 may be held in short-term holding facilities (holding 
rooms), pre-departure accommodation and the family unit at Tinsley House 
immigration removal centre for planned returns.699  
Following this new policy, a new Immigration Act was also passed by Parliament 
in 2014.700 The changes brought by the 2014 Act with regard to detention of minors 
for immigration purposes are as follows:  
• A ‘reflection period’, which is 28 days, must take place during which a child and 
one parent are protected from removal from the UK following the exhaustion of 
their appeal rights.701  
• The Independent Family Returns Panel was created as a statutory body in order to 
provide advice to UKBA on the method of removal and ensure that UKBA 
safeguard and promote the welfare of children in its arrangements.702 
• Unaccompanied children cannot be detained for more than a 24-hour period and 
they can only be detained at short-term holding facilities during transfer to or from 
a short-term facility and or a place where their presence is needed for immigration 
purposes.703 
• Pre-departure accommodation is the only place where families with children will 
be held, for a maximum of 72 hours.704 The duration of detention can be extended 
to seven days only with an authorisation by the Minister.  
After 2010, the UK showed a significant level of commitment to end detention of 
minors for immigration purposes. The developments were meaningful in terms of the 
UK’s compliance with human rights standards. The Government basically limited 
detention of minors to detention at pre-departure accommodation centres for 72 hours 
with a repeated emphasis on the welfare of children. The dynamics that played a 
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valuable role in this process were the push which came from national campaigns and 
creation of public disapproval. For this reason, it was easier for the Government to 
follow their promise of the ban which they gave before the elections of 2010.  
During the 2014 Immigration Bill discussions in Parliament, there were several 
concerns raised by Members of Parliament with regard to the changes mentioned 
above. The main concerns and criticisms in parliamentary debate were on lack of 
clarification concerning detention of minors for immigration purposes.705 It was 
suggested that incorporating the ban into the Act would prevent further detention of 
minors for immigration purposes.706 Furthermore, the Act did not refer to any time 
limits on detention of minors and it was criticised as follows: 
In May 2010, the Government did indeed commit to ending the immigration 
detention of children. There was a widespread, positive response to this 
change—and there have been some improvements. Fewer children are 
detained, and when they are it is for shorter periods. This must be recognised. 
The Government’s amendments would create a legislative basis for some of 
these improvements, for example by setting a time limit on child detention in 
law. However, it is very disappointing that the Government’s amendments do 
not prohibit or even properly limit child detention. They do not state that 
detention should be a last resort, as is the current policy, or that detention 
should be for the shortest possible time. I fear that, in practice, it may become 
normal for children to be detained for the maximum permissible period, where 
this is administratively convenient.707  
However, the Government defended these changes and the then Home 
Secretary Theresa May stated that they reflected their commitment to end child 
detention and mentioned a statutory provision that allowed detention of minors at pre-
departure accommodation instead of immigration removal centres: 
We propose to reinforce the commitment to end the detention of children for 
immigration purposes by putting key elements of the family returns process 
into primary legislation. That will involve providing a statutory prohibition on 
the detention of children within immigration removals centres, subject to the 
exceptions agreed in 2010, which continue to be Government policy; 
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providing families with children a minimum of a 28-day reflection period 
following the exhaustion of appeal rights against a removal before their 
enforced removal; placing a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to appoint 
an independent family returns panel to advise on the best interests of the child 
in every case in which enforced return is proposed; and providing a separate 
legal basis for pre-departure accommodation independent of other 
immigration detention facilities.708 
Given the concerns over detention of minors, we can examine whether the 
restriction has been effective in practice. First of all, it is significant to refer back to 
the statistics mentioned before regarding detention of minors after the ban was in 
place. Statistics of detention of minors were still around 100 per year in 2010, over 
200 in 2012 and 2013. During these times, detention of minors occurred mostly 
before family removal at Cedars Pre-Departure Accommodation. The Government 
stated that this is family-friendly environment instead of a detention or removal 
facility.709 However, families accommodated at Cedars are still arrested and detained 
under 1971 Immigration Act powers. The critics attacked conditions at Cedars such as 
high fences, surveillance cameras and full body search on entry and criticised the 
changes as being superficial.710   
Following the policy, the new challenge the Government faced was the 
implementation of the new arrangement that result in separation of families in some 
cases. After 2010, detaining parents and putting minors in care became a more 
obvious alternative to detaining minors with families. However, the impact of 
separation of families on children became a concern within the duty to protect child 
welfare defined in the 2009 Act and reasserted in the 2014 Act.711 The Bail for 
Immigration Detainees’ report revealed that some children were transferred between 
unstable care arrangements and neglected by the authorities during separation of 
families.712 The average duration of detention of parents was 270 days.713 While some 
                                                
708 HC Deb 30 January 2014, vol 574, col 1053. 
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712 Bail for Immigration Detainees, ‘Fractured Childhoods: the separation of families by immigration 
detention’ (Bail for Immigration Detainees April 2013) 
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of these parents were deported from the UK without their children, the majority of 
them were released at the end.714 Being away from their parents at local care units 
caused children to feel distressed and affected their quality of life.715 However, it was 
observed that the immigration authorities did not take these experiences of minors 
into consideration as required by their duty regarding children welfare.716 This 
demonstrated the complexity of the issue surrounding the practice of decision to 
detain children for immigration purposes. While placing children in the care of local 
authorities during detention of parents was seen as a viable alternative instead of 
detaining children with their parents in the beginning, this caused several problems 
once put into practice in terms of child’s best interest principle. This reveals that 
child-related policies and legislation need further assessment if the state is committed 
to secure children’s rights in their policies. In this specific case, different alternatives 
that can secure family unity in a non-closed centre without constant surveillance can 
be considered to be in the child’s best interest.  
 Overall, the Government’s amendments and commitment to end detention of 
minors, in practice, did not actually prevent detention of minors for immigration 
purposes fully. The statistics with regard to detention of minors and recent practice to 
detain minors at short term holding facilities and pre-departure facilities prove this 
assertion. For this reason, it is very challenging to measure effectiveness of the ban on 
detention of minors in the UK as detention of minors has not ceased to exist, yet.   
e. The International Community’s Approach to the UK’s Immigration Detention 
Policy 
Since 2010, international monitoring bodies have been addressing developments in 
the UK. The ECRI’s report in 2010 criticised the UK regarding the lack of a time 
limit:  
As regards detentions, ECRI notes with concern that there is no maximum 
limit on the length of detention of asylum-seekers. Moreover, despite a new 
                                                                                                                                      
January 2009 and July 2012. For this research, data was collected from 111 of these parents and their 
200 children. 
713 ibid.  
714 Bail for Immigration Detainees, ‘Bail for Immigration Detainee’s submission to the APPG on 
Refugees and APPG on Migration’s parliamentary inquiry into the use of immigration detention in the 
UK’ (September 2014) 
<http://www.biduk.org/sites/default/files/BID%20submission%20to%20detention%20inquiry_separate
d%20families%20Sept%202014_0.pdf > accessed 16 July 2017.  
715 Bail for Immigration Detainees (n 712) 29.  
716 Bail for Immigration Detainees (n 714).  
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duty imposed on the Secretary of State to make arrangements to ensure that 
asylum functions are discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and 
promote the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom, there is at 
present no maximum limit on the length of detention of children who are 
detained with their families. … ECRI stresses that the detention of asylum 
seekers should be used only as a last resort, when no other viable options are 
available. 717 
The report also stated: 
ECRI urges the United Kingdom authorities not to treat undocumented 
asylum-seekers as criminals. It urges the authorities to ensure that the 
detention of asylum-seekers is used only as a last resort, and that individual 
decisions to detain are subject to thorough and effective judicial scrutiny. 
ECRI again recommends that the authorities ensure that the detention of 
children remains strictly limited to cases where it is absolutely necessary. 718 
The UK’s response to these criticisms was that detention plays a vital role during the 
removal process of families, hence it is an inevitable part of the immigration 
system.719 
  Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE also submitted 
resolutions addressing all member states regarding detention of children with families 
and unaccompanied children. The Assembly called upon member states not to detain 
unaccompanied children on any ground.720 Appropriate care arrangements should be 
preferred instead of the detention facilities.721 The Assembly was also concerned over 
the rising detention numbers in the member states due to the increasing numbers of 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants and stricter immigration policies of the member 
states.722 After pointing out these concerns, the Assembly called member states to 
                                                
717 European Commission Against Racism and Tolerance, ‘ECRI’s report on the United Kingdom’ (2 
March 2010) CRI (2010) 4 para 173.  
718 ibid. 
719 ibid para 91.  
720 Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Unaccompanied Children in Europe: Issues of Arrival, Stay and Return’ 
Resolution No: 1810 (15 April 2011) Doc. 12539 para 5.9. 
721 ibid. 
722  Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Detention of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants in Europe’ 
Resolution No: 1707 (28 January 2010) Doc. 12105 para 1. 
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follow their obligations under international human rights and refugee law.723 The 
authorities were asked to consider alternatives to detention.724  
CONCLUSION 
Detention of children with or without their families for immigration purposes has 
been on the agenda of the UK for a long time as shown chronologically in this 
chapter. In 1971, the UK was at the start of modern immigration detention. The 1971 
Immigration Act created this phenomenon with wide discretionary powers in the 
hands of immigration authorities. This main principle of the power to detain still 
remained untouched in the UK since the 1971 Act. Although there were not many 
established immigration detention centres, the numbers of detained people before the 
1990s were still considerable. Between 1993 and 2009, the UK experienced 
increasing detention numbers due to increasing numbers of asylum applications. 
Asylum became an important driver for the Government to manage the issue of 
immigration and asylum. Especially with the start of the 2000s, immigration detention 
became a routine practice used by authorities compared to the 1990s. Therefore, while 
new places of detention were planned and established all across the country, a new 
type of detention, called fast-track for asylum seekers, emerged simultaneously. This 
period has faced new legislation targeted in particular at asylum seekers.  
With regard to detention of minors, it occurred in the UK when either the child 
was alone or accompanied by her family. Withdrawing the reservation to CRC, which 
was related to immigrant and asylum-seeker children, led the Government to adopt a 
duty regarding protecting welfare of children in the 2009 Act. This reflected in the 
UKBA guidance later on, in a way that required the UKBA to safeguard the welfare 
of the children during its arrangements. During this time, immigration detention, in 
particular detention of minors, was criticised by the international monitoring bodies to 
which the UK reports; NGOs; domestic organisations and establishments; domestic 
courts; and members of Parliament. International monitoring bodies noted their 
concerns over the use of detention of minors and recommended that the UK end this 
practice. NGOs addressed the issue in their reports and campaigned for a fairer 
immigration system. Domestic organisations reported poor conditions of detention 
centres and pointed out how harmful it would be for minors’ development. While 
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domestic courts and ECtHR did not find the policy to detain unlawful, it usually 
criticised the way authorities exercised this power. In return, this practice was 
defended by the governments for the sake of an efficient immigration control. 
Criticisms and discussions around detention of minors by NGOs and Members of 
Parliament became more intense at the end of 2000s. This was followed by a 
commitment given by the Coalition Government of Liberal Democrats and 
Conservatives to end detention of minors for immigration law enforcement. However, 
the chronology pictured in this chapter also showed that a commitment to end 
detention of minors is not as straightforward and effortless as it sounds. It brings its 
own challenges for governments to overcome, such as separation of families. 
Discussing detention of minors in legal terms is challenging as there is no 
single legal document outlawing detention of minors for immigration purposes. As 
stated in the chapter explaining international human rights standards, international 
conventions setting standards for detention of minors have not banned detention of 
minors for immigration purposes yet. For instance, CRC, especially formed for 
children’s rights, did not openly ban detention of minors. Instead, it brought principles 
to be considered during detention. However, it was not clear on the obligations of the 
member states in terms of detention of minors. The principles established by the CRC 
need some clarification. For instance, detention of minors as a last resort by states is 
allowed under the CRC. On the other hand, the CRC does not provide an assessment 
test to establish the necessity of detention as a last resort. Vague obligations of the 
member states under the CRC led the courts argue that detention policy was lawful as 
long as the policy adopts the same principles under the CRC and immigration 
authorities follow these obligations. This was very significant in terms of the UK’s 
compliance since there was no pushing factor deriving from the jurisprudence.  
After 2010, the UK showed strong signs of compliance and commitment to 
end detention of minors for immigration purposes. The Coalition Government limited 
detention of children to detention at pre-departure accommodation facilities for a 
period of 72 hours. Even though there is still no clear-cut ban on detention of minors, 
declining numbers of minors under detention is very meaningful and valuable in 
terms of the UK’s compliance.  
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CHAPTER 5. THE FACTORS AFFECTING POLICY AND 
LEGAL CHANGES: CASE STUDY - TURKEY 
Drawing upon the findings of the Chapter 3 on Turkey’s immigration law history, this 
chapter combines the historical evolution of Turkey’s immigration legislation with the 
reaction from international and domestic actors in order to analyse what this means 
for the case study and application of theory. It seeks to identify the relevant triggers 
that led Turkey to reform its legislation on immigration and asylum management. In 
addition to these triggers, it also focuses on the law-drafting period and explores how 
the international human rights standards on detention of minors became a part of 
Turkey’s latest immigration legislation in 2014. While tackling these issues, the thesis 
applies the selected compliance theory by Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks in order to 
put these motivating factors into a theoretical framework.  
This chapter’s main focus will be the period that starts after the beginning of 
EU accession period in 1999. It will, however, briefly touch on the period before this 
date. While analysing this timeline after 1999, the chapter will have three main parts 
where each part analyses different types of influence deriving from different 
international and national institutions on Turkey: by courts, supranational agencies 
and civil society. Each part examines whether there are any meaningful and 
influential triggers to push the Government of Turkey to change its behaviour. It will 
read each of these influences through the lens of Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’ 
theory in order to demonstrate whether this theory is applicable to this case study. 
Each part will refer to parliamentary and Commission debates and interviews with the 
selected officials. Due to the way legislation is being drafted in Turkey 725 , 
Commission debates will weigh more than parliamentary debates. Commission 
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debates will be at the centre in order to understand the reasons for compliance or non-
compliance with human rights standards in terms of immigration detention.  
The chapter on Turkey’s historical record of immigration law has 
demonstrated that the first period before 1994 was a legal vacuum period.726 During 
this period, the Government brought the Law on Foreigners’ Residency and 
Movement and Passport Law in 1950.727 However, this law did not bring detailed 
regulations regarding immigration management. In addition to this, the law made in 
1950 did not include any provisions concerning immigration detention. The 
provisions within the Law on Foreigners’ Residency and Movement only implied 
administrative detention by mentioning that immigrants who were to be deported 
would be accommodated at the places that would be decided by the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs.728 Lastly, the Ministry of Interior Affairs published a directive on 
refugees’ guesthouses.729 Whereas the Directive did not bring any guidelines about 
conditions of detention and the legal basis for detention, it basically provided practical 
guidelines such as the services provided to the asylum seekers. Hence, the detention 
policy was not comprehensive and Turkey did not have detailed regulations governing 
immigration-related detention during this legal vacuum period.  
As mentioned before, this chapter seeks to find out whether there was any 
influential actor(s) in Turkey’s historical record of immigration law that resulted in 
compliance with international human rights standards in terms of immigration 
detention of minors. When we look at this legal vacuum period before 1994, we can 
state that there was not any international or domestic reaction towards Turkey’s 
immigration management system, hence the lack of a social mechanism suggested by 
the selected compliance theory during this period. The legislation and the policy 
brought during this period were made by the initiation of the then Governments 
without any socialisation mechanism among different actors. Hence, there was no 
pressure or encouragement for a change in Turkey’s domestic law in the immigration 
field. As an important observation, the changes made during this time did not carry 
                                                
726 To read further on these periods and the reasons for this division, see Chapter 3. Turkey’s Historical 
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much human rights essence. For instance, the legislation did not have the international 
protection element for asylum seekers. This could be the result of the intensely 
government-involved law and policy-making without any external influence. On the 
other hand, this lack of human rights background in law and regulations provided 
international institutions a solid argument regarding Turkey in the following periods 
after the intense interaction process started, which will be explained in detail later on. 
However, based on an extensive literature research, it is clear that that there was no 
substantial record of international or national social mechanism that criticised 
Turkey’s immigration policies and law regarding immigration detention, or 
specifically child detention, during this period. 
This brings us to the next period where Turkey moved towards a certain level 
of institutionalisation of its immigration law. During this period, Turkey faced large 
influxes of refugees and asylum seekers from different regions such as Bulgaria, Iran, 
and Iraq due to wars and tensions in these regions.730 These vast numbers pushed 
Turkey to take a step towards managing this issue with detailed regulation. Hence, the 
Government brought more regulations and principles for immigration management 
under the 1994 Asylum Regulation.731 This regulation was the turning point towards 
change and institutionalisation of immigration management policies. 732  With this 
regulation, the status determination of asylum seekers was given into the hands of the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs instead of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)733.734 The meaning of this new reorganisation was that the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs’ recognition of asylum seekers was needed before they 
were able to be referred to the UNHCR for resettlement.735 This regulation, also, 
required that asylum seekers whose application was taken by the Ministry of Interior 
                                                
730 To read the details of these different movements to Turkey, see Chapter 3. Turkey’s Historical 
Record in Relation to Compliance with International Standards.   
731 1994 Türkı̇ye’ye İltı̇ca Eden veya Başka Bı̇r Ülkeye İltı̇ca Etmek Üzere Türkı̇ye’den İkamet İznı̇ 
Talep Eden Münferı̇t Yabancılar ı̇le Topluca Sığınma Amacıyla Sınırlarımıza Gelen Yabancılara ve 
Olabı̇lecek Nüfus Hareketlerı̇ne Uygulanacak Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelı̇k [1994 Asylum 
Regulation] 1994. 
732 Ahmet İçduygu and Damla B Aksel, ‘Irregular Migration in Turkey’ (International Migration 
Organization Turkey September 2012) 17, 40.  
733 UNHCR as the UN Refugee Agency is a global organisation that is established in 1950. Its work 
focuses on protection of rights for refugees, forcibly displaced communities and stateless people. 
734 1994 Asylum Regulation (n 731) art 6.  
735  Celia Mannaert, ‘Irregular Migration and Asylum in Turkey’ (2003) UNHCR New Issues in 
Refugee Research Working Paper No 89 7 <http://www.unhcr.org/3ebf5c054.pdf> accessed 6 July 
2017.  
 151 
Affairs would be accommodated in one of the guesthouses736 without any set time 
limit. In general, this regulation was significant in terms of bringing a certain level of 
structure to Turkey’s immigration management system. On the other hand, it was 
missing an important component of an immigration management system: international 
protection. The asylum regulation did not carry any elements of international 
protection. 
Turkey initiated this new regulation as a reaction to the large influxes of 
asylum seekers from different parts of the world which occurred in the late 1980s and 
during the 1990s. Through the Goodman and Jinks’ theory, it is hard to identify any 
type of interaction or socialisation between Turkey and international or national 
institutions during this period. There was not any international monitoring report, 
expert report or case law that referred to Turkey’s immigration law and policies or 
encouraged Turkey to change their immigration law and policies within this timeline. 
In the absence of a socialisation mechanism, the reaction to influxes could be the only 
reason for a change in state behaviour.  
Furthermore, since this change in state behaviour did not include any 
international protection element in this asylum regulation, this may be the 
consequence of an absence of international or national pressure on Turkey towards 
compliance with international human rights standards. In addition to this, the power 
shift from the UNHCR to the Ministry of Interior Affairs on status determination and 
referring asylum seekers to accommodation at the guesthouses without setting any 
time limit demonstrated the State’s authoritative power over its immigration 
management system instead of a human rights-oriented approach within the 
immigration system.737 This picture can give us a clue about the state’s mentality and 
priorities in Turkey in the area of immigration. Although this thesis aims to apply 
Goodman and Jinks’ compliance theory into this case study, it is impossible to 
analyse the period before 1999 in Turkey due to a lack of socialisation at international 
or domestic level. During the period before 1999, there were not any concerns voiced 
by groups or institutions in relation to the immigration system in Turkey. Hence, the 
application of the theory will be relevant for the post 1999 period where socialisation 
between groups, institutions and the Government occurred.  
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EUROPEANISATION: AFTER 1999 
Beginning with 1999, Turkey took some substantial steps in the area of immigration 
management. The Ministry of Interior Affairs published several circulars on illegal 
migration, return centres and unaccompanied minors.738 Through these circulars, the 
Ministry informed the authorities about the measures that needed to be taken towards 
irregular migration, return centres and how to treat unaccompanied minors.739 While 
these small but important developments were taking place at the policy level, the 
Asylum and Migration Bureau was established in 2008 in order to drafting a new and 
comprehensive immigration law. This Bureau drafted a new law called the Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection that was ratified by Parliament in 2013.740 
This law included several important elements of international protection for asylum 
seekers and immigrants and a clear and comprehensive immigration management 
system. For that reason, it is very important and valuable to focus on this period and 
the dynamics behind it for the purposes of this research. 
After 1999, Turkey’s socialisation with international and national institutions 
on the topic of immigration has shown a dramatic shift from non-existent to intense 
interaction. It is essential to look at this period by focusing on these different 
institutions classifying them under their types of influence on Turkey. The actors that 
became involved in Turkey’s immigration law development were the European Union 
(EU), the Council of Europe (COE), Parliamentary Assembly of the COE, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 741, other human rights bodies and experts 
under the COE mandate, the Committee on the Rights of the Child and civil society 
organisations. Whereas the judicial influence derives from the ECtHR’s judgments, 
the political influence results from the EU’s progress reports, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of COE’s resolutions, human rights bodies’ reports and the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child’s reports. Last but not least, civil society organisations’ reports 
will be taken into consideration. Detention of children has never been the central 
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focus within this socialisation between state and various different actors. Since 
Turkey lacked a comprehensive immigration management system including border 
controls, deportation procedures and removal centres, the reaction from international 
and national actors focused on the fundamental missing elements of the system rather 
than specific focus on detention of children. In the Parliamentary Commission 
meetings and parliamentary debate about the Bill, detention of minors was only 
briefly mentioned, mostly focusing on treatment of unaccompanied minors. 742 
However, there was not any detailed specific discussion over detention of minors 
during these debates. Aydoğan Asar, one of the interviewees, while commenting on 
detention of children, mentioned that there was not much discussion about the details 
regarding children ‘since the main philosophy adapted was child’s best interests from 
the International Convention of Rights of the Child’. 743 
As previously mentioned in the methodology regarding the interviews, the 
data from the interviews will be complementary to the findings from the extensive 
archival research and parliamentary and Commission debates in order to find out the 
potential impact of the judicial influence, influence of supranational agencies and 
civil society influence. The data from the interviews cannot be conclusive as it cannot 
be fully objective and includes personal story telling. The interviewees would be 
stating their own views and opinions on what happened in this process. However, due 
to the limited parliamentary debate on this issue in this particular case study, 
interviews can produce some insights that are worth exploring further. 
I. JUDICIAL INFLUENCE 
To start with, the ECtHR’s decisions against Turkey can be considered as an 
influential trigger on Turkey’s decision to set up a Bureau to work on drafting a new 
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law in the area of immigration. In terms of judicial influence744, there were not any 
judgments delivered by neither the ECtHR nor national courts regarding the practice 
of immigration detention in Turkey before 2009. To this date, there still has not been 
a judgment from national court on this issue. For this reason, this section will focus on 
the ECtHR’s judgments only. In 2009, Turkey faced a case in front of the ECtHR 
regarding its immigration detention and deportation procedures.745 This first case 
became a landmark case in terms of Turkey’s immigration management system in the 
sense that it revealed the defects in the system and punished Turkey for these gaps. 
Following this judgment, the ECtHR delivered fifteen cases within a short amount of 
time in which it found that conditions at the detention centres in Turkey were 
threatening migrants’ human rights and most of these judgments demanded 
compensation to be paid to the applicants.746  
This wide range of case law demonstrated that the ECtHR was willing to 
deliver judgments regarding immigration detention in Turkey that found Turkey in 
violation of the Convention due to the lack of safeguards in domestic law. Although 
there were not any cases regarding detention of children, these cases attached great 
importance in order to show the fundamental gaps in immigration detention practice 
in Turkey. In order to understand this judicial influence better and put it into a 
theoretical framework, the next section will read these findings through three different 
socialisation mechanisms suggested by Goodman and Jinks’ compliance theory.  
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I.1. Material Inducement 
According to Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, material inducement is one of the 
social mechanisms to change state behaviour. The material inducement approach 
suggests that state behaviour can be influenced through introduction of material costs 
and material benefits.747 Therefore, states and institutions can force states to comply 
with the standards of human rights through material rewards and punishments. 
Material inducement concentrates mostly on military or economic sanctions as the 
principal machinery to push states towards compliance.748 This approach emphasises 
states’ instrumentalist nature. As a result of material inducement, states show 
compliance with international human rights standards. However, the state does not 
necessarily change their underlying preferences on the way to compliance. While the 
preferences stay the same, the cost-benefit calculations of the target state change.749 
Hence, this approach proposes that the change in state behaviour occurs only if the 
target state can see it to be in their material interest to do so in its cost-benefit 
calculations.  
Under the material inducement approach, the material punishment that Turkey 
as a state needs to pay after every judgment relating to this issue would make Turkey 
reconsider their cost-benefit calculations. According to material inducement, this 
would change Turkey’s behaviour as it is in their material interest to do so. However, 
the interviewees’ and other involved actors’ statements can challenge this theory. As 
explained in detail before in Chapter 3, the law-making process in Turkey involves 
relevant Parliamentary Commission meetings before the law is submitted to 
Parliament. While different actors brought the ECtHR’s several judgments to the 
attention of the Parliamentary Commissions during almost every meeting, the 
monetary compensation Turkey had to pay has never been the central argument of this 
discussion. For instance, when the Minister of Interior Affairs described the reasons 
for an urgent need of a new immigration law to the Parliamentary Commission, he 
mentioned the ECtHR’s judgments only at the closing remarks of his speech.750 He 
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also did not point out the amount of the money Turkey had to pay so far. When the 
draft of the new legislation was submitted to Parliament, the Minister of Interior 
Affairs repeated his predecessor’s argument: 
With this new law, the deportation procedures and detention of foreigners will 
be regulated in line with the European Court of Human Rights’ judgments, 
hence this will prevent the European Court of Human Rights to deliver 
judgments against our country.751 
In addition to this, during the parliamentary discussions of the new law, the speech of 
the Member of Parliament from the opposition party revealed: 
Our concerns, as a party, over the lack of a comprehensive immigration 
management system were particularly about detention and deportation 
procedures where the Court’s judgments found that Turkey was in breach of 
the Convention rights. 752 
In addition to these findings, one of the interviewees also stated ‘The monetary 
compensation was not something that Turkey as a state cannot afford. The issue was 
reputational damage more than monetary damage on the budget.’753 He carried on, 
‘The drafting process of the new law was neither started nor carried on as a result of 
material nature.’754 
Even though these judgments were very significant in terms of its frequency 
and impact, none of the officials paid much attention to the material aspect of the 
judgments. The reputational damage was far more important than the monetary 
damage Turkey had due to the ECtHR’s decisions since 2009.  
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The second mechanism of social influence suggested by Goodman and Jinks is 
persuasion. This mechanism offers an explanation for change in state behaviour 
through processes of social learning and information exchange within international 
organisations and transnational networks.755 This involves discussion and deliberation 
in order to convince target actors. As a result of this deliberation, target actors become 
fully and voluntarily convinced of ‘the truth, validity and appropriateness of a norm, 
belief or practice’.756 There are two different techniques to apply this mechanism: 
framing and cuing. Framing occurs if the subject of the message that needs to be 
transferred to the target actor has resemblance with already accepted norms by the 
concerned actor.  In addition to framing, another micro-process that can help 
persuasion to happen is cuing. This element is based on the assumption that states can 
be persuaded through thinking harder about the advantages of that specific norm or 
message. When actors are exposed to new information, they are more likely to think, 
reflect and argue that information.  
The ECtHR’s judgments after 2009 were the common factor to be referred to 
in the interviews, the Parliamentary Commission meetings and parliamentary 
discussions. These judgments pointed out the controversial practices in Turkey and 
expressed the measures that need to be taken in order not to lose cases against 
applicants before the ECtHR. In the light of the persuasion approach, the ECtHR’s 
judgments can be seen as an important cuing element.  
One of the interviewees as a member of the working group who drafted the 
law, Aydoğan Asar, clearly expressed, ‘The decisions of the Court pushed 
Turkey to think harder on the existing domestic law. The Government decided 
to take further steps in order to prevent further decisions from the Court.’757 
He carried on: 
We (the working group) had close contacts with the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg. The aim during these interactions was to find out 
the reasons of the Court’s recent judgments and what type of regulation was 
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necessary in order to overcome these decisions. In addition to this, when the 
Court’s officials came to Turkey, we invited them to our workshops in order 
to receive their feedback on our work.758 
This interaction is significant in terms of cuing as this would allow 
deliberation and also increase familiarity with the best practices. However, 
persuasion’s final phase is fully and voluntarily acceptance of the norm that is 
imposed in this socialisation mechanism. However, it was argued that the authorities 
did not reach this stage. The anonymous interviewee, who was involved in the process 
since the formation of the working group, stated: 
The argument concerning the balance between human rights and security 
during the drafting process was used so many times, the involved actors 
started to believe in this. However, I do not think they internalised the human 
rights norms fully. In addition to this, now (after the law was passed) the 
working group was dissolved. The perspective they gained is gone with 
them.759 
Instead, it is believed that the actors involved in the law-making process did 
not fully internalise the human rights values and feel a need to redefine their 
interests or beliefs accordingly. Meral Açıkgöz, as one of the interviewees, 
mentioned ‘at the practice level, I can see the shift towards securitisation as 
the mentality has not fully changed’.760 
Hence, one of the tools of the persuasion approach has been applied in this case 
although it is hard to label this socialisation as only persuasion. It can only be stated 
that there was a certain level of persuasion at the judicial influence perspective. 
I.3. Acculturation 
The third mechanism of social influence by Goodman and Jinks is acculturation.761 
They argue that this is the missing mechanism in compliance and international 
relations theories. They aimed to bring a set of related social processes that are 
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described by interdisciplinary literature under the acculturation approach. This 
approach put its focus on ‘the relationship of the actor to a reference group or wider 
cultural environment’. 762  The target actor changes its behaviour due to this 
relationship rather than believing in the norm’s ‘validity or appropriateness’. Instead, 
the change occurs because the norm is related to a desired relationship with a 
reference group. Subsequently, the target actor uses methods such as mimicry and 
status maximisation to have a better relationship with the reference group. The 
underlying mechanism is that change occurs through pressures to conform with the 
reference group or environment.  
To start with, actors will be influenced by cognitive pressures. Cognitive 
pressures can be classified under two types of pressure: ‘social-psychological costs of 
nonconformity and social-psychological benefits of conforming to group norms and 
expectations’.763  Empirical studies show that people show discomfort when they face 
a challenge in a way that their behaviour was not consistent with their self-
conception. To reduce the feeling of discomfort, the actor changes its behaviour or 
brings a justification for their past behaviour. This can be linked to the basic human 
need of rationalising their actions to themselves and others.  
In addition to cognitive pressures, acculturation can also occur through social 
pressures. Individuals seek to maximise social status and lessen social disapproval. 
This type of social pressure can have two different forms: shaming or shunning for 
imposing social-psychological costs and social approval for providing social-
psychological benefits. Social-psychological studies demonstrate that actors alter their 
behaviour when they face a threat of social pressure that will be imposed by a 
reference group. In the cases of acculturation happening through external pressures, it 
is more likely to end with public compliance but not necessarily private acceptance of 
the norm that is imposed by the reference group. This is a very significant and unique 
element of acculturation that makes this mechanism distinct from other compliance 
mechanisms.  
The impact of the ECtHR’s judgments on Turkey can be described as 
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embarrassment. Before the Bill was sent to the Parliamentary Commissions, in 
Parliament there was also a request by a group of MPs to understand the 
circumstances that asylum seekers are in with a reference to the judgments of the 
ECtHR: 
The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights pointing to the 
arbitrary detention at foreigner guesthouses, domestic law’s inefficiency in 
deportation and asylum cases, and the need for a major change in Turkey’s 
immigration management system are important to reveal the picture our 
country is in. 764 
The Members of Parliament in Parliamentary Commission meetings and 
parliamentary discussions also expressed their disappointment with these judgments 
and expressed the urgent need to take some steps towards making new legislation 
immediately.765 For instance, after referring to the number of the decisions of the 
ECtHR, a member of the Parliamentary Commission and a Member of Parliament, 
Celal Dinçer, asserted during a Commission meeting: 
We are hoping that we will ensure that this draft will clear the legal gaps that 
the European Court of Human Rights pointed out. This draft should be able to 
prevent further decisions of the Court that find us in violation of the 
Convention. 766 
Another Commission’s final report after discussing the draft of the new law stated ‘It 
is absolutely vital that there should be new legislation on immigration and asylum due 
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to the ECtHR’s recent judgments against our country.’767 During one of the Interior 
Affairs Commission meetings, a member of the opposition party, Hasan Huseyin 
Turkoglu, stated, ‘It should be appreciated by all parties that this draft includes the 
elements inspired from international conventions and the European Court of Human 
Rights’ decisions and approach to the issue.’768 
Acculturation focuses on the importance of a reference group with which the 
target actor seeks to be associated. In this case study, the influential reference group 
in Turkey’s case can be easily spotted as Europe throughout the constant and intense 
relationship over the years769. This cultural environment of Europe can include the 
European Union, the ECtHR under the COE or other European organisations related 
to the immigration law in Turkey. Europe, in general, has always been a place that 
Turkey desires to be associated with in one way or another.770 Westernism, as an 
important ideology in Turkey, suggests that Turkey will have a more dominant role in 
the international realm if it becomes a civilised country in the eyes of the West and 
emphasises the importance of close relations with the Western world.771 Being part of 
the Council of Europe and ratification of European Convention on Human Rights 
only a year after it became effective also demonstrates the degree of Turkey’s desire 
to be associated with Europe. For that reason, the ECtHR’s judgments were harmful 
in a sense that it was damaging the image Turkey was trying to create by saying that 
Turkey’s domestic law is violating the European Convention on Human Rights.  
Hence, what was drafted in the new legislation was highly influenced by the 
judgments of the ECtHR. For instance, in the Interior Affairs Commission meetings, 
when there was a proposal to amend the wording of a provision on the circumstances 
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in which deportation decisions cannot be taken, the reply by Atilla Toros, the Director 
in Immigration and Asylum Office was, ‘This wording is fully in line with the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.’772 
The importance of these decisions to the Members of Parliament was also 
evident in the parliamentary stage. The parliamentary debates showed that there was a 
constant questioning of Government officials on the number of cases in relation to 
Turkey in front of the ECtHR.773 Furthermore, when the Bill was submitted to 
Parliament, Celal Dinçer, as a member of an opposition party and Interior Affair 
Commission, made a speech on the need for this legislation. After he listed all the 
shortcomings of existing immigration management system, he put a special emphasis 
on the case law of the ECtHR: 
However, among all these gaps in the system, the most worrying thing for us 
is the European Court of Human Rights’ recent judgments against our country. 
These judgments have been about immigration detention and deportation 
decisions. With this new legislation, I believe these problems and needs will 
be cleared.774 
As a supporting argument, Meral Açıkgöz, also stated, ‘The decisions of the ECtHR 
were the most important justifications for the Government to draft a new law as it was 
seen as having done damage to Turkey’s reputation.’775 
The damage on the reputation due to this wave of decisions from the ECtHR 
shows that the ECtHR played an important role during the initiation of the law-
                                                
772‘İçişleri Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi [Interior Affairs Commission Meeting Minutes]’ (TBMM, 20 
June 2012) <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon_tutanaklari.tutanaklar?pKomKod=13> 
accessed 7 September 2017.  
773 Two examples of this can be listed: ‘Parliamentary Debate’ (TBMM, 23rd Term 10th session 23 
October 2008) 
<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d23/c030/tbmm23030010.pdf> accessed 7 
September 2017; ‘Parliamentary Debate’ (TBMM, 23rd Term 95th session 28 May 2009) 
<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d23/c045/tbmm23045095.pdf> accessed 7 
September 2017. The reliability of the search engine at the parliamentary debate database can be 
questionable as at some parts of the engine does not produce the results that it should produce. 
However, as this is the only database to search archive of the parliamentary debates, the results that 
came up will be used in this thesis.  
774 ‘Parliamentary Debate on the New Law on Foreigners and International Protection’ (TBMM, 24th 
term 80th session 20 March 2013) 694 
<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d24/c046/tbmm24046080.pdf> accessed 7 
September 2017. 
775 Interview with Meral Açıkgöz  (n 760).  
 163 
drafting process. The anonymous interviewee’s opinions on the ECtHR’s decisions 
were very similar to the other interviewees’. He pointed out ‘The biggest drive behind 
the law-drafting process was the case law of the ECtHR due to the volume of the 
decisions delivered.’776 One of the interviewees also disclosed that they ‘visited 
Strasbourg to meet the judges of the ECtHR in order to discuss what needed to be 
done in the new law that would prevent further judgments’.777 He carried on:  
The judgments of the Court were mostly related to the removal centres. For 
this reason, we brought new regulations for these removal centres. With this 
new law, the conditions and the duration of administrative detention are clear 
now.778 
This direct focus on the ECtHR and the aim of preventing further decisions by the 
Government revealed how significant these decisions were on the way to draft a new 
law in immigration and asylum management system. This clearly demonstrated that 
Turkey sought to find ways to stop receiving disapproval from the ECtHR, as its 
reference group, like acculturation would suggest in this scenario. Since Turkey’s 
exposure to the ECtHR and the importance of the ECtHR to Turkey are both quite 
high, conformity with the norms induced by the ECtHR became more likely as 
predicted by acculturation.  
II.  INFLUENCE OF SUPRANATIONAL AGENCIES 
II.1. The Interaction with the EU 
Turkey has been a candidate country for the EU accession after its application was 
examined and accepted by the EU in 1998. Under this application scheme, the EU 
submits progress reports on the candidate country’s progress in complying with the 
Copenhagen criteria.779 Thereby, the EU’s progress reports on Turkey were the main 
source of international criticism with regards to the lack of a comprehensive 
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immigration law since 1998.780 
This interaction between Turkey and the EU, as explained in greater detail in 
Chapter 3, displayed a strong level of socialisation. This level of socialisation can be 
seen as a dominant influence towards drafting a new law that complies with 
international human rights standards regarding immigration detention of children.  
In terms of detention of minors, detention of children for immigration 
purposes was a tiny detail of the bigger picture of the immigration management 
system within this socialisation between Turkey and the EU. As reported before in 
Chapter 3, the EU’s progress reports did not necessarily mention detention of children 
for immigration law enforcement.781 The main concern of the EU was about the lack 
of a comprehensive immigration management system that can manage irregular 
migration in Turkey. For that reason, prevention of illegal migration and stricter 
border controls were always the main discussion in the progress reports. The push 
from the EU had more of a practical weight than human-rights oriented approach. 
Nonetheless, the criticisms in the progress reports still pointed out the necessary 
elements in relation to administrative detention and deportation procedures that 
Turkey needs to follow. Hence, within this bigger picture, the human rights approach 
towards detention of minors was only a necessary component of the bundle.  
II.1.1. Material Inducement 
 
Material inducement plays a key role in terms of the socialisation between the EU and 
Turkey. Although there have been no direct or explicit sanctions or rewards from the 
EU towards Turkey, the membership application can be read as a very beneficial 
reward for Turkey if the application process ends successfully. Being a member state 
of the EU can open many doors such as free movement of goods, people and free 
trade. This can bring a significant material advantage to Turkey in the region and 
prosperity to the country’s economy. As a developing economy, EU membership can 
bring a further boost to Turkey. Hence, Turkey followed the national action plans and 
accession partnership documents over many years in recalculation of benefits and 
costs since this push from the EU had a materialistic nature as an end result instead of 
an instant reward/sanction. The interviewees and the Members of Parliament involved 
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in the Parliamentary Commission meetings stated that being in line with the EU’s 
regulations was important in order to gain momentum in the accession process to the 
EU. As quoted before: 
In 2008, the main reason behind the establishment of the Asylum and 
Migration Bureau was the harmonisation with the European Union. In order to 
see what Turkey has done so far to comply with the 2005 National Action 
Plan, this Bureau was set up as a result of a direct pressure from the EU.782 
Hence, it can be stated that there was a hidden material inducement agenda in the 
beginning of the process while setting up the working group to draft the new law. The 
accession and harmonisation with the EU was an important drive for the Government 
of Turkey.  
The drafting procedure which followed setting up the working group can be 
read under the acculturation approach as it will provide some parallel themes to this 
social mechanism. As quoted before, all interviewees agreed upon their efforts to take 
EU legislation as standard setting criteria during the drafting. During the 
Parliamentary Commission meetings, the accession process to the EU was referred. A 
Member of Parliament, Alpaslan Kavaklıoğlu, in one of the meetings stated: 
Immigration issue is one of the significant pillars of the EU accession process. 
Until the full accession to the EU happens, we have to make our international 
protection system in line with EU legislation and complete our institutional 
structure.783 
The Preamble of the law also stated that the documents submitted within the 
accession process to the EU showed the need for a new law.784 This constant 
reference to the accession process showed how important becoming a member of the 
EU was to Turkey, with all the added material advantages a successful application 
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would bring. Hence, the push in the beginning to adopt new circulars and legislation 
was derived from a materialistic nature.  
 II.1.2. Persuasion 
 
When we look back to the detailed historical record of Turkey in Chapter 3 and this 
Chapter, it is readily conceded that the persuasion approach was steadily evident 
during the timeline within the interaction with the EU. There was a constant 
information exchange and deliberation between actors. Monitoring and reporting 
played a significant role in the sense that it prompted Turkey to realise that there was 
a need for new legislation in the area of immigration and asylum.  
Cuing, as a micro process of persuasion, can be seen here in reporting and 
monitoring since the EU made Turkey think harder on their needs and controversial 
practices. Concerning the change of behaviour because of a need, the persuasion 
approach also suggests that the target actor can accept the induced behaviour as it 
may solve a problem or be useful for his needs. Therefore, in this case study, it is 
apparent that Turkey has seen this need and adapted the induced behaviour 
accordingly.  
On the other hand, it is challenging to claim that persuasion was the main 
mechanism used by the EU that influenced Turkey to comply with international 
human rights standards. Although social learning and deliberations are central under 
the persuasion approach, the basis of influence for this mechanism, as stated before, is 
the congruence with internal values. This approach indicates that the norm should be 
similar to the target actor’s internal values. For that reason, framing has three different 
elements that demonstrate to what extent the target actor’s values and beliefs are 
similar to the induced norm or belief. As a result of this, the persuasion approach 
implies that the target actor will fully accept the norm and revise its identity and 
interests accordingly. However, when we apply this to Turkey’s case, it is hard to 
claim that Turkey as a state has fully internalised human rights norms. The interviews 
with the selected people, as quoted before785, revealed that there was not full 
acceptance of the human rights norms in relation to administrative detention since 
state actors did not internalise the norms.  
                                                




The EU can be defined as the reference group with a dominant influence on Turkey. 
To start with, the acculturation approach would expect to see the impact of social 
pressures coming from European institutions, in general, on Turkey as the target 
actor. Social pressures on the target actor work through shaming or shunning for 
imposing social-psychological costs and social approval for providing social-
psychological benefits. Turkey has experienced a constant wave of progress reports 
from the EU following its application for membership in 1998. These reports 
criticised the lack of a comprehensive immigration management system in Turkey 
year after year as explained in detail before. Whenever there was a development 
towards the induced practice by the EU, the progress reports showed appreciation of 
this effort and showed approval. However, controversial practices and the lack of 
immigration legislation were accorded the EU’s public disapproval in the progress 
reports. During this process, Turkey had taken baby steps towards making new 
legislation including setting up a Special Task Force and writing action plans. The 
substantial step towards law-making was only taken in 2008 by setting up the 
Immigration and Asylum Bureau. This discontent in the case of limited progress and 
praise in the case of the progress can be seen as part of the shaming and social 
approval mechanisms that are the key elements in the acculturation approach.  
In addition to this, in most of the Parliamentary Commission meetings, 
harmonisation with the EU was always mentioned as an important part of this new 
proposed legislation. For instance, in a Human Rights Commission meeting, a 
member of the ruling party, Cemal Yılmaz Dinçer, focused on the importance of this 
legislation for the negotiations with the EU: 
This proposed legislation is a significant step towards the harmonisation with 
the European Union Acquis. Within the negotiations, asylum and immigration 
management is an important element under the 24th Chapter called ‘Justice, 
Freedom and Security’. 786 
The EU’s influence on the Government to draft this proposed legislation became clear 
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when a representative from the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ege Erkoçak, expressed this 
legislation’s place in the negotiations with the EU as follows: 
The common emphasis of the national programmes written for the EU Acquis 
for the last ten years has been a new legislation on immigration and asylum 
and one institutional structure to manage this system. The importance of this 
proposed legislation and the EU’s expectation on this topic have been clearly 
expressed in the latest EU Progress Report…. 
We have an upcoming working group meeting with the EU on the 24th 
Chapter. Bringing this draft law to a point close to the finalisation is going to 
help our position in the negotiations in these meetings.787 
One of the interviewees involved in this research also expressed: 
In 2008, the main reason behind the establishment of the Asylum and 
Migration Bureau was the harmonisation with the European Union. In order to 
see what Turkey has done so far to comply with the 2005 National Action 
Plan, this Bureau was set up as a result of a direct pressure from the EU.788 
Therefore, it can be stated that there was a direct influence of the EU during the 
establishment of this Bureau that paved the way for a new law. Another study that 
conducted interviews with the Bureau officials stated that the Asylum and Migration 
Bureau was founded with ‘the wind of the European Union behind it’, and with the 
recognition that ‘new civilian institutions were needed to better comply with the 
conditions set forth by the European Union’.789 Turkey, as an outsider and striving to 
be a member of this environment, was in a position to push harder and ensure that the 
integration process with the EU would progress swiftly. 
Following the first steps of setting up the law-making process, the EU’s influence was 
also seen during the law-making process. In terms of setting a standard, the EU’s 
                                                
787 ‘Avrupa Birliği Uyum Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi [EU Affairs Commission Meeting Minutes] 
(TBMM, 6 June 2012) 
<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon_tutanaklari.tutanaklar?pKomKod=401&pDonem=2
4&pYasamaYili=2>  accessed 7 September 2017.  
788 Interview with Meral Açıkgöz (n 760). 
789 Hakki Onur Ariner, ‘Acculturation with international standards in Turkey’s migration reform: The 
Law on Foreigners and International Protection’ (Turkish Migration in Europe: Projecting the Next 50 
Years, Regent’s College, December 2012) 5.  
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norms and regulations on immigration management and international protection 
played a significant role during the law-making process. The Preamble of the new 
law, where the lawmakers explain the reasoning of new legislation, clearly 
emphasised that the new law aimed to bring harmonisation with EU legislation on the 
way to full membership to the EU. 790 The Preamble also described how the National 
Development Plans of Turkey had pointed out this need since 2007 in the light of the 
suggestions from the EU. Turkey was clearly attempting to fit in in this cultural 
environment by following the EU guidelines and standards during the drafting of new 
legislation. This can be explained as mimicry of the reference group’s practices under 
the acculturation approach. Hence, the law-drafting group referenced EU legislation 
very closely. Ms Açıkgöz, as one of the interviewees, expressed, ‘During the drafting 
process, there was determination to bring a holistic system that would cover 
immigration and asylum issues. For that reason, there was painstaking research on 
legislation of the EU.’791 The anonymous interviewee supported this argument by 
stating ‘We prepared charts that showed the legal context in Turkey before the new 
law, the legal context in the EU and the legal context in Turkey after the new law.’792  
For instance, Mr Asar referred to best practices stating ‘We have applied the EU’s 
best practices model and looked for the best practices within the EU member states 
and reflected this into our draft.’793 Overall, the EU was not only an initial push but 
also provided significant standard-setting criteria for Turkey’s recent Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection.  
It can be claimed that the socialisation process with the EU started with a 
material consideration as EU accession could lead to several rewards for Turkey’s 
economy. However in time, with the constant exposure to human rights discourse, the 
involved actors started to believe that they can associate with the reference group’s 
values. The anonymous interviewee referred to this, ‘The actors in the working group 
started to claim that Turkey can write a better and more humane law than the EU. I do 
not think that they believed in this in the first place.’ 794 
                                                
790 The Preamble of Law on Foreigners and International Protection (n 784). 
791 Interview with Meral Açıkgöz (n 760). 
792 Interview with the anonymous interviewee (n 753). 
793 Interview with Aydoğan Asar (n 743). 
794 Interview with the anonymous interviewee (n 753). 
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Furthermore, acculturation also suggests several elements to identify patterns 
of state action to recognise whether acculturation is at work. One of those elements is 
isomorphism where states become similar in terms of their organisational structures 
and policies. This is linked to the presence of decoupling within states where states 
conform to the group norms even though there is no national interest or need for this 
change. In this case study, it can be observed that Turkey has taken adequate steps to 
become similar to the reference group during the law-making process. The 
interviewees all expressed that they brought EU legislation and best practices from 
around Europe to the drafting committee in order to make the new legislation 
compatible with the European values. There were also several twinning projects 
between European countries and Turkey on asylum and immigration and training 
given by European officials to Turkish officials in the immigration management field. 
These developments prove that there is a high level of isomorphism between Europe 
and Turkey. However, in terms of decoupling, it is challenging that this is applicable 
to Turkey’s case as there was a national need for a new immigration law. On the other 
hand, this does not rule out the acculturation experience in this case study since 
Goodman and Jinks believe that decoupling can be a strong sign for the presence of 
acculturation, yet acculturation is not necessarily an indicator for decoupling.795  
Beyond the technicalities of new legislation, acculturation suggests that target 
actors assess the relationship to the reference group instead of assessing the induced 
norm, in contrast to the process involved in persuasion. This is very visible in 
Turkey’s case as the discussion around detention of minors for immigration purposes 
was not at the highest level. Not only the statements by the interviewees but also the 
Parliamentary Commission meeting notes revealed no substantial discussion over the 
human rights standards for  treatment of minors during immigration law enforcement. 
Instead, Turkey evaluated the relationship with Europe before and during the drafting 
process. 
On a general note, as a developing economy, Turkey desired to be a part of the 
EU and its economic advantages such as free trade in terms of material rewards. This 
aim initiated the compliance with the EU’s requests towards new legislation on 
immigration and asylum. However, this sole material inducement turned into an 
                                                
795 Goodman and Jinks (747) 139.  
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acculturation process since Turkey, as an outsider, tried to be a part of this European 
cultural environment by complying with their standards. It is more likely that 
acculturation occurred as a by-product of the material inducement approach in 
Turkey. 
II.2. The Council of Europe and the Committee on the Rights of the Child  
 
Following this important interaction between the EU and Turkey, it is essential to 
examine the interactions between Turkey and international organisations such as the 
Council of Europe’s human rights bodies and the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child as the second type of political influence on Turkey.  
To start with, Turkey, as a member of the COE796, has received reports and 
recommendations from the Commissioner for Human Rights, resolutions from 
Parliamentary Assembly and other human rights bodies that have a mandate under the 
COE. These reports referred to the lack of comprehensive immigration legislation in 
Turkey and recommended that Turkey take necessary measures to rectify this 
situation.797   
Turkey, as a member state that ratified the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, also receives concluding observations from the Committee on Rights of the 
Child, which is important to include when considering in the interactions between 
Turkey and the international organisations. In 2012, the Committee on Rights of the 
Child mentioned asylum-seeking and refugee children in its concluding observations 
of Turkey.798 The Committee raised its concerns on detention of children with adults 
and the difficulties for asylum-seeking and refugee children to access health and 
education.799 The Committee called on Turkey to ensure that every effort is made to 
secure these children’ rights and provide counselling.  
This interaction of the Committee and the bodies under the mandate of the 
COE with Turkey often did not get much attention from the Government. This was 
reflected in the drafting and law-making process. The interviewees from the working 
                                                
796 Turkey became the 13th Member State of the Council of Europe on 13 April 1950. 
797 To read further on this, see Chapter 3. Turkey’s Historical Record on Compliance with International 
Standards.  
798 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding Observations: Turkey’ (20 July 2012) UN 
Doc CRC/C/TUR/CO/2-3. 
799 ibid para 60.  
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group did not refer to these reports or observations during the interviews. When they 
were asked specifically, they expressed that they do not have any recollection of these 
observations or reports being mentioned in the meetings. In addition to this, neither 
the Parliamentary Commission meetings’ notes nor the parliamentary debates showed 
any discussion in relation to these country reports or concluding observations. This 
lack of attention overruled any type of efficient or successful trigger coming from 
these organisations on Turkey to change state behaviour.  
II.2.1. Material Inducement 
 
The COE does not have any material leverage over Turkey. Turkey was a member of 
the COE from 1950. Hence, there is no on-going application process for membership 
at stake in the case that Turkey does not follow the human rights standards set by the 
COE. These reports and recommendations do not impose any material sanctions on or 
rewards to Turkey. For that reason, under the material inducement approach, they 
would only have a nominal meaning. This argument can be applied to the influence of 
the Committee on Rights of the Child since the reports do not have any material 
sanctions/rewards, only has a nominal meaning for Turkey.  
II.2.2. Persuasion 
 
Throughout this period of interaction between Turkey and the international 
organisations that Turkey became involved in such as the COE and the Committee on 
Rights of the Child, it can be stated that social learning or deliberation did not play a 
significant role. We have not seen any type of reaction coming from the Turkish 
Government towards these institutions either in a way of acceptance or denial. The 
information exchange did not happen at a significant level. In terms of cuing as a 
micro-process under the persuasion approach, it is visible that Turkey was in a phase 
of change during this period by publishing circulars and directives as a result of 
critiques of their controversial practices. However, Turkey did not fully comply with 
the advice and recommendations to introduce new legislation coming from these 
international organisations during this long period of interaction. Instead of this, 
Turkey attempted to fix its policies by circulars and directives. The Parliamentary 
Commission meetings’ notes did not show any discussion in relation to these country 
reports or concluding observations. The interviewees also expressed that there was no 
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Social pressures from other international institutions include the reports of the COE 
human rights bodies, Parliamentary Assembly resolutions and the Committee on 
Rights of the Child. As explained in detailed before, Turkey has faced reports from 
these European human rights bodies concerning its controversial practices of 
detention of minors and families for immigration purposes and the lack of 
comprehensive immigration legislation. The reports and resolutions, however, were 
not submitted as often as the EU’s progress reports. Furthermore, it is hard to describe 
the relationship between these bodies and Turkey as close as the relation between 
Turkey and the EU, with reference to public opinion and public awareness of these 
institutions. While the judgments of the ECtHR and the progress reports of the EU 
can be easily found in the news for the public, there would be not any articles or news 
on these human rights bodies’ criticisms of Turkey.  
These reports neither created a huge stir in Turkish politics nor dominated the 
working group or Parliamentary Commission or parliamentary discussions. This 
could be explained with the acculturation approach’s perspective about the reference 
group. It was suggested that conformity happens if the importance of the reference 
group is higher; the relationship between the reference group and the target actor is 
closer; lastly, the size of the reference group is larger. Hence, the low impact of these 
bodies can be explained with this argument by the acculturation approach. As stated 
before, the importance of this reference group within the European cultural 
environment was lower than the EU to Turkey. In addition to this, the exposure of 
Turkey to these bodies was not particularly significant, based on the number of 
reports. Thus, it can be articulated that these particular bodies under the mandate of 
the COE is a part of wide European cultural environment. However, there are some 
discrepancies within this environment in terms of different reference groups at 
different levels of importance to the target actor. For that reason, the impact on the 
target actor can vary between those reference groups.  
                                                
800 Interview with Meral Açıkgöz (n 757); interview with the anonymous interviewee (n 750); 
interview with Aydoğan Asar (n 740). 
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III. CIVIL SOCIETY INFLUENCE 
Before 2007, there were no significant civil society reports that criticised or 
commented on Turkey’s detention practices in general or specifically in relation to 
minors. After 2007, there are a few civil society reports commenting on Turkey’s 
controversial practices regarding detention of minors and adults for immigration 
purposes.801 However, the existence of these reports would become significant if there 
was an interaction and information exchange between state and civil society actors. In 
Turkey’s case, there was no reaction found coming from the Government or any other 
state official in response to these reports. Ms Açıkgöz, on the other hand, explained 
the lack of civil society’s influence on the process stating ‘We did not have any 
written source of criticism from civil society to be used as a reference in the 
discussions during drafting the new law.’ 802 
The reasoning behind this can be the lack of public opinion in Turkey. 
Immigration and asylum issues have never been politicised in Turkey’s context.803 If 
this were a politicised topic, it would have led to argument and reflection on the state 
side. For that reason, the apathy of the state towards civil society reports can be 
considered a result of this lack of public opinion in Turkey over this topic. In order to 
apply the theory, there has to be an interaction and socialisation between state and the 
relevant actor. In that sense, there was not enough interaction between lawmakers and 
civil society to analyse through the lens of the theory. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed the historical record of Turkey’s immigration law with 
reference to the selected compliance theory for this case study. Each part explained a 
different type of influence in Turkey’s historical record with references to the 
developments in immigration law and explored whether there is any applicability to 
the social mechanisms suggested by the compliance theory. 
During the period before 1994, the developments were not extensive or 
comprehensive enough to make the immigration management system efficient. In 
                                                
801 For further details, see Chapter 3. Turkey’s Historical Record in Relation to Compliance with 
International Standards. There were two reports published by Helsinki Citizens Assembly.  
802 Interview with Meral Açıkgöz (n 760). 
803 Interview with Meral Açıkgöz (n 760); interview with the anonymous interviewee (n 753); 
interview with Aydoğan Asar (n 743). 
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terms of socialisation of Turkey with different international and national actors, there 
was not any evidence to show that this type of socialisation occurred during this 
period. This led the Turkish Government to act on their own initiatives and interests 
without any impact of human rights in the introduced legislation and policies during 
this stage. The following period is where Turkey moved towards institutionalisation. 
During this period, the Turkish Government brought new legislation due to the 
immigration flows to Turkey from different regions. The Government felt the need to 
manage the issue of asylum with a new regulation since the numbers received by 
Turkey were increasing due to the troubles in the neighbouring countries. Like the 
period before, there was no record to demonstrate that there was any level of 
socialisation between Turkey as a state and international or national institutions over 
the immigration law issue.  
The last and more fundamental period for this research, after 1999, is where an 
intense level of socialisation is evident. This period was analysed under three parts: 
judicial influence, influence of supranational agencies and civil society influence.  
The judicial influence coming from the ECtHR’s judgments had an important role in 
Turkey’s development of immigration law. These judgments were referred as an 
important push on the Turkish Government to take substantial steps towards new 
immigration legislation by the interviewees who were in the working group that 
drafted the new law, the officials that were in the Parliamentary Commission 
meetings and the Members of Parliament at the parliamentary discussions. This strong 
dynamic was, then, read through the lens of Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’ theory. 
While these judgments carried a material nature through compensation awarded to the 
applicants, the material aspect of these judgments did not have a significant weight 
during the decision-making of the Government to draft new legislation. Instead of 
this, the reputational damage was mentioned more frequently and dominantly. In 
terms of persuasion, the officials in the working group visited Strasbourg and had a 
close dialogue with the judges at the ECtHR in order to see what was needed to fill 
the gaps in Turkish immigration law. This was important in terms of using a tool of 
the persuasion approach named cuing where the target actor thought harder and 
reflected on its needs. The last mechanism suggested by the compliance theory was 
acculturation where the reference group that a state wants to be associated with has an 
influential power through cognitive and social pressures. Europe, as a wide cultural 
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environment, can be defined as Turkey’s reference group. Within this reference 
group, the EU and the ECtHR under the COE can be included. For that reason, the 
judgments of the reference group were harmful to the country’s reputation that 
Turkey desired to boost. It was clear that the working group was determined to 
prevent disapproval from the ECtHR through its judgments in order to end the 
discomfort Turkey experienced due to social pressures. Being criticised by the ECtHR 
was damaging Turkey’s plan to be associated with the reference group. Hence, it can 
be claimed that there was a strong acculturation impact within the judicial influence 
perspective. 
Secondly, there is the influence that derives from the EU, the COE and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child. However, the human rights bodies under the 
mandate of the COE, the COE’s parliamentary resolutions and the Committee’s 
reports and concluding observations did not carry much weight for the Turkish 
Government. They were often either ignored or not successful in creating enough 
discussion. Although these institutions are part of the European cultural environment, 
they did not have that strong leverage over Turkey due to lack of public opinion and 
public awareness about these institutions and the amount of these reports. 
Another type of influence, on the other hand, was very powerful at different 
stages of drafting this new legislation. The interaction between the EU and Turkey 
was a regular and productive type in terms of its results. Turkey’s desire to be a 
member of the EU triggered Turkey to bring its legislation in line with the EU as an 
aim to comply with the EU’s criteria for accession. The EU’s priority in this 
relationship was to ensure that Turkey would have a stronger system to fight illegal 
migration. The norms regarding detention centres and detention of children were part 
of the bigger package of an immigration management system. In order to gain 
momentum in the accession process to the EU, Turkey was open to listen to the EU’s 
stance towards immigration and asylum. The reason for this interest could be 
attributed to the material advantages that the membership to the EU would bring to 
Turkey and its economy. Hence, this process can be read as an implied material 
inducement. Following the attraction of EU membership as a trigger to Turkey as a 
developing economy in the first place, the law-drafting process turned out to be a very 
involved process for the state officials. Throughout this process, they became aware 
of, discussed and reflected on the immigration issues. The desire to be associated with 
this reference group as an outsider to this cultural environment and this constant 
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exposure to the EU norms on the immigration issue led the officials to be acculturated 
in a sense. Hence, acculturation occurred as a consequence of material inducement. It 
can be stated the socialisation between Turkey and the EU was more about material 
advantages and the strong power of the reference group over the target state than a 
significant internalisation of EU values and/or private acceptance of human rights 
norms.  
To summarise, it can be stated that Turkey was under social pressures from 
Europe as a cultural environment. As mentioned before, Turkey would like to be part 
of Europe and its culture as an outsider. Whenever Turkey faces a challenge from 
Europe, they should feel discomfort and seek ways to change the behaviour, 
according to the acculturation approach. In reality, it can be stated that the discomfort 
felt after receiving several progress reports and experiencing the ECtHR’s consistent 
stance towards Turkey’s immigration law may have led Turkey to conform with the 
European norms in order to lessen the social-psychological costs and improve social-
psychological benefits. In this example, Turkey was attempting to minimise the 
dissonance that resulted from conflict with the norms of the reference group. By 
conforming to the group norms, Turkey could feel the social-psychological benefit of 
being part of European’s wider cultural environment and reduce the social-
psychological costs of getting criticism on a regular basis. This could be reason of the 
Strasbourg visit by the working group and the steps taken by Turkey within its 
domestic law throughout the years of the European Union accession period.  
Furthermore, having greater linkages with international networks could be as a 
sign of acculturation. This has an impact in practice in the sense that greater linkages 
will bring greater pressure from international organisations on the target actor. This 
case study exhibits these signs as Turkey has been receiving reports, resolutions and 
the ECtHR judgments from different bodies of European human rights institutions. 
The common themes of these documents was the urgent need of a new immigration 
law in Turkey in order to deal with the challenges regarding migration and bring the 
legislation in line with human rights standards. The extent of pressure resulting from 
greater linkages played a considerable role in Turkey’s realisation of this need.  
In a general note in relation to the application of the theory, Turkey’s case 
study can be explained by more than one mechanism. While it is evident that 
acculturation was at work concerning the judicial and supranational agencies’ 
influence, material inducement was the initiating factor in terms of Turkey’s 
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relationship with the EU. Furthermore, persuasion was present at a certain level where 
Turkey was in an information exchange with the EU and the ECtHR. However, 
persuasion was not as strong as the other social mechanisms as full internalisation of 
the norm has not occurred. Turkey’s progress towards compliance with international 
human rights standards was highly influenced by external actors and socialisation 
with these actors. Therefore, the selected compliance theory that focuses on this type 
of socialisation fits in this case study and has a strong defining power. 
In conclusion, it could be said that the EU; the ECtHR’s judgments; international 
organisations’ constant criticism over the lack of legislation on immigration and 
asylum has had an immense influence on Turkey’s progress in immigration law. The 
harmonisation process with the EU brought structure, a concrete time plan and 
institutionalisation to Turkey’s immigration management system. Turkey has made 
extensive progress in order to align with the EU Acquis without any clear 
parliamentary or public resistance.804  In addition to that, the process could be 
characterised by academic and technocratic routes instead of political actors’ 
discussion, which made the process smoother.805  
  
                                                
804 Saime Özçürümez and Nazlı Şenses, 'Europeanization and Turkey: Studying Irregular Migration 
Policy' (2011) 13 Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 233, 245. 
805 ibid 245-6.  
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CHAPTER 6. THE FACTORS AFFECTING POLICY AND 
LEGAL CHANGES: CASE STUDY – THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Following the previous chapter on Turkey’s case analysis, this analysis chapter will 
examine the UK’s case and draw conclusions on this case study. It seeks to 
investigate the relevant drivers that led the UK to revise its legislation that allowed 
detention of minors for immigration law enforcement. While looking at these 
different potential dynamics that could affect the Government to change behaviour, it 
will be vital to place these triggers into a meaningful theoretical framework. In order 
to do this, the thesis applies the selected compliance theory by Ryan Goodman and 
Derek Jinks to the case study. 
This chapter will have three main parts: Judicial Influence, Influence of 
Official State and Supranational Agencies and Civil Society Influence. The first part 
will be on domestic court’s approach and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(ECtHR) judgments regarding detention of minors under Judicial Influence section. It 
will start with a brief summary of domestic and international case law concerning this 
topic. Following this summary, the thesis will examine what this case law meant for 
the Government. This will also include references to the interviews806 conducted for 
this research. This data will complement the objective evidence derived from 
parliamentary debates and literature search. Lastly, there will be an application of the 
chosen compliance theory to this specific part. Every part will follow the same 
structure with different findings and different analysis. While the judicial influence 
section will be focusing on case law, the influence of official state and supranational 
agencies section will analyse the international and official state agencies’ reports with 
                                                
806 The interviews were conducted between 2015-2016 with Zrinka Bralo, The Lord Ramsbotham GCB 
CBE, Julian Huppert and Tony Smith. Zrinka Bralo was a Commissioner on the Independent Asylum 
Commission, the most comprehensive review of the UK protection system. She was involved in 
campaign to end detention of children for immigration purposes in 2010. She has been a Chief 
Executive at Migrants Organise since 2001. The Lord Ramsbotham is a member of House of Lords 
since November 2006. He was involved in Citizens UK Campaign to end detention of children for 
immigration purposes in 2010. He is still actively working on detention issue in Parliament. Julian 
Huppert is a Liberal Democrat politician and is a former Member of Parliament for Cambridge. He 
worked in Parliament between 2010 and 2015. He was involved in drafting of the immigration 
legislation that ends the immigration detention of children. He is a lecturer in Physics and Public Policy 
at Clare College, Cambridge University. Tony Smith is a former Director General of the UK Border 
Force. He worked for the UK Home Office for 40 years. 
 180 
references to the response they have received from members of Parliament. This 
second part will have two subsections as international and official state agencies will 
be studied separately. The third part will be on civil society organisations and NGOs’ 
reports and campaigns while being structured with the same pattern.  
I. JUDICIAL INFLUENCE 
To begin with, domestic and international judgments can have an influential stance on 
states to amend their policies or legislation. Since 1971 with the introduction of 
immigration detention in the UK 807 , there have been several domestic and 
international cases regarding the detention practices in the UK as explained in detail 
in the Chapter 4808. Domestic case law, firstly, reveals what the judiciary branch’s 
approach to the detention policy compared to the executive and legislative branches in 
the UK.  
The domestic courts had a cautious approach towards immigration detention 
practices in the UK since 1971.809 Domestic case law suggested that the detention 
policy is lawful as it provided certain protection from the international conventions, it 
only criticised the way authorities exercised this power to detain children for 
immigration purposes. On the other hand, international case law found the UK’s 
detention policy lawful in relation to adult detention as there were not any ECtHR 
judgments against the UK regarding detention of minors. This non-interventionist 
nature of the case law should be read with an analysis of the obligations under 
CRC.810 CRC does not ban detention of children for immigration purposes. There is a 
lack of a well-defined ban that the courts need to take into account. On the other hand, 
the principles brought by CRC are also open to interpretation as they are missing 
clear-cut definitions. For instance, CRC urges States Parties to use detention ‘only as 
a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time’.811 However, 
CRC does not provide any clear time limit for detention of minors. It is open to 
interpretation for the immigration authorities to decide on the shortest appropriate 
                                                
807 Immigration Act 1971, sch 2, paras 9, 16 (2). 
808 To read further on the case law, see Chapter 4. The UK’s Historical Record in Relation to 
Compliance with International Standards. 
809 To read further on the case law at domestic and international level, see Chapter 4. The UK’s 
Historical Record in Relation to Compliance with International Standards. 
810 To read further on the international human rights standards regarding detention of minors, see 
Chapter 2. Detention of Children in the Immigration Context: International Human Rights Standards.  
811 International Convention on the Rights of the Child (signed 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 
September 1990) 1577 UNTS 1 (CRC), art 37.b.  
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period of time. For that reason, the Court’s view on time limit stated as ‘It is not for 
this Court to lay down to what may have been a reasonable period of detention but, in 
my judgment, such a period was bound to be far less than approximately two 
months.’812 
This non-interventionist approach by the courts can be explained with this 
absence of clarity in the obligations under CRC. As long as the policy carries the 
features of the CRC principles in general, it is hard to dispute the legality of the 
detention policy. This gave the UK a wide discretion over the use of power to detain 
under the Immigration Act 1971 powers. For the application of the theory, since the 
criticism did not focus on the policy itself, this lack of meaningful intervention in 
relation to the detention policy under the judicial influence made the theory 
application difficult as the selected theory relies on criticism towards a state’s policy 
in order to bring compliance.  
I.1. Material Inducement 
When we apply judicial influence to the selected theory, material inducement should 
be our first mechanism to check whether there is any parallel between the UK’s case 
and the theory’s elements. As explained in detail before under Chapter 1.1. 
Compliance Theories, material inducement depends on material sanctions or rewards. 
This mechanism suggests that states change their behaviour in order to prevent 
financial burden or receive financial help. This process does not involve any 
voluntary change. Financial elements play the central role in the decision for change 
in behaviour. The costs that will be incurred can be social or material. However, in 
order to see the relevance of these social costs to the material inducement approach, 
these social costs must be translated into material costs in the end. In terms of judicial 
influence at national and international level, the UK was not sanctioned to pay any 
monetary compensation to people who challenged the UK’s detention policy. Hence, 
this makes it impossible to apply material inducement into this case study where there 
were no monetary sanctions or rewards available to analyse the UK’s reaction.  
                                                
812 S & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 1654, para 69.  
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I.2. Persuasion 
Secondly, the persuasion approach claims that change in state behaviour occurs 
through processes of social learning and information exchange within international 
organisations and transnational networks. Hence, domestic and international 
judgments can be a tool of persuasion in order to persuade states to change their 
legislation and policies on a certain topic. The reflection of these cases in 
parliamentary debate can give us clues whether this limited case law led to any 
argument of the policy on legal or moral grounds in Parliament.  In the UK’s case, the 
judgments were used within parliamentary discussion of new legislation or existing 
legislation in order to show the gaps in the legislation if the judgment was against the 
Government’s policies like in the Chahal case. The Chahal case was discussed 
heavily by Members of Parliament as the judgment found the UK was in a breach of 
the Convention rights. The judgment of the ECtHR, finding a breach of Article 5.4813 
of the Convention, had an impact on the appeal process set out in the legislation.814 As 
the right to appeal to the immigration appellate authorities against the Home 
Secretary’s decision was not provided to the detainees if national security was 
involved, and this was criticised by the ECtHR, Parliament set up a new bill that 
introduced the right to appeal to an independent commission. For that reason, social 
learning occurred to a certain extent where the Members of Parliament used the 
Chahal case in order to pass a new legislation.  
However, as research showed, the UK’s detention policy has not been heavily 
criticised by domestic or international courts since 1971. Although the ECtHR 
decisions criticised Belgian authorities in the aforementioned cases on their detention 
policy relating to minors after 2006815, there have been no cases brought to the 
attention of the ECtHR regarding the situation in the UK. In spite of the reference to 
these cases concerning Belgium in the Suppiah case in 2010 at the domestic court, the 
UK’s policy was found lawful as it covered key protection elements from different 
                                                
813 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention 
on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), art 5.4: ‘Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or 
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided 
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.’ 
814 HL Deb 05 June 1997, vol 580, cols 733-56; HL Deb 23 June 1997, vol 580, cols 430-40; HL Deb 
07 July 1997, vol 581, cols 481-94; HL Deb 15 July 1997, vol 581, cols 912-49; HC Deb 30 October 
1997, vol 299, cols 053-73; HC Deb 26 November 1997, vol 301, cols 032-41. 
815 Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium (2008) 46 EHRR 23; Muskhadzhiyeva and 
Others v Belgium App no 41442/07 (ECtHR, 19 January 2010). 
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international conventions. Violation of Article 5 was found on the basis of the failure 
of the application of this policy by the authorities. In addition to that, it was found that 
the conditions at detention centres were better equipped to accommodate the needs of 
minors, unlike Belgian cases.  
The lack of ECtHR judgments regarding the UK’s policy and positive 
feedback by the domestic courts towards the UK’s policy in relation to other ECtHR 
judgments on Belgian cases prevented any social learning from occurring for the 
UK’s authorities. For this reason, social learning did not materialise between these 
institutions and the Government concerning detention of minors. In addition to that, 
this persuasion approach puts great emphasis on the norm that the target actor needs 
to adopt. The norm, here, is that detention should be only used as a last resort at 
detention centres that are not suitable for children. In the UK’s case, the detention 
policy of minors was not challenged with an alternative norm or policy by the courts 
under the judicial influence. The courts have found the policy lawful and reasonable 
in their judgments. This was also a significant missing point in the case study while 
looking for parallel themes between case study and the selected theory.  
I.3. Acculturation 
 
Finally, the selected theory suggests acculturation as a socialisation 
mechanism in where the reference group plays an important role on the way to 
changing state behaviour. Through cognitive and social pressures pushed by the 
reference group, the target actor is made to change the policy or legislation in 
question as the target actor would like to have a better relationship with its reference 
group. Receiving constant pressure and disapproval would lead target actor to act in 
away of which the reference group approves. The costs that the target actor needs to 
pay will be social costs, unlike the material inducement’s material costs. Under the 
judicial influence in the UK’s case, it should be expected that the ECtHR is an 
important reference group to the UK owing to the high rate of implementing the 
judgments of the ECtHR.816 However, the lack of judgments on this issue made an 
analysis of this relationship between the UK and the ECtHR unattainable. 
                                                
816 Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of 
Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2014) 48 table 3.1. 
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In the Chahal case, there was a certain level of inclusion of the judgment 
within the parliamentary debate on a new legislation. In these judgments, the 
detention policy of the UK was not criticised, instead being found lawful by the 
ECtHR. Hence, parliamentary debate was about this process in practice rather than 
the detention policy itself. However, reference to the case law in Parliament showed 
that there was value attached by the Government on this case law criticising practices. 
Furthermore, the Khawaja 817  case was also mentioned in parliamentary debate 
relating to the questions to the Home Secretary regarding the number of detainees 
detained at prison establishments and remand centres.818 It was also brought to the 
attention of Parliament when the appeal process was discussed as this judgment stated 
that the appeal process was impractical.819 Immigration detention as a practice has not 
been challenged in the light of this judgment as it was not challenged by the domestic 
courts. Nevertheless, these references in parliamentary debates are important to 
recognise that the ECtHR as an institution through its judgments carried a certain 
level of pressure on the UK.  
By contrast to the criticisms derived from case law, the Saadi case was also 
brought to the attention in Parliament. The national court’s decision of the lawfulness 
of the detention policy was mentioned briefly in Parliament in order to prove the 
argument that the detention policy could not be criticised on legal grounds. Case 
law’s confirmative approach was reflected in Parliament in order to prove the current 
policy’s legality. Mr Browne as then Minister for Citizenship and Immigration stated 
this, ‘The lawfulness of detaining asylum claimants for the sole purpose of deciding 
their claims quickly was upheld by the Court of Appeal and by the House of Lords in 
the case of Saadi.’820 
This reference to the judgment of the domestic courts in relation to support of 
detention policy of asylum seekers demonstrated that case law is taken seriously by 
Members of Parliament in a way that Minister of the Cabinet felt the need to refer to 
this to make a point on the legality of this policy. What this means for the 
acculturation approach is that the courts at domestic and international level can be a 
significant reference group for the UK. It can be speculated that if there was 
substantial criticism from the courts concerning the detention policy, this would have 
                                                
817 Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1982] Imm AR 139, [1983] 2 WLR 321. 
818 HC Deb 31 July 1984, vol 65, col 218-9W.  
819 HL Deb 29 March 1983, vol 440, cols 523-49.  
820 HC Deb 16 September 2004, vol 424, col 157-9W. 
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been one of the influential triggers behind steps to comply with international 
standards.  
Since this research is looking for the motives behind the decision for change in 
this policy, it is important to note that judicial influence was not a factor which 
pushed the state to change the policy due to its positive feedback and approval. 
Judicial influence was not one of the major triggers in the UK’s compliance history. 
There is not enough evidence to say that the reason for a change in detention policy of 
minors in the UK was the judicial influence on the Government as the judgments 
were confirmative of the UK’s detention policy and did not deeply challenge the 
policy as long as the immigration authorities follow the safeguards provided by the 
international conventions. The judgments stated that there was no obvious breach of 
the Convention because of the policy as there was no discussion over the compliance 
issue. This approach has not changed up to the present time because the recent 
judgment of the ECtHR showed that the UK system of immigration detention did not 
breach the Convention despite the lack of statutory time limit.821  
 
II. INFLUENCE OF OFFICIAL STATE AND SUPRANATIONAL AGENCIES 
II.1. Supranational Agencies 
States are under constant monitoring by the committees of the international 
conventions they have signed and ratified in the past. This system normally requires 
state actors to submit reports regarding the steps they take in order to realise their 
obligations under that particular convention. On the other side, these committees 
produce reports on the States Parties in order to comment on the developments 
regarding the realisation of the rights specified in related conventions. These 
complementary reports can be significant factors for promoting compliance with 
international human rights standards. As State Parties are criticised or praised by these 
bodies on the international stage, this would apply a political leverage on the 
governments concerned. 
                                                
821 J.N. v The United Kingdom App no 37289/12 (ECtHR, 19 May 2016). The Court stated in its 
judgment that setting a time limit for detention is not enough to ensure the ‘quality of law’. Hence, the 
Court always chose to assess the detention system as a whole instead of just focusing on time limit.  
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The UK has been part of this system through its ratified conventions 
throughout the years. For the purposes of this research, two important committees and 
one Commissioner can be identified as being the Human Rights Committee, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Commissioner for Human Rights. 
These institutions were in the position to monitor the situation in the UK concerning 
detention of minors for immigration law enforcement. Starting in 1995, the records 
have shown that the UK received reports and concluding observations from the 
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the issue 
of detention of minors.822 The Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, in their reports, expressed their concerns over the treatment of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers with a view to deportation. The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child called on the UK to approach this practice as a measure of last 
resort. In 2000s, the Commissioner for Human Rights also submitted reports on the 
UK’s human rights practice and found the extent of use of detention of minors for 
immigration law enforcement concerning. 
In addition to the criticism concerning detention practice in the UK, the UK’s 
reservation823 to CRC was a major point within the reports received from the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child. With this reservation, the UK reserved its right 
to apply its own immigration legislation, notwithstanding the rights set out in the 
Convention. The scope of this reservation stated that the UK upheld its right to refuse 
to provide protections to children who do not have the right to enter and remain in the 
country. This crucial reservation has been criticised by the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child several times since 1995. The main argument in these reports was that 
this reservation could hamper the compatibility with the object and the purpose of 
CRC as the scope of the protection provided by CRC could exclude migrant and 
asylum children in the UK. 
Overall, supranational agencies produced several reports regarding the human 
rights situation in the UK since the ratification of international conventions. The 
committees voiced their concerns over the detention of minors for immigration 
                                                
822 To read further on the history of these reports, see Chapter 4. The UK’s Historical Record in 
Relation to Compliance with International Standards. 
823 The UK’s reservation was as follows: ‘The United Kingdom reserves the right to apply such 
legislation, in so far as it relates to the entry into, stay in and departure from the United Kingdom on 
those who do not have the right under the law of the United Kingdom to enter and remain in the United 
Kingdom, and to the Acquisition and possession of citizenship, as it may deem necessary from time to 
time.’ 
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purposes and the UK’s reservation to CRC. There was a certain level of attention 
towards these reports and criticism at parliament level. However, there has been no 
substantial change at the legal and practical level as a result of these reports. Along 
with this general overview, it is important to put this analysis into the theory. 
II.1.1. Material Inducement 
To start with, material inducement, as explained before, offers a way of understanding 
for the change of state behaviour in terms of monetary sanctions and rewards. Since 
this mechanism relies on solely monetary damage or rewards, these supranational 
agencies do not have such power over the ratifying countries as they can only produce 
social costs or social approval that cannot be turned into material costs. Hence, we 
cannot show any parallel themes between this case and the theory themes.  
II.1.2. Persuasion 
When we have a look at persuasion as a way of changing state behaviour, the norm 
that state actors should change becomes central. In this case study, the norm is to use 
child detention as a last resort for the shortest appropriate period of time and not to 
detain children at ill-suited detention centres. In addition to this principle, legislation 
should also cover providing other facilities such as education and recreational 
activities to child detainees.  
The persuasion mechanism does not fit into this part of the case study’s 
history of compliance. Supranational agencies’ comments on detention of minors 
were not brought to attention to the parliamentary debate. Although there were 
substantial criticisms coming from these actors, socialisation between state and these 
actors did not occur on a positive note. Social learning or information exchange, as 
persuasion suggests, did not play an important role for the UK to push forward 
towards compliance.  
II.1.3. Acculturation 
The last mechanism of the selected theory, acculturation, offers a different 
explanation for change in state behaviour. It happens because there is a desire to have 
a better and closer relationship with a reference group that values compliance. In this 
case study, however, it is very hard to see this type of desire on the UK Government 
side, unlike in Turkey’s case. It is opposite to the first case study in the sense that 
Turkey’s desire to be associated with the European cultural environment was at the 
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same level as the UK’s reluctance to be seen as a follower of the international treaty 
bodies. The lack of attention and reference to the reports by these monitoring bodies 
by Members of Parliament and the defensive approach by Government officials in the 
case of a reference to these reports can be seen as the signs of this reluctance to be 
associated with these treaty bodies. For instance, we can present two examples of 
reaction from the government officials when faced with references to international 
obligations and monitoring bodies’ criticisms. In the first example, the international 
obligations of the UK towards children were mentioned: 
…So the Government have an obligation to explain to the Committee how the 
detention of children in these centres is compatible with their duties under 
the Human Rights Act and how they came to make a statement on the face of 
the Bill that there was nothing in it that was not compatible with our 
obligations under the convention.824 
Additionally, they pointed how poor conditions of detention centres might damage 
minors’ personal development.825 Nevertheless, the government officials asserted: 
We believe that we are acting within the spirit of our human rights and 
UNCRC obligations. …The detention of children, regrettable though it is, is 
necessary from time to time. It is within the scope of Article 5(1)(f) and is not 
prevented by Article 5…. 
We believe that we are exercising our powers in a proportionate, reasonable 
and fair-minded way. We make full provision to protect the welfare and 
interests of the child.826 
The second example also follows the same pattern. Mr Browne of the Liberal 
Democrats remarked on the Government’s view on the treaty bodies: 
The first is about the Government not enforcing the UN convention on the 
rights of the child and about their desire to be seen as tough in this area. They 
seem to be concerned that anything that smacks of a UN-led, consensual, 
international approach would be seen as a sign of weakness.827 
This remark is very significant in terms of understanding the UK’s approach towards 
supranational agencies. This demonstrates that the Government was reluctant to 
change its policy or legislation following a critique from treaty bodies. International 
                                                
824 HC Deb 09 November 1999, vol 337, cols 1004-35. 
825 ibid. 
826 ibid. 
827 HC Deb 20 November 2007, vol 467, cols 53-4WH. 
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monitoring body influence could be viewed as weakness in the eyes of the 
Government.  
A response to this remark came from Meg Hillier as the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for the Home Department. She pointed out:  
When I was first elected as a councillor in 1994 and first came across the issue 
of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, I certainly did not think that I 
would stand here one day as part of a Government who have to make tough 
decisions about detention, including detention of children. It is not something 
that we aim to do but something that we have to do as part of the immigration 
process.828 
The response carried the same characteristics of other responses from different 
governments as executive branches throughout the history of this discussion.829 It was 
suggested that detention practice of minors was undesirable but necessary part of the 
immigration law in the UK. The morality argument made this practice undesirable. 
This is even stated by Government officials as above.  
The interviews conducted for this research cannot be deemed conclusive in 
terms of findings, yet can provide some insights that help us understand the situation 
further. The interviewees were all selected depending on their involvement in this 
discussion. Hence, their contribution to this discussion will be valuable in order to 
bring a different light to these findings. For instance, Lord Ramsbotham, a member of 
House of Lords, is an important figure that worked within Parliament and with non-
governmental organisations in order to end detention of minors. He stated: 
All I can say is that during the period 2005 to 2010 it was only if there was an 
immigration legislation that attention was focused on it, otherwise there were 
certain individuals who focused on issues in certain countries, but it never 
received tremendous attention as such.830 
Further on, he also expressed the level of emphasis given to international criticisms 
by state institutions: 
But what I was concerned about was that all too frequently the international 
criticism is just sort of disregarded, it will go away.  And it's an unfortunate 
                                                
828 ibid. 
829 HC Deb 08 May 2003, vol 404, cols 929-36. 
830 Interview with Lord Ramsbotham GCB CBE, House of Lords (London, the UK, 12 April 2016).  
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characteristic of both the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, which I 
discovered the case in point.831 
Another interviewee, Julian Huppert as a former Member of Parliament for the 
Liberal Democrats, believed ‘in terms of that level of debate, treaty requirements and 
so forth were particularly important.’832 
Cognitive or social pressures, suggested by the acculturation approach, did not 
show any parallel ties with the UK’s case in relation to supranational agencies as 
there was no desired relationship that led to mimicry by the UK. Considering the vast 
amount of criticism coming from monitoring bodies, the reaction to these reports and 
recommendations in the parliamentary debates was only minor.  
II.2. Official State Agencies  
Following the supranational agencies’ reaction to the situation in the UK regarding 
detention of minors, it is crucial to look at the developments at the national level. The 
UK has been monitored by several domestic institutions on this topic such as 
Children’s Commissioner, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons for England and 
Wales and the Joint Committee on Human Rights.833 The reports and comments from 
these institutions can be very important to understand the compliance decision by the 
Government.  
To start with, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons for England and Wales 
completed several announced and unannounced inspections at immigration detention 
and removal centres across the UK.834 These reports have observed the situation at 
these centres and given recommendations on the issues that needed improvement. The 
situation concerning minors was one of the main issues in these reports since 2002. 
Another national monitoring body is the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights835. This body submitted reports regarding the UK’s reservation to CRC and 
detention practice in the UK. Lastly, the Children’s Commissioner also expressed his 
opinions on the topic of detention of minors in the UK. After a visit to Yarl’s Wood in 
2005, one of the detention centres that held children, the Children’s Commissioner 
                                                
831 ibid.  
832 Interview with Julian Huppert, Politician, Liberal Democrat (Cambridge, the UK, 26 October 2015).  
833 To read further on these monitoring bodies’ reports, see Chapter 4. The UK’s Historical Record in 
Relation to Compliance with International Standards. 
834 To read further on these inspection reports, see Chapter 4. The UK’s Historical Record in Relation 
to Compliance with International Standards. 
835 Joint Committee on Human Rights is appointed from the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons to consider human rights issues in the United Kingdom.  
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published recommendations and expressed the shortcomings of the system.836 As a 
follow-up to this report, the Commissioner carried out two more visits to the same 
detention centre and conducted interviews. These reports used several references to 
international law to support their arguments. 
II.2.1. Material Inducement  
Along with this background information, it is essential to read all this through the lens 
of the selected theory. To start with, it will be hard for material inducement to play a 
role in the UK’s compliance with international human rights standards regarding the 
influence potentially created by national and supranational agencies as this 
mechanism relies heavily on monetary rewards and sanctions. Official state agencies, 
like supranational agencies, cannot impose any monetary sanctions or rewards. These 
bodies are only capable of creating a certain level of political influence that would 
only impose social costs on the Government, such as reputational damage. Under the 
material inducement approach, social sanctions can be significant as long as they 
produce material sanctions at the end. However, official state agencies cannot produce 
such sanctions. For this reason, it is impossible to find parallel themes between this 
social mechanism and the case study.  
II.2.2. Persuasion 
Persuasion, however, might play a role in terms of pushing the Government and its 
officials to consider about the shortcomings of detention practice. Official state 
agencies’ reports produced information on the situation of detention centres and level 
of care provided to children detainees. Furthermore, they pointed out the gap between 
the UK’s human rights treaty obligations and the practice. As these reports were 
referenced during parliamentary debate several times, they could have pushed the 
Government and its officials to think harder about detention of children and the 
reasons for the demand to end this practice. Hence, this process can be described as 
cuing that is an important element under the persuasion approach where target actors 
are pushed to think harder on their law and policies that are not complying with 
international human rights standards. For instance, in one of those parliamentary 
                                                
836 Children’s Commissioner, ‘An Announced Visit to Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre’ (30 
December 2005) <http://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/publications/announced-visit-yarls-
wood-immigration-removal-centre> accessed 16 July 2017. 
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debates Lord Avebury as a Liberal Democrat Peer brought the Inspector’s report to 
the attention of Parliament. The more important point in this debate was when Lord 
Avebury referred to the interaction between the Government and the inspector, ‘On 
12 July, we discussed the time that the Government are taking to reply to Anne 
Owers’ reports on the IRCs, and the Minister told the Committee that the reply on 
Dungavel had been published.’837 Here, we can see that the Government were 
replying to the concerns expressed by the Chief Inspector’s reports. This means that 
there was a certain level of interaction between the Chief Inspector and government 
officials.  
In addition to that, the Joint Committee’s output regarding the treatment of 
asylum seekers was quoted by Lord Judd during a debate concerning a new 
immigration bill in 2007:  
I want to speak specifically about how this Bill affects children. Earlier this 
year, the Joint Committee on Human Rights conducted an inquiry into the 
treatment of asylum seekers. I was repeatedly struck during that inquiry by the 
way children are treated in the asylum process and, too often, by the sheer 
invisibility of their needs.838 
Another parliamentary debate referred to one of the outputs of the Joint Committee in 
order to show the wrongdoings in the system. Diane Abbott of the Labour Party 
mentioned this reference, ‘Finally, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its report 
on the treatment of asylum seekers in March 2007, found that the UK was in breach 
of its human rights obligations by detaining children.’839 
This inquiry by the Joint Committee pushed state actors to think harder in a 
way that can be seen as cuing under the persuasion approach. In contrast with 
supranational agencies, reference to these bodies’ reports in parliamentary debate 
gives us a clue about the level of interaction between national bodies and members of 
Parliament. Although cuing as one of the tools persuasion suggested has been used 
here, persuasion’s final stage of being fully convinced did not occur in the UK’s case 
study. This showed itself how detention policy was still defended for the sake of 
immigration control.  
                                                
837 HL Deb 23 July 2007, vol 694, cols 54-5GC. 
838 HL Deb 13 June 2007, vol 692, cols 722-5. 
839 HC Deb 20 November 2007, vol 467, cols 41-3WH. 
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II.2.3. Acculturation 
Finally, acculturation, as suggested by Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, suggests that 
the desired relationship to a group or an environment will pressure state actors 
towards compliance. This pressure aims to create psychological discomfort in the 
target state. If these social sanctions stay abstract, such as reputational damage instead 
of being translated into material costs, it can be claimed that acculturation occurs. If 
we see official state agencies as a group with which the UK Government body wants 
to be associated, from whom it is reluctant to receive any criticism, we can find 
parallels between this mechanism and this case study. Official state agencies were 
always mentioned with high respect during the parliamentary debates.  
To explain further, Diane Abbott of Labour Party as the then ruling party 
referred the Chief Inspector’s report: 
Having spoken generally about the problems in detention centres, I move to 
some specifics relating to children. I could quote from many pressure groups 
and lobbyists, but I cannot do better than to quote the Government’s own chief 
inspector of prisons, Anne Owers, on her most recent inspection of Yarl’s 
Wood immigration centre in February 2006: 
‘Our most important concern...remained the detention of children.’840 
This remark can be quite significant in order to see the importance of the chief 
Inspector. She continued her remarks: 
I have known Anne Owers for years, ever since she was campaigning on 
immigration issues and I was a lobbyist on race and immigration issues. If the 
chief inspector of prisons puts such a paragraph into the introduction of her 
inspection report on a detention centre, it should not take a debate such as this 
to make Ministers realise that our treatment of children in detention is not 
satisfactory.841 
Last but not least, Ms Abbott again explains why the Inspector’s remarks were 
important and should be taken into consideration stating ‘Her Majesty’s chief 
inspector of prisons cannot be accused of being partisan or hearing only one side of 
the story.’842 In a different discussion, Lord Bassam of Brighton as a Labour peer 
indicated: 
                                                
840 HC Deb 20 November 2007, vol 467, cols 41-3WH. 
841 ibid.  
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…that the inspector made some positive comments even about Yarl’s Wood. 
She observed that a child protection committee had been established and met 
regularly twice a month; that the terms of reference were clear and 
appropriate; that the committee operated as a strategic planning and policy-
making group; and that the work plan produced to develop child protection 
policy and practice was impressive. Those are positive observations. 843 
During the same year, Lord Avebury criticised the UK’s reservation to CRC by 
mentioning the criticism only from official state agencies, ‘It allows the UK to detain 
children in places such as Yarl’s Wood, contrary to the advice of the JCHR and in the 
face of repeated criticism by the Chief Inspector of Prisons, Anne Owers.’844 
The Inspector’s reports or recommendations were mentioned by Members of 
Parliament several times either to support their argument against detention of minors 
or praise the Government’s steps taken towards compliance. For instance, Ms Abbott 
pointed out: 
Successive bodies and individuals have tried to get past Governments to deal 
with this issue. It was a particular preoccupation of a previous Children's 
Commissioner and it is a preoccupation of the chief inspector of prisons, Anne 
Owers, who did a comprehensive report on the issue two or three years ago. 
As I said, every reputable organisation that has looked at this has said that the 
detention of children is wrong in principle and detrimental to children in 
practice.845 
On the other hand, Mr Woolas as then Minister of State referred to the Inspector’s 
reports to improve the image of the Government’s actions in relation to Yarl’s Wood 
detention centre:  
We take the welfare of children in our care very seriously and are proud of the 
investment made to improve services at Yarl's Wood over the last couple of 
years, the main centre for holding families with children. The improvements 
we have made have been considered and acknowledged by the likes of the 
Children's Commissioner for England, the Independent Monitoring Board and 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons.846 
                                                
843 HL Deb 23 July 2007, vol 694, cols 54-5GC. 
844 HL Deb 12 July 2007, vol 694, cols 66-8GC.  
845 HC Deb 17 June 2010, vol 511, cols 222-3WH. 
846 HC Deb 18 January 2010, vol 504, col 33W. 
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Hence, it is clear that the position of HM Chief Inspector of Prisons was highly 
respected by Members of Parliament. They used the Chief Inspector’s reports in their 
arguments for or against the detention policy. It has been used more often than the 
reports of supranational agencies on detention of children for immigration purposes. 
 Moreover, Lord Roberts of Llandudno made a direct reference to one of the 
reports by the Children’s Commissioner stating: 
It is alleged that in Yarl's Wood - the Minister may say that my figure is not 
correct - 83 children last year were detained for 28 days or more. That is 
horrific. The Children's Commissioner for England said: 
‘The UK should not be detaining any child who has had an unsuccessful 
asylum claim. Not only is there no reason to continue the administrative 
detention of children, we present evidence in this report to demonstrate that it 
may be harmful to their health and well-being’.847 
 
In addition to this, since social and cognitive pressures play an important role under 
this mechanism, the way the reports were written and quoted within the parliamentary 
debate could cause shaming and social approval as solely social sanctions for the 
Government. For that reason, we have seen the reference to the Inspector’s reports in 
positive and negative ways in the parliamentary debate. As explained above, while 
opposition party members quoted the Inspector’s reports to point out the wrongdoings 
of the system, Government officials quoted same reports, only mentioning the 
Inspector’s positive feedback848. The criticism from the Chief Inspector also had an 
impact on the NGOs’ work as well. Julian Huppert, one of the interviewees, explained 
why HM Inspector’s reports were significant, ‘Because of some of the inspection 
reports that have been done, there were in atrocious conditions previously, so that did 
play well with the NGO’s and few people who were very involved.’849 
On a more general note, there is a definite difference between international 
and official state agencies in terms of this case study. Supranational agencies’ 
criticisms were not taken into consideration as much as were those of official state 
agencies. The reason behind this was the Government’s approach to these different 
bodies. While the approach towards supranational agencies was distant in a way that 
                                                
847 HL Deb 4 November 2009, vol 714, cols 323-5. 
848 See (n 843) and (n 846).  
849 Interview with Julian Huppert (n 832).  
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the Government was reluctant to be associated with this reference group, official state 
agencies’ output regarding the UK’s detention policy became part of the discussion to 
establish a strong argument for change. However, this demonstrates that instead of 
persuasion where the norm is the most important element, acculturation played a more 
important role in this case study since acculturation refers to the relationship with a 
reference group. Hence, even though these international and official state agencies 
pointed out exactly the same issues regarding detention of children in their reports and 
recommendations, official state agencies’ reports weighed more than international 
ones within the parliamentary debate by legislative and executive branches and also in 
interviews. Furthermore, the presence of acculturation depends on how close the 
relationship between the target actor and the reference group. It can be claimed that 
official state agencies have a close relationship with Parliament in general. For 
instance, while the Joint Committee is itself composed of members of Parliament, the 
Justice Secretary appoints the Chief Inspector of Prisons. 
Nevertheless, compared to Turkey’s case, acculturation is not as obvious in 
this interaction between official state agencies and the Government since it might be 
too ambitious to say that official state agencies can be seen as a reference group for 
the Government. As stated in Turkey’s case, there was a constant reference to the EU 
and the ECtHR in the law-making process, parliamentary debates and even the 
Preamble of the legislation. Here, while there was reference to these bodies in the 
parliamentary debate and respect shown towards their work, it was not as persistent as 
in Turkey’s case. Hence, the importance of these state agencies’ criticism for the 
Government can also be seen through different analysis. It is well known in 
international relations literature that formal and informal institutions work towards 
promoting compliance and they have better chance of success in established 
democracies.850 These national monitoring agencies were in a position to create 
meaningful impact on the Government’s decision-making due to the UK’s position of 
being a stable democracy.  
Nonetheless, it would still be hard to claim that socialisation with official state 
agencies was the only interaction that influenced the Government’s decision to act 
towards compliance with international human rights standards. These official state 
agencies produced reports for many years.  The Government only decided to end 
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(Cambridge University Press 2009) 152-153. 
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detention of minors in 2010. Hence, there was no instant impact on the Labour 
Government despite its influence throughout time. On the other hand, it would be safe 
to say that the constant pressure and criticism could have caused a certain level of 
social pressure that the actor desired to end by complying with international human 
rights standards. Hence, it is clear that official state agencies’ critique was one of the 
necessary measures for the change in the UK’s detention policy.  
III. CIVIL SOCIETY INFLUENCE  
Before 2001, the policy regarding detention of children with their families stated that 
the decision to detain should ‘be effective as close to removal as possible so as to 
ensure that families are not normally detained for more than a few days’851. Yet in 
2001, the change in policy wording led to a dramatic increase in the scale of detention 
of children with families. The renewed policy stated that detention of families would 
be allowed if their circumstances justify detention. These circumstances would 
include risk of absconding or the need for identity clarification. This, surely, widened 
the scale of detention of families as the circumstances permitting a decision to detain 
were much more extensive with this renewed policy instead of just being limited to 
pending removal cases.  
  Following this change, civil society and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) started their advocacy campaigns against this practice.852 In these campaigns, 
they provided counter-arguments for the Government’s justification of using 
detention practice for minors and families. However, the legality of the policy was not 
part of the discussion as the policy carried key elements of the international 
conventions and was approved by the case law. The points made about international 
obligations of the UK were challenged that detention of minors is not prevented by 
international law. For that reason, the argument in these reports was about finding a 
balance in this practice of detaining minors in terms of numbers and duration rather 
than focussing on the lawfulness of the policy. Therefore, the ethical argument was 
weighed more than the lawfulness argument in relation to the detention policy.  
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III.1. Material Inducement 
After bringing the relevant archive and information to light, it is crucial to see these 
developments and the way they folded through theory application. Material 
inducement is a social mechanism in which target actors are forced to change 
behaviour through material sanctions and rewards. In this case study, civil society 
organisations and NGOs do not have that type of power to push the Government in 
this way as they cannot provide material rewards or sanction the target actor. Even 
though they can push social sanctions that can be useful to manipulate the target actor, 
the costs on the target actor are not calculable. Hence, it is easy to rule out any 
parallels between the material inducement approach and the case study.  
III.2. Persuasion 
Secondly, persuasion plays an important role in convincing target actors towards 
compliance with international human rights standards according to the selected 
theory. It depends on the norm in question and the level of importance given to the 
norm by target actors. Hence, civil society and NGOs can use persuasion techniques 
such as cuing and framing, as explained before, in order to push states to comply with 
international human rights standards. With the reports produced and campaigns run 
by civil society organisations, it can be claimed that they aimed to use cuing 
techniques where a target actor is forced to think harder on its practices and 
internalise the norm fully in the end.  
  The widespread criticism by civil society organisations was cited in the 
parliamentary debates. To start with, BID’s handbooks were mentioned within 
parliamentary debates. For instance, in 2007 Jeremy Corbyn of the Labour Party 
referred to this organisation’s work, ‘Bail for Immigration Detainees, which has done 
good work, produced a handbook and press release on 2 July. The press release stated 
that children are being damaged by immigration detention…’853 
Save the Children’s research on case studies also was quoted by concerned 
Members of Parliament and Lords. For instance, Lord Judd as a Labour peer pointed 
out: 
I am indebted to the Save the Children Fund for its concern and insight into 
these matters and also to the Refugee Children’s Consortium for its incredibly 
hard and committed work in this area of policy. Save the Children Fund 
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research found that the length of time that children were detained with their 
families varied from seven to 268 days.854 
He, again, made his argument based on the findings of the Save the Children’s 
research: 
The Government have said that they detain children only as a last resort and 
for as short a period as possible. Yet the statistics that I have seen suggest that 
is not the reality for many children. For example, Save the Children found 
children who were detained for up to 268 days in 2005. That is backed by 
other members of the Refugee Children’s Consortium. What we are 
witnessing is ongoing detention throughout the asylum process and, most 
worryingly, in many cases people are being detained and subsequently 
released.855 
Members of Government as well as members of the opposition parties also refer these 
reports. Neil Francis Gerrard, as a member of the governing party, referred to Save 
the Children’s evidence that refutes the Government’s argument regarding detaining 
children for the shortest period of time: 
We all understand that it can be difficult to remove a family with children. I 
accept that there may be circumstances in which some pretty tough, nasty 
decisions have to be made by Ministers. However, we do not need to keep 
children in detention for long periods. On 30 June, children were in detention - 
mainly in Yarl’s Wood -10 of whom had been in detention for more than a 
month. Save the Children came up with cases of families with children that 
have been in detention for more than six months. I do not think that any of us 
should find that acceptable.856 
Another campaigning civil society organisation, the Children’s Society, was also part 
of parliamentary debate. The Children’s Society’s reports and case studies were used 
as part of the argument against detention of children several times. For instance, Lord 
Judd as a Labour Peer stated: 
The Children’s Society reports the case of a family who were detained in 
Yarl’s Wood for several months. One of the children in the family, who was 
eight years old at the time, had learning difficulties and was distressed to see 
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his mother disintegrate while in detention until she attempted to take her own 
life. The child missed several medical appointments while he was in the 
centre, appointments which were essential to have a prosthetic limb fitted, and 
eventually contracted a bone infection that made it impossible for the limb to 
be fitted. It is impossible to overestimate the impact of this experience on an 
eight year-old child.857 
Lord Ramsbotham as a member of House of Lords also explained the involvement of 
civil society organisations in the process and the Government’s intention to receive a 
direction from Citizens UK: 
Citizens UK have been very strong on this; they've been campaigning for it for 
ages.  I mean you know about Citizens UK and it is the coalition.  And I got 
involved with it first when it did an inquiry into what's called Lunar House, 
which is the home of the international...the Immigration Directorate.  And this 
report showed just how inefficient the whole organisation was.  But what was 
interesting was the Government were very keen on that report and were very 
grateful for it because it pointed the direction that they should go.  And then 
came the asylum inquiry or commission, again which was Citizens UK.858 
As persuasion, one of the socialisation mechanisms in this theory, puts great emphasis 
on the interaction between actors in a way that this leads further thinking on the 
controversial practices, there was this type of interaction between civil society and 
Members of Parliament in this case study. Government officials are pushed to think 
harder on detention of minors during this debate in Parliament with detailed reference 
to the conditions of detention centres or psychological impact on detained children. 
However, it is hard to find any supporting indication that the UK Government fully 
and voluntarily internalised the norm of detaining children as a last resort for shortest 
period of time at detention centres that are suitable for children. There was always this 
abovementioned dilemma of the Government between an efficient immigration 
control and detention of children. Julian Huppert raised his argument about 
persuasion, ‘…I was very pleased to have pushed that legislation because it was quite 
clear that if Labour had a free reign, they would just go back to detaining children.’859 
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To a certain extent, it is clear that Nick Clegg, as the Liberal Democrat Party 
leader, was committed to ensuring that detention of children should be forbidden by 
domestic legislation, as he put this commitment in the party’s election manifesto860. 
He also pushed for the legislation and was closely involved in the negotiations. It can 
be claimed that he was fully persuaded about the validity of this norm in relation to 
detention of children. Lord Ramsbotham, as a person who was involved in this 
process before and after the manifesto commitment, clearly expressed Nick Clegg’s 
involvement in the process: 
Well, I think the dominant factor in it all was actually the Liberal Democrat 
Party because during all our activities against the Labour Government, during 
the time of the Labour Government, it was always the Liberal Democrats who 
were in alliance with cross-benchers and others who were taking this strong 
line, more than the Conservatives.  And actually the leading figure was Nick 
Clegg and it was to him we always felt that we were reporting and he was 
determined to get this through.  I mean the trouble is with the immigration 
thing at that time, one always felt there were party politics involved.861 
Zrinka Bralo of the IAC also pointed out the importance of having a key person in 
Parliament to push the new legislation: 
So the next thing that happened is that elections happened two days after that, 
Nick Clegg pushed it because it was his thing into the manifesto.  And this is 
how it happens.  So campaigns are helpful because they raise general 
awareness, but campaigns don't force politicians, it is people who force 
politicians to change something.862 
Putting this commitment to end detention of minors to the election manifesto and 
Nick Clegg’s involvement in the negotiation process can be seen as one of the 
essential measures for the change at the policy and legislation level. This was another 
important turning point in terms of the UK’s detention policy and the compliance with 
the norm.  
However, it would be daunting to claim that all members of the Government 
fully and voluntarily internalised this change. Therefore, the ban on detention of 
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children for immigration purposes did not happen overnight. Tony Smith stated the 
circumstances after formation of the Coalition Government in 2010: 
So they get elected and then they get briefings from us about, well we don't 
want to detain children either (laughing), but you're not going to be able to 
remove some people unless you detain.  So Citizens found that after a year or 
two the promises that had been made were not being kept because then the 
Government realised that they had a problem with this because they did not 
want to be seen to be weak on immigration control.863 
If full internalisation occurred on the Government’s side, there would not have been 
any discussion over this ban. However, in practice the ban did not happen smoothly 
and it needed further work and negotiations.  
III.3. Acculturation 
Lastly, acculturation is a mechanism suggested by Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks in 
this compliance theory. Instead of emphasising the norm as occurs in the persuasion 
approach, the relationship with the reference group plays an important role in order to 
push the target actor to comply with international human rights standards in the 
acculturation approach.  
While applying the theory, the impact of civil society is difficult to be read 
under the theory due to lack of international law reference. Prioritising the ethical 
argument instead of a legal one in their campaigns made it difficult to find fit with 
Goodman and Jinks’ theory as this theory puts an emphasis on influence through 
international law. Hence, this does not fit into this theory’s acculturation approach.  
III.4. Alternative Explanations for Civil Society Influence 
Although not matching with the selected theory, civil society still played a 
fundamental role in this process. Within the parliamentary debate, civil society 
campaigns were mentioned on several occasions. For instance, Jeremy Browne of the 
Liberal Democrats, as one of the opposition parties, openly expressed his party’s 
support for No Place for a Child campaign in 2007. He declared: 
The Government talk about their ‘Every Child Matters’ campaign, but if that 
is to be anything other than a slightly trite slogan, it must encompass children 
who are not British children within the mainstream education system. It must 
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mean that literally every child has a set of rights and that we have a duty and 
obligation to them. It is on that basis that my party supports the ‘No Place for 
a Child’ campaign of Save the Children, the Refugee Council and Bail for 
Immigration Detainees, which calls for alternatives to child custodies, such as 
granting such people bail, or having them attend reporting centres or stay in 
supervised community accommodation. The campaign also proposes a host of 
other measures that might lead to a more satisfactory resolution to this vexed 
issue than that which the Government have so far managed to achieve.864 
The general public’s involvement and support of this campaign was also mentioned in 
the House of Lords in 2009. Lord Hylton stated: 
The detention of children is contrary to the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. That fact compels the Government to derogate from the convention. 
This is a great shame on the 20th anniversary of the convention, which we as a 
country helped to draft. …In 2006, 13,500 members of the public backed the 
campaign called ‘No Place for a Child’.865 
In addition to the parliamentary debate, there was a growing opposition 
towards detention of children in Parliament at the same time. Parliamentary support 
towards ending detention of children for immigration purposes can be seen in early 
day motions 866  in Parliament since 2006. The first one, for instance, had an 
explanation as follows: 
That this House is concerned by the detention of children in UK immigration 
detention centres as part of the standard immigration procedure; recognises the 
negative impact on children's mental and physical health and the disruption of 
their education; welcomes the work conducted by Save the Children, the 
Refugee Council, Bail for Immigration Detainees, the Scottish Refugee 
Council and the Welsh Refugee Council to bring an end to this unjust policy; 
supports their recommendations that children should be treated as children 
first and foremost and their needs and rights protected; calls for alternatives to 
detention to be piloted; and urges the Government to make detailed statistics 
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available on an ongoing basis regarding the ages of, and numbers of, children 
held in detention and the length of time each is held in detention.867 
The second early day motion also expressed the concerns while referring to 
the relevant civil society organisations and campaigns. Its brief clearly mentioned the 
work done by the No Place for a Child Coalition by Save the Children, the Refugee 
Council, Bail for Immigration Detainees, the Scottish Refugee Council and the Welsh 
Refugee Council and urged the Government to follow the recommendations by this 
Coalition.868 In the following years, early day motions followed the same pattern and 
referred to the work conducted by civil society organisations and called the 
Government to end this practice.869 In 2010, in order to bring attention to another 
campaign to end detention of children, called OutCry!, another early day motion was 
also submitted.870 These early day motions showed the growing support for a change 
in detention policy and awareness of public campaigns.  
Following the 2010 election, the work towards ending detention of minors for 
immigration purposes started. The then Minister for Immigration, Damian Green of 
Conservative Party, referred to their work with the civil society organisations: 
In June I set up a review of how we work with families in the immigration 
system. The Home Office launched a consultation which received over 340 
responses from different organisations and members of the public. We also 
sought the views of interested parties through a working group co-chaired with 
the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, received recommendations from 
a further expert group convened by Citizens UK and examined how other 
countries manage family removals.871 
Zrinka Bralo of IAC explained these negotiations in detail:  
So Citizen's UK were then approached by the Diana Princess Memorial Trust 
Fund and I was drawn into that conversation and Lord Ramsbotham as well.  
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And a number of other experts as well as two women who were in detention 
with children and one was still facing deportation.  And we then quickly held 
two day negotiations with the Government in order to make sure that we come 
up with step by step on what needs to happen for the Government to end 
detention.872 
This work was also referenced in parliamentary debate. Baroness Neville-Jones 
declared, ‘At the moment, we are working with various charities and NGOs that will 
help us to find solutions so that we can come forward with something that is not just 
process but that incorporates a solution.’873 
The work conducted with civil society and the UKBA officials reflected in the 
new policy. After 2010, UKBA guidance also has made several changes regarding 
family with children under 18 detention policy.874 This policy was also by a new 
Immigration Bill 875  that brought compliance with the abovementioned norm in 
2014.876  
This close work between relevant civil society and Government officials 
showed a strong level of commitment towards their promise of ending detention of 
minors. This also demonstrated that the involvement of civil society was significant 
for Government officials as it was one of the fundamental push factors for the 
Government to act on this issue. For that reason, it is still very significant to 
acknowledge the role of civil society and its impact here with the help of an 
alternative theory.  
A theory particularly focusing on the potential of civil society suggested by 
Keck and Sikkink offers a greater interpretation of how civil society reacts to non-
compliance.877 Since advocacy networks fall into a different category of a group that 
is motivated by values rather than material interests or professional norms, it has 
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taken time to give their efforts recognition. In the case of non-compliance, they 
‘frame’ issues to clarify them for the target audience and encourage action. 878 Seen in 
this case study, civil society organisations framed detention of minors in their 
campaigns and made this topic more understandable for everyone. Since they aim for 
policy change towards compliance, they employ information, symbolic, leverage or 
accountability politics.879 While information politics focuses on newly-generated 
information, symbolic politics make use of symbols and stories. Leverage politics gets 
powerful actors involved in the process and initiates a certain level of moral leverage; 
accountability politics ensures holding target actors responsible for their previous 
policies. Advocacy networks can combine these elements in one campaign. Here, 
civil society organisations in their campaigns also employed information, leverage 
and accountability politics together. 
In the beginning of the campaigns, they produced credible information and 
statistics on the detention of minors and what kind of impact this practice had on 
children. This newly-generated information and facts about detention of minors, as 
stated before, brought counter-arguments to the Government’s justification of 
detaining children and families. This, somehow, held the actors accountable to their 
previously-stated claims under accountability politics. Last but not least, leverage 
politics can be seen in play where civil society mobilised the general public in their 
public campaigns. As stated before, unlike other actors, civil society adopted a moral 
argument in order to push state actors to change their practices on detention of 
minors. This moral leverage produced better results in this case study than the legal 
argument by other involved actors in this process.  
This brings us a better explanation of what civil society can do against non-
compliant states. In established democracies, findings suggest that compliance with 
international law is more likely in strong democracies with the help of a solid 
presence of domestic civil society.880 What civil society achieved here was not about 
international law’s impact on states. Contrarily, they chose to use an ethical argument 
to put pressure on decision-makers. A sustained campaign based on ethical arguments 
created a space for reform in relation to detention of children. Here, international law 
stayed in the background regarding the argument used in civil society campaigns. 
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This can be related to the lack of prescriptive obligations in international human rights 
standards set for detention of children for immigration purposes, as mentioned before. 
International law did not necessarily adopt strict language in relation to detention of 
minors such as specifying the duration of detention. For this reason, while the legal 
argument allowed a platform for decision-makers to defend the practice of detaining 
minors, ethical argument did not leave this kind of leeway for the authorities in the 
UK. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed different types of influences that could have had an impact on 
the UK’s decision to comply with international human rights standards on detention 
of minors for immigration purposes such as detention as last resort and for a shortest 
period of time. Goodman and Jinks’ compliance theory was also applied to this 
analysis in order to put these developments into perspective.  
To start with, the judicial influence of international and domestic case law was 
taken into consideration. After a brief summary of these judgments, it was stated that 
the UK’s detention policy was lawful as it provided the same protections as the 
relevant Conventions. Since there was no clear ban on detention of minors in 
international law, the courts found that the policy did not breach human rights. 
However, when the immigration authorities did not comply with the policy, the 
judgments clearly stated that there was a violation. The ECtHR judgments on 
Belgium in relation to detention of minors were referenced in these judgments. 
Nonetheless, there was no learning from them as the judgments concerning the UK’s 
policy and practice expressed that there was a difference between Belgium and the 
UK in terms of practice and policy. While the UK’s policy carried certain elements of 
protection for children, Belgium’s immigration detention policy was not adequate to 
provide rights for children. Furthermore, the conditions of detention centres in the UK 
and Belgium showed differences as the UK’s detention centres were more equipped 
for children than Belgium’s detention centres. This can be seen as an endorsement for 
the Government as the policy received approval at judicial level. This had given the 
UK leeway to carry on with this practice as the challenge from case law was not 
strong enough to make a change. Hence, judicial influence did not play a key role in 
the UK’s decision to comply with international human rights standards.  
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When the selected compliance theory is applied to this part of the case study, 
it is found that material inducement was not present as there were not any monetary 
sanctions ordered by these judgments regarding practice of detention of minors. 
Secondly, persuasion might have played a role if there were more cases telling the UK 
that this practice was wrong. This could have led social learning or discussion on the 
side of Parliament. However, in reality due to the non-interventionist approach by the 
Courts, this did not materialise. Lastly, it was difficult to find any parallels between 
judicial influence and acculturation as the third mechanism of the selected compliance 
theory. The lack of judgments stating that the UK’s detention policy was unlawful 
brought up a clear message that there was not any cognitive or social pressure on the 
UK Government to change its current legislation or policy of detention of children. 
As mentioned before, these judgments carried a permissive approach towards this 
policy.  
 The second part of the chapter focused on the influence of international and 
official state agencies. There have been several reports produced by supranational 
agencies such as the Human Rights Committee or the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child. These reports criticised the UK’s reservation to CRC and the Government’s 
practice of detaining children with or without their families. Although there have been 
occasional references to these reports in the parliamentary debates, they were mostly 
about the criticism regarding the UK’s reservation to CRC. The reports’ criticisms on 
the detention of minors were not mentioned in the parliamentary debates. When 
theory is applied, it was clear that material inducement do not exist in this part of the 
case study as these monitoring bodies do not have this type of power over States 
Parties. They can only create political influence to a certain extent instead of any 
monetary sanctions.  
Secondly, the persuasion mechanism could be in play, as this approach 
suggests monitoring and reporting can play an important role in convincing target 
actors. However, the lack of reaction given by the legislative and executive bodies has 
demonstrated that these reports were not strong enough to create social learning and 
persuasion at the end. Lastly, acculturation as suggested by the compliance theory can 
be analysed to see whether there are any parallels between the case study and this 
mechanism. Since the acculturation approach relies on the desired relationship to a 
reference group, it was challenging to find any parallel links in this case study. The 
UK’s approach to these bodies has revealed that these supranational agencies are not 
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within the UK’s reference group with which the UK would like to have a better and 
close relationship. As a matter of fact, the interviews and the parliamentary debates 
demonstrated that the UK Government did not want to look weak by following the 
recommendations produced by UN treaty bodies.  
In the section on the influence of official state and supranational agencies, the 
second subpart looked into official state agencies such as the HM Inspector of 
Prisons, the Children’s Commissioner and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. 
These institutions have produced reports and conducted inspections at removal and 
detention centres. The parliamentary debates including members of opposition and 
ruling parties showed a considerable amount of reference to these reports and 
recommendations. It was clear that there was respect towards these institutions at 
Parliament level. In order to read this analysis meaningfully, this subpart has applied 
the compliance theory to the case study. It was apparent that material inducement 
couldn’t exist for the same reasons listed above while analysing supranational 
agencies. Monitoring bodies generally have a political influence instead of monetary 
one. They cannot produce material costs for the target actor. However, persuasion was 
significant in terms of pushing the UK Government to think harder about its practices. 
There is little clarity that persuasion played a fundamental role but it was important in 
a sense that these reports were used against the Government in order to make an 
argument against detention of children.  
Finally, acculturation was relevant to a limited extent since the Government 
depicted official state agencies as important and respected institutions. As suggested 
by the theory, acculturation uses shaming and praising in order to change state 
behaviour. During the parliamentary debates, the reports were quoted in terms of both 
their positive and negative points. While the Members of Parliament who were 
against detention of children used these bodies’ reports in order to support their 
argument, government officials defended the policy by using the good points in these 
reports. For that reason, shaming and praising were used at the same time for different 
purposes. It is clear to say that official state agencies were one of the necessary 
factors that influenced the Government’s decision to act towards compliance with 
international human rights standards. While there is no direct causality towards 
compliance, it can be said that persistent shaming from these bodies can be seen as 
one of the essential measures that have resulted in the compliance decision by the UK 
Government.  
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On the other hand, it was challenging to depict this interaction between the 
Government and national state agencies as a strong example of acculturation unlike 
Turkey’s interaction with the EU and the ECtHR. Although the criticisms of these 
national agencies were taken into consideration by members of Parliament, the 
reference to these reports was not constant in the process. The success of these 
agencies to reach the authorities and impact their decision-making to a certain extent 
can be related to the UK’s being an established democracy with a strong presence of 
influential national institutions.  
The last part examined civil society influence through civil society and NGOs 
in the UK. There had been wide criticism by organisations such as BID, Save the 
Children and the Children’s Society. They produced reports with case studies and had 
organised public campaigns against detention of minors in the UK. Their reports and 
campaigns were mentioned in the parliamentary debates. At the end, they also played 
a significant role during the drafting process. Unlike the judicial bodies using a legal 
argument, NGOs and civil society used a moral and ethical argument in relation to 
detention of children while campaigning.  
When theory is applied to the civil society influence part of the case study, 
material inducement can be dismissed easily as these organisations do not have any 
powers of monetary sanction or reward over the Government. Second of all, 
persuasion did not happen fully as the full internalisation and acceptance of the norm 
did not occur in the Government. Detention of minors as a policy was still defended 
for the sake of an effective immigration control. Lastly, there was no fit with the 
acculturation approach as civil society is not the reference group. In addition to that, 
civil society used a more ethical argument instead of relying on international law 
argument as required by the theory. With the adoption of another analysis by Sikkink 
and Keck, it can be stated that civil society influence was one of the main elements of 
this compliance case study. They not only mobilised public opinion but also used a 
moral argument to eliminate the justifications of the Government of the legality of 
this practice. This brought a new perspective to this issue as legality of detention of 
minors had never been contradicted successfully due to lack of clear-cut international 
standards and international and domestic law against the UK. Also, aforementioned 
findings suggest that stable democracies with a strong domestic civil society are more 
likely to comply with international human rights law. This could be another angle by 
which to explain the success of civil society influence in this case.  
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 The application of this theory to this case study demonstrated that material 
inducement did not work at any parts of the case study. However, some parts of the 
case showed some elements of persuasion once there was a certain level of interaction 
between the Government and the actor. This can be seen in the relationship between 
official state agencies and the Government. The Government gave a degree of 
importance to these reports. Acculturation also showed some parallel themes in 
relation to the interaction between official state agencies and the Government.  
Nevertheless, it is still very complex to read this process through the lens of 
the compliance theory as the theory suggests that change can happen through the 
rhetoric of human rights. However, there are several different dynamics beyond 
human rights involved in this case study, such as the need for immigration control. 
For that reason, there is not one comprehensive explanation of how the decision to 
change policy and legislation of detention of minors was made. This case study did 
not fit into the theory as strongly as Turkey’s case study.  
The alternative explanation can be provided by a combination of different 
elements in this case study. There were some necessary and sufficient measures that 
led the Government to change the policy. As stated before, official state agencies’ 
critique, especially the inspection reports by HM Chief Inspector, played a necessary 
role in this process. Additionally, NGOs’ campaigns and reports were successful in 
making a moral argument and raising awareness among the public and Liberal 
Democrats. However, there were some dynamics that cannot be captured with the 
limits of this theory. Beyond all these related and internal factors, there is one more 
thing to bring to the discussion: asylum statistics. As mentioned before in Chapter 
4881, statistics show that there was a considerable decrease in the number of asylum 
applications after 2004. This could be an underlying factor influencing the 
Government to change this policy as there was a much reduced flow of people 
coming to the UK at the end of the decade unlike in 2001 or 2002. While the rising 
numbers of detained children for immigration purposes in the 2000s brought a sense 
of crisis on the Government’s side, this sense of crisis lost its power over the 
authorities due to the fall in asylum numbers. This policy was not so urgently needed 
for an efficient immigration control anymore. This is a circumstantial factor in the 
sense that it cannot be read as socialisation mechanism as it is not under an actor’s 
                                                
881 To read further on this, see III. Detention of Minors (1993-2009) in Chapter 4. The UK’s Historical 
Record in Relation to Compliance with International Standards. 
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control. Lastly, it was an additional push that Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats 
became a part of the coalition Government after May 2010 election. As mentioned 
before, Nick Clegg’s promise to change and commitment to this change was also 
another part that played a significant role.  
On a general note, official state agencies’ reports quoted some international 
law references as they mentioned international human rights standards in their reports. 
However, the rest of aforementioned influential factors carried a more domestic 
character, hence there was lack of reference to international pressure. On the other 
hand, domestic criticism by official state agencies and civil society dominated the 
discussion in relation to detention of minors. The process in the UK referred to 
domestic rather than international criticism. International law has been used as a 
further tool instead of a fundamental argument. For this reason, it can be described as 
a moral journey rather than a legal one. Common sense towards immigration 
detention of children has changed over time while sense of crisis management in 
relation to high numbers of asylum has disappeared due to decline in asylum 
numbers. The long-established policy and law on immigration detention of minors 
have shifted through moral values and pragmatic needs at domestic level rather than 





This thesis investigates the factors that led Turkey and the UK to comply with 
international human rights standards on immigration detention of minors. It examines 
international and domestic criticisms and the governments’ interaction with 
international and domestic groups in order to explain factors that influenced this 
process towards compliance. Using the process tracing method to find out about these 
dynamics in two selected case studies, this research suggests that these two very 
different countries, the UK and Turkey, adopted the same course of action albeit 
prompted by different considerations. The case selection of Turkey and the UK was 
based on the most different case study principle. While the UK and Turkey had both 
previously detained children for immigration purposes and had recently changed their 
policy and legislation on this topic, their history and culture in relation to human 
rights are different. The research aimed to analyse why these two very different 
countries acted in a similar way in complying with international human rights 
standards in relation to immigration detention of children.  
There are many distinct human rights compliance theories to explain why 
states comply with international law standards. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’ 
human rights compliance theory was the selected theory for this thesis to apply to 
these two case studies. Goodman and Jinks puts a great emphasis on international law 
and how international law influences states to promote human rights. Although their 
theory focuses on state’s interaction with various actors such as international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations, the theory attaches great weight to 
this interaction’s reference to international law standards. Hence, this theory can 
explain the change if there is a substantial interaction between state and the relevant 
actor if this actor uses international law arguments to convince the state to comply. 
This theory claims three distinct socialisation mechanisms that can have an impact on 
state behaviour: material inducement, persuasion and acculturation. The material 
inducement approach relies on material sanctions and rewards in its socialisation 
mechanism where states are forced to make cost-benefit calculations while making 
decisions of compliance or non-compliance. Persuasion, on the other hand, occurs 
through social learning where states are convinced of the truth or the validity of the 
norm that they need to comply with. A successful persuasion mechanism should be 
able to achieve a full internalisation of this norm by a state. Lastly, acculturation, 
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based on social psychological studies, puts a significant level of emphasis on the 
relationship to a reference group. States adopt the behavioural norms of their 
reference group due to the desire to be associated with this group. This can occur 
through cognitive and social pressures imposed by the reference group, such as 
shaming non-compliant state behaviour or providing benefits of conformity for a 
compliant state. The acculturated state shows public conformity rather than private 
acceptance of international human rights standards. By choosing this theory to 
examine its effectiveness to explain the change in these two countries, the research 
aimed to bring a deeper understanding of what triggered the decision to comply with 
international human rights standards regarding immigration detention of children. 
There are certain standards for immigration detention in general provided by 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights. These conventions set the basis for immigration detention while 
preventing arbitrary detention. Bodies established under these Conventions’ 
mandates, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) or Human Rights 
Committee, interpreted immigration detention in their judgments and decisions on a 
case-by-case basis. However, there are more specific standards set for detention of 
minors for immigration purposes. The main element of these standards emerges from 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the judgments of the ECtHR. Although 
this Convention does not ban detention of minors, it points out three important 
principles in relation to detention of minors. The first principle is that the best 
interests of the child principle should be applied by decision makers in policies and 
legislation regarding children. The second one, particularly on detention practice, is 
that detention should be used only as a measure of last resort. The last one is that 
detention shall be only used for the shortest appropriate period of time. In addition to 
this, there are several General Comments published by the Committee under this 
Convention’s mandate. These General Comments provided standards that should be 
met at the detention centres such as access to education, recreational and play 
facilities. In addition to these, the judgments of the ECtHR pointed out the need for 
detention centres that are suitable for children’s needs. 
This research found that these standards do not amount to a clear-cut ban on 
detention of minors. These conventions do not rule out deprivation of liberty in 
relation to immigration detention. They explicitly allow detention in the context of 
immigration proceedings. They only establish certain minimum standards for this 
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practice. Hence, detention of minors would be allowed if the policy or legislation on 
this practice follows international standards. Apart from that, the aforementioned 
principles do not carry explicit language in terms of limiting the detention of minors. 
The wording of these principles has a permissive tone. For instance, the wording 
regarding the shortest appropriate period of time does not set a clear time limit and is 
open to interpretation by decision-makers. This vagueness and subjective element in 
these principles regarding detention of minors allowed the authorities to claim their 
compliance with international human rights standards despite problematic practices. 
This also made legal arguments against immigration detention of minors weak and 
easily refutable. 
Keeping in mind these principles, in order to answer the central research 
question of finding the underlying factors behind the move towards compliance, this 
thesis captured and analysed different domestic or international dynamics that had the 
potential to be influential on the UK’s and Turkey’s history of compliance. This 
included a detailed examination of the UK’s and Turkey’s historical developments, 
law and policy changes. This study also made an original distinction between 
different types of influence that can be achieved over decision-makers. It has 
identified potential influences and analysed them under sections called judicial 
influence, influence of official state and supranational agencies, and civil society 
influence. Judicial influence refers to relevant case law derived from national and 
international courts in relation to immigration detention. Influence of official state and 
supranational agencies include domestic and international monitoring bodies’ 
reaction. This categorisation of influences, which was not provided by the theory, 
systematised different types of influences and allowed a clearer analysis.  
I. TURKEY 
Turkey, one of the case studies in this research, had three important phases in terms of 
its immigration law. The first period before 1994 was a period with only limited 
progress on general immigration management. For the purposes of this research, the 
most important development in Turkey’s immigration law during this period was the 
1950 Law on Foreigners’ Residency and Movement. This law brought the 
establishment of guesthouses for asylum seekers in Turkey. This establishment was 
the start of the practice of holding asylum seekers in a confined facility in Turkey. 
Following this legislation, in 1983 this period also saw a directive on the guesthouses 
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in relation to the facilities provided in these places. These developments were the 
seeds of the detention practice in Turkey’s immigration law.  
The second period under focus in this research was the period between 1994 
and 2001. One major development during this time was the 1994 Asylum Regulation. 
It was significant in the sense that it brought a certain level of structure to Turkey’s 
immigration management system. This regulation relocated decision-making powers 
in relation to status determination from the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees to the Ministry of Interior Affairs. This relocation of power showed the 
Government’s controlling approach towards asylum and immigration during this 
period.  
Although the introduction of new legislation and policies into this area was 
very much needed and significant during these two periods, it was clear that there was 
a lack of criticism from domestic or international groups concerning immigration 
detention. There were not any recorded monitoring reports that referred to detention 
of minors or immigration detention. Since Goodman and Jinks’ theory relies on a 
presence of interaction among states and other influential groups for socialisation 
mechanisms to occur, there was not any basis to apply the theory throughout these 
two periods. This lack of interaction on this topic, however, had an impact on the 
progress made in immigration management system in Turkey. For instance, the 
policies and legislation that were passed during this period did not carry any human 
rights-oriented approach. This can be mostly related to the lack of inputs from 
national or international actors. Most progress in the immigration law and policies 
were derived from the basic need to control the influx of immigration and asylum 
applications. Without any criticism from different actors towards the Government’s 
decisions, this need to control immigration led government officials to act on this 
issue with an authoritarian approach without any human rights concerns or 
sensitivities. This also demonstrated the perspective of the decision-makers towards 
asylum and immigration in general. They preferred to choose a stricter way to deal 
with these issues in the absence of guidance. 
On the other hand, the most recent period in Turkey’s immigration law, which 
started after 2001, has seen several circulars in order to bring a more accountable 
structure in relation to return centres and unaccompanied minors. These circulars 
were the first steps towards new and extensive immigration legislation that was 
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accepted in Parliament on 4 April 2013.882 This law is remarkable in terms of the 
reform it brought to Turkey’s immigration management system. It introduced clear 
provisions about administrative detention, set a time limit for detention and adopted 
the best interests of the child principle. This thorough immigration law was a 
meaningful step towards Turkey’s compliance with international human rights 
standards at the legislative level as it included international protection elements that 
are required for detention of minors such as the best interests of the child principle. 
This important period after 2001 was the phase in which several different 
actors interacted with Turkey, unlike during the first two periods. To start with, 
Turkey’s candidacy application to the European Union (EU) put a spotlight on 
Turkey’s immigration management system at the international level. Hence, the most 
important actor during this period was certainly the EU. The close-knit relationship 
between Turkey and the EU resulted in several documents, reports and action plans to 
improve Turkey’s immigration management system. Turkey’s national plan and 
programmes were highly influenced by the EU’s concerns, such as border controls 
and the establishment of reception and removal centres. Turkey’s immigration 
management system has changed immensely and adopted several principles from the 
EU’s vision for Turkey since its application to join the EU.  
The EU frequently revised Turkey’s Accession Partnership document as part 
of the membership process. These documents set up the targets that Turkey needed to 
reach in relation to its immigration management. According to these targets, Turkey 
wrote national programmes that included timetables for legislative alignment with EU 
legislation. This was an important indication of the EU’s direct influence on Turkey’s 
immigration law. The most concrete step taken by the Turkish Government was 
setting up a Development and Implementation Office on Asylum and Migration 
Legislation and Administrative Capacity (Asylum and Migration Bureau) in 2008. 
This was a promise given to the EU to establish a common unit for asylum and 
migration. This office, under the Ministry of the Interior, was the first institutional 
step on the way to an extensive immigration law. This Bureau was appointed to carry 
out studies, projects and analysis on legislative and administrative structure in line 
with the National Action Plan on asylum and migration and national programmes. 
                                                
882 Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu [Law on Foreigners and International Protection] 2013, 
No: 6458. 
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There were also twinning projects where the EU officials trained Turkish 
officials on topics such as asylum and human trafficking for capacity building. In 
addition to this, the EU funded most of the projects regarding immigration and 
asylum in Turkey. For instance, while the establishment of expulsion centres have 
twenty million euros budget, three quarters of the budget was from the EU funding.883 
Hence, the character of the relationship between these two actors was not only at the 
mentoring level but also financial level. This demonstrated the EU’s clear desire to 
ensure that changes were made to Turkey’s immigration management system in the 
way that the EU preferred.   
In addition to these Accession Partnership documents and national 
programmes, the EU progress reports were another main means of interaction 
between the EU and Turkey. The EU progress reports, dating back to 1998, showed 
appreciation when there was progress in Turkey’s immigration management system. 
On the other hand, the reports were critical in the times in which no progress was 
made regarding the immigration system. On the specific issue of immigration 
detention, the EU’s approach in these reports was critical of the conditions of the 
removal centres, yet appreciative for the establishment of reception and removal 
centres.  
This research suggested that the progress made in Turkey’s immigration 
legislation after 2001 has taken its inspiration from the EU. For instance, the 
Preamble of the new immigration legislation made strong references to the EU’s 
impact within this law-making process. Debates at several different parliamentary 
Commissions 884  such as the Human Rights Commission and the parliamentary 
debates also mentioned the desire for harmonisation with the EU on this issue. This 
desire was also mentioned in the interviews conducted for this research. 
Whilst reading these dynamics through the lens of the selected theory, it was 
clear that material inducement, persuasion and acculturation, the three socialisation 
mechanisms recognised by Goodman and Jinks, all played a significant role in the 
interaction between the EU and Turkey under the influence of supranational agencies. 
Firstly, the socialisation process with the EU started with Turkey’s interests in the 
potential rewards that the EU membership could bring, such as free trade and free 
movement. The Government was on a mission to comply with the EU’s demands for 
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884 See footnote 346. 
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an immigration management system in return for better trading opportunities. This 
brought rapid progress in terms of changes in immigration management system. On 
the other hand, the EU’s clear message to Turkey was to have better border controls 
and more capacity at removal centres to stop flows of migrants. While Turkey used 
this candidacy process to obtain material rewards, the EU used the potential EU 
membership card with Turkey in order to secure better border controls.  
Apart from the material rewards of EU membership, an ideology of 
Westernism played an important role in Turkey’s decisions towards compliance. This 
ideology puts a great emphasis on how the West’s positive perspective towards 
Turkey could give Turkey a more dominant role in the international realm. This 
dominant role does not only mean economically but also politically. Along with this 
belief, Turkey’s reference group can be seen as the EU under the acculturation 
approach. This brought the desire to be associated with the EU in order to have the 
benefits of conformity with a reference group, such as being a dominant actor in the 
international arena. Although Turkey’s motivation was material in the first place, this 
was followed by the acculturation approach. The ideology of Westernism certainly 
strengthened this interaction between the EU and Turkey. In addition to this, 
combined with the constant exposure to human rights discourse, the involved actors 
started to show public conformity with the EU’s values concerning immigration. It is 
more likely that acculturation occurred as a by-product of the material inducement 
approach in Turkey. Although material inducement and acculturation are the two 
main socialisation mechanisms here, persuasion also played a limited role. The 
findings showed that the group that drafted new legislation worked on the EU 
legislation continuously. This could achieve the social learning that is recognised 
under the persuasion approach.  
In addition to the EU’s involvement as an international actor after 2001, there 
were some other international actors that had some potential political influence on the 
Turkish Government. The Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, European Commission on Racism and Intolerance and 
Parliamentary Assembly submitted their recommendations and criticisms in relation 
to Turkey’s immigration management system. These agencies all criticised the 
security-oriented approach of the Turkish authorities in its immigration and asylum 
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management and the conditions of the immigration removal centres. However, it was 
very difficult to find out what kind of impact these institutions had on the 
Government’s law-making process as they were not mentioned in the parliamentary 
debates, the parliamentary Commission debates or the interviews. This can be related 
to the lack of leverage that these institutions have over Turkey. While the EU 
promised a membership to a transnational network with several economic and 
political benefits, these institutions were not in a position to pledge any benefits.  
Another point of influence during this last period within Turkey’s immigration 
law was the judiciary at the international level as there has been a lack of relevant 
domestic case law regarding immigration detention to this date. Since Turkey ratified 
the European Convention of Human Rights and accepted the optional clause to 
recognise the ECtHR and accept individual complaints procedures, this ECtHR’s 
judgments were the main elements of this influence. Starting from 2009, Turkey 
received several judgments stating that Turkey’s immigration law did not provide 
basic protections to immigration detainees and asylum seekers as it lacked clear legal 
provisions establishing the procedure for ordering and extending detention for 
deportation proceedings. Hence, within a very short amount of time, Turkey faced 
more than 12 cases that ended in the applicants’ favour, requiring that the 
Government pay monetary compensation to the victims. This series of judgments 
were seen as damaging to Turkey’s reputation by the Turkish Government. The 
ECtHR’s influence far exceeded its potential legal impact on a state. It also created 
reputational damage for Turkey due to its important position in the European context 
and the level of importance given to this body by Turkey. The interviewees for this 
research all mentioned how government officials sought to prevent these judgments 
from the ECtHR. The members of the law-drafting group mentioned that they visited 
the judges in Strasbourg in order to do what was required in new legislation to prevent 
further judgments. In the parliamentary Commission and parliamentary debates, these 
judgments were a clear source of frustration and there was an urgent need to deal with 
the issues pointed out by the ECtHR in order to stop the embarrassment rather than 
simply to prevent the monetary consequences of these judgments. This was echoed in 
the interviews conducted for this research, and in parliamentary and Commission 
debates.  
Hence, it can be stated that the second significant socialisation process 
occurred between Turkey and the ECtHR. Since the judgments of the ECtHR 
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damaged Turkey’s reputation in the international realm, it was obvious that the 
Government decided to draft the new law to prevent further reputational damage. 
Although there was a material consequence for Turkey in these judgments, such as 
monetary compensation to be paid to victims, this was never the concern in the eyes 
of the Government. This, again, can be related to the strong ideology of Westernism 
in Turkey. To be seen as a non-compliant actor by the West can have significant costs 
in terms of Turkey’s place in international realm, according to this ideology. For that 
reason, it is hard to say this socialisation between Turkey and the ECtHR was a type 
of material inducement despite the fact that Turkey had to pay a significant amount in 
compensation to victims. Instead, the findings suggested that the series of judgments 
created a strong feeling of embarrassment in Turkey. This is a clear indication of the 
acculturation approach where a state prefers to conform to the reference group’s 
position to that particular issue in order to lessen the degree of psychological costs of 
non-conformity. Seeing the ECtHR as one of the reference groups in the European 
context led Turkey to act on new legislation that could prevent further criticism from 
the ECtHR. Finally, persuasion was also present to a limited extent where the law-
drafting group had meetings with the judges in Strasbourg in order to ensure what was 
needed to fill the gap in the legislation. This can be seen as social learning under the 
persuasion approach.  
Finally, due to the low numbers of NGOs working on this issue in Turkey, the 
Government was not under a great pressure from civil society unlike in the UK. In 
this period, there were only a few civil society reports on the guesthouses of Turkey 
and unaccompanied minors. Although civil society was included during the 
discussion of the Bill at Parliamentary Commission meetings, the interviewees 
concluded that there was no reference to civil society reports during the law-drafting 
process. Since Goodman and Jinks’ theory relies on socialisation occurring between 
states and other influential groups, this lack of socialisation on this front made it 
impossible for the application of the theory in this instance.  
Hence, the theory had high explanatory power in relation to this case study as 
Turkey’s case study provided a good fit with the selected theory. While it is evident 
that acculturation was present in the relationship between the ECtHR and the EU, 
material inducement was the initiating factor for the EU’s socialisation with Turkey. 
Furthermore, persuasion was present at a limited level through social learning as 
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Turkey was in an information exchange with the EU and the ECtHR. Although this 
thesis focuses on detention of children for immigration purposes, in Turkey’s case 
study there was not much reference to children. Since previous Turkish immigration 
legislation lacked international protection elements, much needed to be done during 
the law-making process. Hence, in terms of detention of minors, it is recognisable so 
far that detention of children for immigration purposes was a tiny detail in the bigger 
picture of the immigration management system. For that reason, there was no 
particular focus on children by the institutions involved in this process.   
Another observation of this research was that there was no resistance from the 
opposition parties regarding this legislation in the Parliamentary Commission and 
parliamentary debates. The lack of informed public opinion on issues such as 
immigration statistics, asylum applications or detention of children in Turkey before 
the Bill was passed helped the law makers to adopt international protection elements 
easily and without any concerns regarding loss of electoral support. However, the 
recently changing political landscape and the substantial numbers of refugees in 
Turkey has resulted in increased public awareness towards immigration issues. The 
polls showed that Turkish citizens are increasingly alarmed about competition in the 
employment market and rising crime rates in the regions where Syrian refugees 
live.885 If the Government had brought this Bill before Parliament only two years later 
than it was passed, the harmony in the Parliamentary Commission and Parliamentary 
debates might have been absent due to fear of loss of electoral support.  
II. THE UK 
Compared to Turkey, the UK has had long-standing legislation on immigration 
detention since the 1970s. While domestic law on power to detain did not differ much 
in time, the numbers of detention centres and detained people have gradually risen. 
For instance, the new policy of fast-track detention in 2000 brought a practice of 
detaining asylum seekers until a decision on their asylum application is made. This 
showed the shift in policy towards greater use of immigration detention. However, in 
2010, the Government announced its decision to end detention of minors for 
immigration purposes. This announcement was first followed by policy change and 
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later by legislative change. The Immigration Act 2014 brought in a restriction which 
only permitted the detention of families with children at pre-departure 
accommodation centres. It also limited the duration of detention of unaccompanied 
minors to a 24-hour period only. Here, with this legislation, the UK followed the 
principles of detention for the shortest appropriate period of time as a last resort at 
suitable detention centres.  
Up until the policy change in 2010, there was not any change in domestic 
legislation regarding immigration detention and the detention statistics were rising 
simultaneously. Hence, the UK faced criticisms and recommendations in relation to 
its detention practice from supranational agencies such as the Committee on Rights of 
the Child and the Human Rights Committee. The criticism from these bodies pointed 
out the large-scale use of power to detain children for immigration law enforcement. 
They also criticised the lengthy period of detention of minors and recommended the 
authorities stop detaining children. However, these criticisms were not given great 
weight as they were based on international law standards. As explained before, 
international human rights standards only provide principles to follow during 
detention of children, such as the shortest appropriate period of time or detention as a 
last resort. Hence, government officials easily challenged the criticism from these 
agencies by stating that detention of minors for immigration purposes is essentially in 
line with international law as long as detention policy carries certain protections that 
international law provides, such as judicial review and that the authorities follow 
these protections in practice. As an answer to these criticisms, government officials 
defended the policy of immigration detention in parliamentary debates for the sake of 
an efficient immigration control. Detention of children was depicted as a ‘regrettable 
but necessary’ measure to ensure effective immigration control and handle abuses in 
the asylum system. Due to the grey area in international human rights law regarding 
detention of children which was mentioned before, government officials were in a 
position to defend this practice if it was necessary.   
 When this socialisation between these international agencies and the 
Government was analysed with the help of Goodman and Jinks’ theory, it was clear 
that this criticism was not strong enough to create change in immigration policy or 
legislation. The parliamentary debates demonstrated that there was not much 
reference to supranational agencies’ recommendations and critiques.  Furthermore, 
there was a negative approach to some extent towards supranational agencies in 
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parliamentary debates. Their critique was almost avoided and not taken into account 
while discussing immigration detention in Parliament. Here, application of the theory 
to the interaction between these agencies and the Government could not draw any 
parallels between the theory and the case study. The compliance theory mainly 
focuses on how change can occur and analyses the socialisation between actors in the 
case of a change in state behaviour. While there was an attempt to change the UK’s 
way of using immigration detention, there was a lack of reaction from the 
Government as the other side of the interaction. Socialisation attempts by these 
agencies failed to create an impact.  
Supranational agencies were not the only ones that criticised this policy and 
practice. Additionally, official state agencies such as the Chief Inspector of Prisons 
and Joint Committee on Human Rights also published reports that denounced 
detention of children for immigration purposes. These agencies’ reports were part of 
the parliamentary debates in the discussions regarding detention policy and the bodies 
were mostly referred to as respectable institutions. Their outputs were mentioned not 
only by opposition party members but also government officials. This demonstrated 
that there was a desire to associate with these bodies’ opinions by Members of 
Parliament. There was also a clear intention to engage with these bodies, in contrast to 
the reaction towards the criticisms of supranational agencies.  
When Goodman and Jinks’ theory was applied to this socialisation between 
official state agencies and the Government, findings can suggest that official state 
agencies might be an important reference group to the Government. As the 
acculturation approach suggests that the reference group can use shaming and 
shunning to influence a state, these reports can be read as meaningful tools to make a 
change in the decision-maker’s perspective towards this policy. However, it is 
daunting to claim that this socialisation is purely present due to the acculturation 
approach as it was not as strong as Turkey’s socialisation with the EU and the 
ECtHR. The reason for these internal bodies’ capacity to make a change can also be 
linked to the close link between the members of these agencies and Members of 
Parliament. For instance, the members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights are 
Members of Parliament at the same time. On the other hand, the Chief Inspector of 
Prisons is appointed by the Justice Secretary. Although these bodies are independent 
bodies, they have undeniable links with Parliament. Nevertheless, these national 
bodies managed to receive a reaction from Members of Parliament in the discussions 
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about detention of minors. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that influential national 
institutions can play a fundamental role in change of policies towards compliance in 
stable democracies. Hence, this can tell us more about the success of official state 
agencies’ involvement. 
 In addition to this influence from monitoring bodies, it is significant to look at 
the case law to see whether there was any judicial influence behind compliance 
decisions. Despite several judgments of the ECtHR criticising Belgium’s immigration 
detention policy of minors, there were not any Court decisions against the UK’s 
detention policy for minors. Domestic courts and the ECtHR followed a non-
interventionist approach in the decisions regarding the UK’s detention policy. It was 
stated that the policy and legislation carried the protections that international human 
rights standards set, such as using detention as a last resort. For that reason, there was 
no meaningful push from the judgments to push the decision-makers to change the 
detention policy. This non-interventionist approach reflects the context where there 
was a lack of clear-cut prohibition coming from international human rights 
conventions. Hence, as long as these protection elements, such as ban on arbitrary 
detention and using detention as a last resort, were provided by the policy and 
legislation, the courts followed a permissive attitude towards UK’s detention policy in 
terms of lawfulness. When the compliance theory is applied to the judicial influence 
component, there was no meaningful judicial criticism in relation to this policy. This 
lack of criticism made it difficult to apply the theory as there was not any message 
which called for a change in policy from case law. Hence, this influence did not act as 
a factor within the theory.  
Last but not least, the UK was under scrutiny by civil society and non-
governmental organisations. There was wide criticism by organisations such as Bail 
for Immigration Detainees, Save the Children and the Children’s Society. These 
organisations submitted reports and case studies in order to show that the 
justifications of the Government for using this measure were wrong. These reports 
demonstrated that the standards provided by international law such as detention for 
the shortest appropriate time as a last resort at detention centres that are suitable for 
children were not followed in practice although they were included in the detention 
policy. They also initiated public campaigns to raise awareness regarding detention of 
children. During their public campaigns, their main argument was whether detaining 
children and families was morally right. For that reason, their strategy differed from 
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the international and official state agencies in the way that they used a moral and 
ethical argument instead of a legal one depending on international human rights 
standards. This was significantly more powerful in mobilising and raising awareness 
amongst the public. Furthermore, it became harder for government officials to defend 
and justify this practice when being asked the simple ethical question of whether 
detaining children is right or wrong. In contrast, when criticism was levelled on the 
basis of international law, it was much easier for the Government to use international 
law as a tool to justify this policy due to the permissive character of international 
human rights standards. Furthermore, civil society campaigners’ close work with the 
Liberal Democrats as a party and its leader, Nick Clegg, starting from prior to the 
2010 election, helped with the success of these campaigns as the Conservative Party 
formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats after the 2010 election. 
Due to being part of the Government, Nick Clegg’s commitment to end detention of 
minors resulted in quick actions towards changing the UK’s policy.  
Applying the compliance theory to this interaction between civil society and 
the Government demonstrated that civil society influence did not produce any parallel 
elements with Goodman and Jinks’ theory. While the selected compliance theory 
relies heavily on international law arguments, civil society campaigns prioritised the 
ethical argument more than the legal argument. Although it is challenging to find any 
parallel themes with this theory, it is still significant to understand the impact of civil 
society in depth as the change in policy happened following these campaigns. Sikkink 
and Keck’s analysis of how civil society can force policy change was adopted in this 
thesis to achieve this further understanding. This analysis suggests that civil society 
uses different types of politics such as leverage or information politics to react non-
compliance in states. Here, civil society in this case study employed information, 
leverage and accountability politics to push decision-makers towards change. 
The reports produced credible information on how the detention of families 
was used in practice, and in so doing they achieved moral leverage that can be seen as 
leverage politics. Leverage politics also played a role when civil society campaigners 
called for a meeting three days before the 2010 election and hosted a debate involving 
the leaders of the major political parties. At this meeting, civil society campaigners 
asked these leaders whether they would commit to end child detention and received a 
positive answer. Following the election result, this commitment was used as part of 
the accountability politics in which these politicians were held accountable for their 
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commitment. Last but not least, by producing credible information that contradicted 
the Government’s claim of using detention of minors within the international 
standards, civil society used accountability politics to hold government officials 
accountable for their previous statements. The success of civil society here can also 
be analysed by the recognised fact that stable democracies with a strong domestic 
civil society are more likely to comply with international human rights law. It is clear 
that civil society played a fundamental role towards the change in the UK and this 
was achieved not through the socialisation mechanisms suggested by Goodman and 
Jinks. Hence, it was only be explained by alternative explanations.  
On a general note, applying the selected compliance theory to the UK’s case 
study was challenging due to lack of parallel themes between the case study and the 
theory’s implications. Goodman and Jinks’ theory heavily relies on international 
human rights law and the role of the institutions to use international law to influence 
non-compliant states. However, the UK’s case showed a distinct path to influence the 
Government separate from employing an international law argument. Since 
international law did not provide clear standards such as a set time limit regarding 
detention of minors, the criticism on the UK’s detention policy was weak and easily 
refuted. Hence, using an ethical argument created a platform to discuss this policy in 
order to change it.  Thereby, these findings can open up a new route to understand 
alternative ways of instigating change when international law only provides 
permissive and subjective standards. Criticism depending on international law is not 
necessarily the only way to push a state to compliance.  
Furthermore, the theory’s particular focus on a necessary socialisation 
mechanism led it to overlook the possibility of any circumstantial factors. Non-
inclusion of circumstantial factors in the theory caused a further mismatch between 
the theory and the UK’s case study. While it contributed to the understanding of the 
phenomenon, it failed to capture the whole reality. This case study has involved some 
circumstantial factors that influenced the decision to comply with international human 
rights standards. In the beginning, the need for a wider detention policy was a result 
of increasing numbers of asylum applications around the 1990s. This created a sense 
of crisis. However, during the following decade, there was a dramatic decrease in the 
numbers of asylum applications as mentioned in Chapter 4. This dramatic fall made 
detention policy not so necessary any longer as asylum applications were dealt in a 
timely manner. This circumstantial factor eased the sense of crisis in the eyes of the 
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Government. It was a very important factor behind the compliance decision which 
was not captured by the selected theory as the sole focus of the theory is on 
interaction among groups, institutions and states. In general, the long-established 
policy and law on immigration detention of children has shown change due to moral 
values and pragmatic needs at domestic level rather than references to international 
law for the UK’s case study. 
III. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
The most-different type of case selection for this study was based on these two very 
different countries having common features, such as practicing detention of minors 
and making a decision towards compliance despite being at different sides of the 
human rights spectrum. While Turkey is a relatively new democracy with a 
developing economy and an outsider to the EU club, the UK had a long-established 
democracy with a robust economy and the EU membership. The priorities towards 
human rights in their agenda can be described as being in different places. 
Nevertheless, they both practiced detention of children for immigration purposes for a 
long time and recently changed their legislation in a way that is compliant with 
international human rights standards on this issue. During this case selection, this 
study aimed to examine the underlying dynamics that led the compliance for these 
two different countries in order to reveal whether the reasoning for this move was also 
different or similar.  
To conclude, there are subtle differences between these two case studies 
although they produced the same result in the end. The compliance by these two 
Governments was achieved for different reasons and through different decision-
making processes. Turkey’s immigration management system lacked many basic 
elements such as legal provisions regarding deportation proceedings in the beginning. 
On the other hand, the UK has always had a very established immigration 
management system. For this reason, Turkey was in a position to draft new legislation 
from scratch. There were several gaps in the immigration management system in 
Turkey during the first two periods. Hence, the drafting of new legislation was open 
to guidance and influence from external sources. The UK, however, had had an 
immigration detention policy since the 1970s. The detention policy and legislation 
adopted human rights standards such as bail hearings. The legal framework was very 
structured. Hence, while Turkey did not need to change the pre-existing legislation as 
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there was none, the UK was asked to change the policy and legislation that had been 
in place since the 1970s. It was much easier for Turkey to adopt a thorough 
immigration management system and be inspired by international best practice in 
immigration management systems. For the UK, it was more difficult in the sense that 
they needed to limit the existing power of immigration authorities, such as setting a 
time limit for detention of children, in order to ensure the authorities were complying 
with international human rights standards.  
Furthermore, this difference between already having a structured immigration 
management system and starting from scratch demonstrated itself in the process. 
While Turkey was in a position to be criticised by the EU and the ECtHR in relation 
to this missing framework, the UK was not equally criticised by international agencies 
as the legislative framework provided certain rights such as bail hearings. The 
criticism in relation to the UK was not about the spirit of the policy but mostly about 
the authorities’ failure to follow the policy adequately.   
These two case studies also experienced different types of socialisation in the 
terms of the theory. In Turkey’s case, it can be seen that material inducement played 
an important role at the beginning due to a promise to be a part of the EU. The 
Government took several steps towards having thorough immigration management 
system in line with the EU membership process. Together with this, the constant flow 
of case law from the ECtHR pushed the Government to act on the lack of immigration 
legislation that covers particular human rights and international protection elements. 
Even though the judgments of the ECtHR resulted in monetary compensation that 
Turkey as a state had to pay to the victims, the reputational damage before the ECtHR 
and Europe as a wider community was referred to more often in parliamentary and 
Commission debates, when compared with monetary compensation. The importance 
of the EU and the ECtHR to Turkey as a reference group brought the elements of the 
acculturation approach into this case study. Furthermore, persuasion was also present 
at a certain level whilst Turkey was in an information exchange with the EU and the 
ECtHR. It can be seen that the socialisation which created an impact on compliance 
decision was very internationally oriented. This can be related back to Turkey’s 
position as a new democracy and a relative newcomer in Europe.  
On the other hand, the UK’s case showed limited, if any, socialisation at the 
international level. Although there have been a long period of receiving criticisms 
from supranational agencies regarding detention of children, subsequent governments 
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followed the same pattern such that the criticism of supranational agencies were not 
taken into consideration. On the contrary, the ECtHR’s approach to the UK’s 
detention policy was almost permissive as the policy covered the required protections. 
The UK Governments were able to use the ECtHR’s approach to justify this policy. 
Hence, international dynamics were either not taken into account or used for 
protection of the policy. On the contrary, socialisation at the domestic level was more 
dominant.  Official state agencies and civil society’s involvement and criticism 
created the necessary pressure on the Government to change its child detention policy 
and legislation. The parliamentary debate paid a significant level of attention to these 
reports and campaigns. Intensive socialisation at the domestic level compared to the 
socialisation at international level in Turkey can be explained by the UK being an 
established democracy and having influential formal and informal national 
institutions.  
While looking into to what extent the involved groups or agencies made an 
impact on decision-makers, the parliamentary discussions were key to achieve this 
aim. In the UK’s case, parliamentary attention towards immigration detention of 
children was present. Hence, it was clear whether or not the involved actors were 
referred to within this parliamentary discussion about detention of minors. On the 
contrary, the parliamentary debate on immigration was lacking in Turkey’s case. The 
parliamentary discussion only briefly referred to this new law-making process. It was 
difficult to see which actors played a more substantial role through parliamentary 
discussions. However, the parliamentary Commission debates, where the draft of 
legislation was discussed, and interviews with the selected officials from the law-
drafting working group supported the analysis of the ECtHR and the EU as 
significantly influential actors, whilst bearing in mind the level of subjectivity of 
interviews as evidence. Also, the relationship between the ECtHR and Turkey through 
case law and EU and Turkey through the membership process was strong enough to 
see the elements of influence from these actors.  
 The two very different cases chosen for this study showed very different paths 
to compliance in parallel with their differences as states. While material inducement 
followed by acculturation played an important role in Turkey’s case, the UK’s case 
showed parallel elements with the theory only regarding socialisation with official 
state agencies. It was also not a direct impact in the UK’s case and the process 
involved circumstantial dynamics such as the drop in asylum numbers and a change 
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of perception towards asylum. Turkey’s position, as mentioned before, as an outsider 
and being relatively new democracy with a developing economy, provided a platform 
for material inducement to play a deeper role followed by acculturation. On the other 
hand, the UK as a long-established member of the European environment with a long 
history of democracy paid more attention to domestic criticism. This gave an 
opportunity to civil society organisations and official state agencies to push the state 
towards compliance. However, the difference between these two case studies was 
evident in terms of being open to influence and taking international criticism into 
account. While Turkey was in a position to accept criticism and comply with this 
feedback in return for the reward of EU membership and improved reputation in 
relation to immigration law, the UK was not as easily influenced by international 
groups. Rather, national actors played a more influential and fundamental role in the 
UK’s case. This showed that the UK and Turkey had different attitudes towards 
supranational agencies. Furthermore, Goodman and Jinks’ theory is predicated on the 
assumption that international law is a prominent behaviour modifier. The theory 
suggests that actors refer and employ international law in their arguments to 
encourage states to comply. In Turkey’s case, actors that used international law in 
their arguments managed to create an impact towards compliance. On the other hand, 
the UK’s case demonstrated that actors that used moral argument succeeded in their 
efforts to promote compliance unlike actors that used international law in their 
arguments. Hence, while the theory was effective to explain the change in Turkey, it 
failed to prove a good fit for the UK’s case.  
Revealing the factors that led to the decision of compliance in these two 
countries is very important in the sense that it provides an insight on how to push the 
Governments to make a compliance decision. This demonstrates that there are 
different sensitivities in these two chosen countries. To sum up the general findings, 
this research showed that using an international law-based argument to influence 
decision-maker’s perceptions towards one particular policy might not work if a state 
is not open to socialisation with that particular actor. Furthermore, compliance 
decisions might not be only taken for the sake of compliance, but for different 
rewards or expectations. Nonetheless, it is still paramount to acknowledge what type 
of factors can push these states to show compliance. If relevant groups such as civil 
society or official state agencies of a particular country know how they can push the 
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decision-makers to change their policies and legislation in relation to different topics, 
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Appendix 1. Interview Questions 
1. Could we please talk about your work on ending detention of minors for 
immigration purposes between 2010 and 2015?  
2. What types of arguments were raised during these discussions involving child 
detention for immigration law enforcement? Why did they think that they need 
to change this law?  
Did the UK's international human rights treaty obligations played any role? 
To what extent was public opinion taken into account?  
Was there any emphasis on treaty bodies’ country reports and UN Human 
Rights Committee concluding observations of the UK? 
Any emphasis on NGOs’ reports?  
3. Have you involved in any active work related to this issue outside Parliament? 
Ex. Committee or NGO negotiations, Home Office ministers and officials?  
4. (If involved in extra parliamentary activities) What types of arguments were 
raised during these extra-parliamentary discussions involving child detention 
for immigration law enforcement? 
Shaming?  
Did the UK's international human rights treaty obligations played any role? 
To what extent was public opinion taken into account?  
Was there any emphasis on treaty bodies’ country reports and UN Human 
Rights Committee concluding observations of the UK? 
NGOs’ reports?  
5. Do you consider that Parliament members were persuaded that detention of 
minors for immigration purposes is a morally wrong practice after 2010 when 
the internal guidance of UK Border Agency was passed?  
6. Overall, child detention has not been completely banned; there are still 
exceptional circumstances defined in 2014 Immigration Act to allow this 
practice. Why was there this type of compromise instead of fully banning this 
practice?  
7. Do you think it is essential to put it into law? Why was this extra step taken in 
2014 Immigration Act? Did this bring any costs?  
8. Were you disappointed that critics still said children are being detained even 
after 2010’s commitment?  
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9. Why do you think it was and still is challenging to secure parliamentary 
support in favour of legislation to prohibit detaining minors without any 
exceptional circumstances?  
 
Interview Questions (Turkish) 
1. Bildiginiz uzere, Turkiye yeni bir yabancilar kanunu gecirerek gocmen 
cocuklarin gozalti kosullarina dair yeni maddeler getirdi ve uluslararasi insan 
haklari normlarina uyumluluk sagladi. Bu kanunun gorusmeleri sirasinda siz 
de Komisyon toplantilarinda yer aldiniz. Ben bu surecin nasil gelistigini ve 
turkiye'nin neden uyum saglama kararligini gosterdigini arastiriyorum. Sizinde 
katildiginiz bu komisyon toplantilarinda ne gibi tartismalar oldu? Hangi 
dinamikler ya da gerekceler one suruldu partiler tarafindan? 
2. Turkiye'nin imzalamis oldugu uluslararasi antlasmalardan dogan 
yukumlulukleri tartismada yer aldi mi? Avrupa birligi'ne uyum sureci mi? 
Kamuoyunun dusuncesi herhangi bir rol oynadi mi? Ya da Turkiye'nin BM 
Insan Haklari sonuc gozlemleri? Sivil toplum kuruluslarinin raporlari? 
3. Cocuk gozaltisi ve gocmen gozaltisina dair komisyon disi toplantilarda da yer 
aldiniz mi? Mesela sivil toplum toplantilari? Buralarda ne tarz argumanlar one 
cikti? Turkiye'nin imzalamis oldugu uluslararasi antlasmalardan dogan 
yukumlulukleri tartismada yer aldi mi? AB uyum sureci? Kamuoyunun 
dusuncesi herhangi bir rol oynadi mi? Ya da Turkiye'nin BM Insan Haklari 
sonuc gozlemleri? Sivil toplum kuruluslarinin raporlari? 
4. Turkiye'nin uluslararasi normlara uyum sureci sizce zorunlu mu yoksa istege 
bagli bir surec miydi? 
5. Turkiye'deki gocmenlere dair bakis acisinin cok bilinir konusulur olmasinin 
sebebini neye bagliyorsunuz? 
6. Sizce Turkiye parlamentosu bu kanunu gecirirken bu yukumlulukleri yerine 
getirebilecegine inaniyor muydu? 




Appendix 2. Consent Form 
       
    Consent Form  
 
Title of study: Detention of minors in the United Kingdom and Turkey as an immigration policy: 
Assessing the Predictive Value of Human Rights Compliance Theory 
 
Please initial box 
 
1. I agree to take part in the above City University London research project. I 
have had the project explained to me, and I have read the participant 
information sheet, which I may keep for my records.  
 
I understand this will involve: 
• being interviewed by the researcher 
• allowing the interview to be audiotaped 
• completing questionnaires asking me about immigration law 
• making myself available for a further interview should that be required 
 
2. This information will be held and processed for the following purpose(s): The 
researcher’s Phd Thesis 
 
 
I understand that I will be given a transcript of data concerning me for my 
approval before it is included in the write-up of the research. 
 
 
I understand that I have given approval for my name and/or the name of my 
village/community, and/or the name of my workplace to be used in the final 





5.  I would like to keep my details anonymous in this research.   
6. I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to 
participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of 
the project without being penalized or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
7. I agree to City University London recording and processing this information 
about me. I understand that this information will be used only for the 
purpose(s) set out in this statement and my consent is conditional on the 
University complying with its duties and obligations under the Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
8.   
My employer has given consent to my participation in this study on these 
terms. 
 





____________________ ____________________________ _____________ 
Name of Participant  Signature    Date 
 
 
__________  ____________________________ _____________ 
Name of Researcher Signature    Date 
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Participant Information Sheet 
 
Title of study: Detention of minors in the United Kingdom and Turkey as an 
immigration policy: Assessing the Predictive Value of Human Rights Compliance 
Theory 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether you 
would like to take part it is important that you understand why the research is being done and 
what it would involve for you. Please take time to read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would 
like more information. 
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
The study is part of my PhD degree in Law. The research looks for the factors that influenced 
the historical record on compliance with human rights standards regarding detention of 
minors for immigration purposes in the United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey. In order to be able 
to answer this research question, the thesis should capture different historical domestic or 
international dynamics that had the potential be influential on the UK and Turkey’s history of 
compliance. Furthermore, the research asks whether the historical records on compliance of 
the UK and Turkey are adequately explicable through Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks’ 




Why have I been invited? 
You have been invited to participate in this research because of your experience in law 
making process and information on child detention practices in the United Kingdom.  
 
 
Do I have to take part?  
Participation in the project is voluntary, and you can choose not to participate in part or all of 
the project. You can withdraw at any stage of the project without being penalised or 
disadvantaged in any way. 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be 
asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason. You could ask for a consent from your institution if needed.  
 
What will happen if I take part?  
• You will participate in an interview.  
• The research will end by the end of 2017.  
• You will meet the researcher once or twice.  
• The meetings will last in around an hour.  
• It will involve a semi-structured interview.  
• The research is a part of the researcher’s PhD degree in law.  
 
What do I have to do?  




What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Contributing to the current literature. 
 
What will happen when the research study stops?  
The data you have provided will be used in the PhD thesis.  
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
• Research supervisors and researchers will have access to the data.  
• Data could be based on audio recording. 
• Personal information, if allowed, could be used in the dissertation. 
 
• The data will be restored in the researcher’s files.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
Thesis as a whole or some chapters of thesis could be published in the future. Anonymity, if 
asked by participants, will be maintained at all times. Participants will get a copy of thesis if 
they request one after the interview/questionnaire.   
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
The participant is free to withdraw from the study without an explanation or penalty at any 
time. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you would like to complain about any aspect of the study, City University London has 
established a complaints procedure via the Secretary to the University’s Senate Research 
Ethics Committee. To complain about the study, you need to phone 020 7040 3040. You can 
then ask to speak to the Secretary to Senate Research Ethics Committee and inform them 
that the name of the project is the detention of undocumented children in the UK and Turkey 
as an immigration policy: Problems and Alternatives 
 
You could also write to the Secretary at:  
Anna Ramberg 
Secretary to Senate Research Ethics Committee  
Research Office, E214 
City University London 
Northampton Square 




Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been approved by City University London Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Further information and contact details 




Prof Daniel Wilsher –  
Dr Carmen Draghici -  
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet.   
 257 
Appendix 4. Ethics Approval Letter 
 
 LREC14002 Pina Canga approval letter 
 
 
The City Law School 
City University London 
London EC1V 0HB 
24th October 2014 
 
Dear Miss Canga, 
 
Reference: LREC14002 
Project title: The detention of undocumented children in the UK and Turkey as an immigration 
policy: Problems and Alternatives 
 
I am writing to confirm that the research proposal detailed above has been granted ethical 
approval by the City Law School.  
 
Period of approval 
Approval is valid for a period of three years from the date of this letter. If data collection runs 
beyond this period you will need to apply for an extension using the Amendments Form. 
 
Project start date: 1st November 2014 
Project end date: 30th June 2017 
Date end of project report due: 30th September 2017 
 
Project amendments 
You will also need to submit an Amendments Form if you want to make any of the following 
changes to your research: 
 (a) Recruit a new category of participants 
 (b) Change, or add to, the research method employed 
 (c) Collect additional types of data 
 (d) Change the researchers involved in the project 
 
Adverse events 
You will need to submit an Adverse Events Form, copied to the Secretary of the Senate 
Research Ethics Committee ( ), in the event of any of the following:  
 (a) Adverse events 
 (b) Breaches of confidentiality 
 (c) Safeguarding issues relating to children and vulnerable adults 
 (d) Incidents that affect the personal safety of a participant or researcher 
Issues (a) and (b) should be reported as soon as possible and no later than 5 days after the 
event. Issues (c) and (d) should be reported immediately. Where appropriate the researcher 
should also report adverse events to other relevant institutions such as the police or social 
services. 
 
Should you have any further queries then please do not hesitate to get in touch. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
                                                
 
Peter Aggar     Professor Daniel Wilsher 
Research Manager    Ethics Director 
Email:   Em   
